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Abstract 
 
 
In this research the law making power of the Iranian parliament is studied at two 
levels: Firstly, the power of the parliament according to the Constitution is explored. 
Secondly its power in real politics is analysed. It is shown that the law making power of 
the parliament as an elected institution can be limited by the unelected institutions 
which are enshrined in the Constitution. Also the political composition of the elected 
institutions (parliament and executive) whether they are Conservative-dominated or 
Reformist-dominated, can define the actual law making power of the parliament. It is 
concluded that the law making power of the parliament oscillates on a spectrum: at one 
end there is a weak law making legislature and at the other end one can see a policy 
influencing legislature.   
The main content of the chapters is as follows: The first chapter is dedicated to 
introduction where the research questions and thesis methodology is explained. In the 
second chapter the most important literature, especially that which considers the 
external and internal variables and typology of legislatures, is reviewed. In the third 
chapter the historical evolution of the Iranian Parliament in the Qajar, First and Second 
Pahlavi Eras is briefly discussed. The fourth chapter is dedicated to the Iranian 
parliament in the Islamic Republic Era. The key concepts which can explain the logic of 
the distribution of power within the Iranian Constitution, the relationship of the 
parliament to the executive power (elected institution) and other power centres ( 
unelected institutions), and  the type of the political regime on the basis of the amended 
Constitution of 1989, is explained. Theoretical propositions are tested in chapter five. 
III 
 
The Sixth and Seventh terms of the parliament, where the political composition changed 
fundamentally from one to the other, are chosen for case study and their law making 
power during the budget process analysed. The dichotomy of elected and unelected 
institutions is applied to the case in this chapter. Then the contribution of the elected 
and unelected institutions during the budget process is explained. The next part of this 
chapter considers the Sixth Majlis and its political context in general. The Majlis and 
executive interactions and the interaction of these two elected institutions with the 
Guardian Council and Expediency Council especially during the budget process, are 
analysed. The same approach is deployed for the Seventh Majlis which in terms of 
political composition was in stark contrast to the Sixth Majlis. It is shown how the 
political composition of the elected and unelected institutions can increase or decrease 
considerably the law making power of the Islamic Consultative Assembly. The overall 
conclusion of the thesis is provided in chapter six.                              
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1. Aims and purposes of this research   
There is plenty of literature on the post revolutionary Iran and its political system but 
it rarely focuses on the parliament as the main target of study. Even in these exceptional 
cases, the legal approach dominates. Naturally in these kinds of studies, the emphasis is 
on the jurisdiction and authority of the parliament according to the Constitution and 
other relevant laws and regulations. What about the real politics? There are many 
dimensions of the Iranian Parliament which have not been covered by researchers at all. 
As already mentioned, apart from recent attempts, the Iranian Parliament has never been 
studied from a legislative studies perspective and as such is an unknown area of 
research. Therefore, a contribution to knowledge of the Iranian Parliament is one of the 
main aims of this research. 
Researchers who explain the Majlis from a legal perspective claim that, theoretically, 
the Iranian Parliament in comparison with the executive power should be one of the 
strongest players in the decision making process but the main object of this research is 
to test this claim in terms of real politics. It is said that “…the Islamic Republic of Iran 
is the world‟s only theocracy, a form of government in which ideally all laws are 
grounded in religion and express the will of God, and a clergy exercises supreme 
power” (Chehabi and Keshavarzian, 2008: 563). Now, the question is where the place of 
parliament (which constitutionally cannot be dissolved) is in Iran‟s theocratic 
government? How do the laws of God and the laws which are supposed to be created by 
the representatives of the people co-exist with each other? 
 In legislative studies, different external factors which impact upon the law making 
function of the parliament are enumerated. The constitution is one of very important 
variable which can define the power of the parliament. On the basis of Article 71 of the 
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Constitution, “…the Islamic Consultative Assembly can establish laws on all matters, 
within the limits of its competence as laid down in the Constitution”. If one reviews the 
Constitution, it is clear that the law making process is a very complicated process 
involving different institutions. From the date when the Iranian Parliament was 
established until the end of 2005, 11412 laws were enacted, of which 2176 laws were 
passed by the post revolutionary parliament (Ghorbani, 2006). They embrace many 
different and important public policy areas. Now the question is what is the contribution 
of the Majlis in this process? In this research the influence of the Iranian Constitution as 
an external variable on the law making power of the parliament will be examined.   
                     
2. Questions of this research 
2.1. Preliminary questions 
 
It might be said that Iran belongs to that group of countries trying to find their way 
toward democratic society. For introducing the current Iran, it is less vague to say that it 
is experiencing transitional democracy. The Constitutional movement in Iran started 
officially from 1906; however one might find the roots of this movement even sooner in 
Iranian history. Parliament has been established in Iran for more than one hundred years 
and except for a short time during which it was prevented to work, officially and 
consecutively has had important role in political activity.  
 As we will see in the following chapters, Iranian scholars and intellectuals obtain 
constitutional ideas from Western countries and then wish to establish them in Iran. 
Nevertheless, we need to know what appeared in Iran as a parliament and to what extent 
it was similar to its counterpart in the West.  Were some features left out or added to it? 
How was it merged with longstanding despotic government in Iran which had created 
especial characters for the Iranian political institutions? Can we explain that with the 
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method and principles and axioms which exist in the current literature of legislative 
studies? 
 These are serious questions and constitute a starting point for us in examining the 
Iranian legislature. As we noted, different societies have special kinds of political 
institutions which exist in harmony with their history, cultures, customs and even 
climates. Therefore we can find some similarities and some differences amongst them. 
When we want to use theories and principles for explaining the political institutions 
these differences should be considered.  
 For analysing the Iranian Parliament and understanding its functions and its 
importance within the political system first of all we need to understand the essence of 
political power since the establishment of modern government in the early twentieth 
century when the parliament was founded for the first time in Iran. Otherwise we may 
get a misleading picture of that if we simply apply the political theories to the current 
Iranian Parliament which are compatible mostly with European societies. As Katouzian 
(1997) put it, the essential difference between countries such as Iran and European 
democracies is a very important point which has been ignored in modern studies of the 
Iranian state and resulted in an unsatisfactory conclusion. In his point of view these 
differences “may be observed in the meaning and social implications of property 
ownership, social stratification and social mobility, the nature of the power of the state, 
and the questions of law, legitimacy, succession, rebellion and the like” (Ibid: 50). 
Katouzian believed that despite European societies in which their overall characteristics 
resulted in democratic government, in Iran social classes, aristocracy, and bourgeoisies, 
and so on have never existed and it is wrong to perceive the Iranian landlords and chiefs 
of the tribes and the like as aristocrats, merchants as bourgeoisies and peasants as serfs. 
So the overall political environment in Iran is very different to that of Western 
countries. That is why one cannot simply apply the legislative studies theories which are 
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applied in Western parliaments, to the Iranian Parliament. For instance, one may find 
some kinds of institutions such as a constitution, parliament, and executive power and 
so on in Iranian society but one should be cautioned that they are substantially different 
from their counterparts in European societies. So, the first step is to answer to this key 
question that to what extent they have similar structures and functions? Nevertheless, it 
does not mean that we cannot use the current theories which have been applied to study 
of Western legislatures. For instance, for assessing the law making power of the 
parliament in the current literature of legislature studies, often the relationship between 
executive and parliament is the central point. In fact the principle of the separation of 
powers has been accepted axiomatically. In this case the important question is which 
one has more power and therefore can influence law making process more? Whereas, 
due to the existence of some unique political institutions and especial perceptions of 
political power which has been articulated in the Iranian Constitution of 1979 and its 
amendment, it seems mere examining of the relationship of Majlis and executive in Iran 
is not enough for assessing the law making power of the Majlis. Another good example 
which shows the differences between European legislatures and the Iranian Parliament 
clearly is the relationship of the political parties and the legislature. Analysing the 
relationship of these two political institutions is very important for examining the law 
making power of the parliaments while, as we will explain in the following chapters, in 
post revolutionary Iran one may not find even one political party which resembles a 
party in European countries.  At the same time that we use those theories for explaining 
the case of Iran, we should consider its special characteristics. Amongst different factors 
(external and internal) which define the power of parliament in terms of law making 
capacity, the constitution is one of the most important. Usually the forms of the political 
regimes which define the nature of relationship between executive and parliament are 
expressed in that. Now the question is what does the Iranian political system look like 
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according to its constitution? How is the relationship between executive and legislature 
regulated?  
 
In this research we are going to assess the power of the parliament in three stages of 
the law making process: the initiation, or formulation, deliberation and enactment of 
bills and proposals. There are three institutions in the Iranian Constitution that are 
involved in all or some of these three aforementioned stages directly: 
Executive (elected institution): According to the Iranian Constitution the 
government‟s bills must be brought forward to parliament after approval by the cabinet. 
Now the question is to what extent parliament has power to impact on the governmental 
bills in these three stages? 
Guardian Council (unelected institution): According to Article 94 of Iranian 
Constitution “All legislation passed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly must be 
sent to the Guardian Council…” In Article 93 it is stated: “The Islamic Consultative 
Assembly does not hold any legal status if there is no Guardian Council in existence, 
except for the purpose of approving the credentials of its members and the election of 
the six jurists on the Guardian Council”. According to Article 91 “With a view to 
safeguarding the Islamic ordinances and the Constitution, in order to examine the 
compatibility of the legislation passed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly with 
Islam, a council to be known as the Guardian Council is to be constituted with the 
following composition: Six 'adil fuqaha' conscious of the present needs and the issues 
of the day, to be selected by the Leader, and six jurists, specializing in different areas 
of law, to be elected by the Islamic Consultative Assembly from among the Muslim 
jurists nominated by the Head of the Judicial Power.” (Who himself is appointed by 
the Religious Leader.) 
Regarding the crucial position of the Guardian Council the question is to what 
extent can it impact the law making power of the parliament in two stages of the law 
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making process: initiation and enactment? It is important to note that there are two 
different institutions here: parliament as an elected institution and the Guardian 
Council as an unelected institution. 
Expediency Council (unelected institution): According to Article 112 “upon the 
order of the Leader, the Nation's Expediency Council shall meet at any time the 
Guardian Council judges a proposed bill of the Islamic Consultative Assembly to be 
against the principles of Shari‟a or the Constitution, and the Assembly is unable to 
meet the expectations of the Guardian Council. Also, the Council shall meet for 
consideration on any issue forwarded to it by the Leader and shall carry out any other 
responsibility as mentioned in this Constitution. The permanent and changeable 
members of the Council shall be appointed by the Leader. The rules for the Council 
shall be formulated and approved by the Council members subject to the confirmation 
by the Leader”. 
 The question is:  to what extent can the Expediency Council as an unelected 
institution influence the law making power of the parliament in reality? 
 
2.2 Main question of the research 
 
As it was stated there are three important institutions which are directly related to 
law making power which is one of the main functions of the Majlis: the Executive as 
an elected institution, and the Guardian Council and Expediency Council as unelected 
institutions. To what extent can they impact upon the law making power of 
parliament? Which group has more influence on parliament and why? By answering 
these questions we should be able to assess the law making power of the parliament 
and categorise it according to legislative studies‟ typologies of legislatures. In this 
thesis the Iranian Parliament will be categorised according to the typology of 
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legislatures which is provided by Philip Norton (1990). Norton categorised law 
making power of the legislatures in three levels: 
a. policy making legislatures are those that can modify or reject measures 
submitted by the executive, and can formulate or substitute the policies of their own.  
b. policy- influencing legislatures are those that are able to modify or reject the 
measures submitted by the executive, but are not able to formulate or substitute their 
own policies. 
c. legislatures with little or no policy making power are those that can neither 
modify nor reject the policies which are submitted by the executive. Also these 
types of legislatures are not able to substitute their own policies.    
 
3. Hypotheses of the research 
 
 It may be said that the law making power of the parliament is subordinate to some 
unelected institutions mentioned in the Iranian Constitution. Depending on the political 
composition of the parliament and executive power - whether their majority is 
Conservative (or New Conservative) or Reformist the law making power of the 
parliament varies as follow: 
First hypothesis: Conservative or New Conservative executive power (elected 
institution) + Conservative or New Conservative parliament (elected institution) + 
Conservative Guardian Council (unelected institution) + Conservative Expediency 
Council (unelected institution) = parliament with strong law making power. 
Second hypothesis: Reformist executive power (elected institution)  +  parliament 
with Reformist majority (elected institution) + Conservative Guardian Council 
(unelected institution)  +  Conservative Expediency Council (unelected institution) =   
parliament with little or no law making power. 
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Third hypothesis: Reformist executive power (elected institution) + parliament 
(elected institution) with Conservative or New Conservative majority + Conservative 
Guardian Council (unelected institution) + Conservative Expediency Council 
(unelected institution) = parliament with strong law making power.  
Fourth hypothesis: Conservative or New Conservative executive power (elected 
institution) + parliament (elected institution) with Reformist majority + Conservative 
Guardian Council (unelected institution) + Conservative Expediency Council 
(unelected institution) = parliament with little or no law making power.   
In this research the law making process means three distinct stages: The first stage 
consists of initiation and formulation by the executive power preparing the bills; the 
Majlis contributes by introducing Members‟ proposals. The second stage is 
deliberation and enactment of bills and proposals which take place in the Majlis. And 
the third and final stages are where the Guardian Council and probably the Expediency 
Council intervene in the law making process.  
  In this research the law making process means the policy making process which is 
very familiar in terms of the legislative studies literature. But as we will see it might 
be confused with the policy making power of the Supreme Leader which is one of the 
main functions of the leadership institution. On the basis of Article 110, it is stated that 
the followings are the duties and power of Leadership:  
“1. Delineation of the General Policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran after consultation 
with the Expediency Council. … .” 
    Also it is noteworthy to say that, in this research, the Islamic Consultative Assembly, 
Majlis, legislature and the parliament means the main political institution which 
according to the Iranian Constitution has authority to make law. However, according to 
the Constitution, the Guardian Council is an inseparable part of the legislative power 
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but since we want to study its impact on the law making power in real politics these two 
institutions are distinguished.        
 
 4. Method of the research 
 
In this thesis different research methods are used which can be categorized as 
qualitative and quantitative research methods.  
In the second chapter, which is dedicated to a literature review, the main academic 
resources, including books and articles about the subject of the thesis is examined and at 
the end the most appropriate theory is adopted. Key reference resources on the typology 
of legislatures are overviewed. Also in this chapter the resources regarding developing 
countries legislatures are studied.   
In the third chapter the evolution of the Iranian Parliament over the course of one 
century through reliable academic and historical resources is explained. It seems that a 
historical perspective can offer a better insight of the subject matter through showing its 
origin and background, growth and development. Secondary sources including essays, 
books and articles based on primary resources are used in this chapter. However, it 
should be noted that the historical perspective of this chapter is just an overview and not 
an in-depth study of Iranian political history. The focus is on the events that have 
shaped the current characteristics of the Iranian Parliament and institutions which have 
influential links with the law making function of the parliament.        
In chapter four the power map of the Iranian political system is drawn normatively 
and the place of parliament within this framework is shown. In this chapter all functions 
and authorities of the parliament are described on the basis of the articles of the 
Constitution of 1979 and its amendment of 1989. In this stage of the research the formal 
power of the parliament is shown. Major academic sources are used. The main problem 
in this phase of the research was the language of the sources, in that most of them in this 
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regard are in Farsi language and for using them in this thesis they had to be translated 
into English which obviously took much time. Besides, there is very poor academic 
literature on those articles of the Iranian Constitution which relate to parliament‟s 
functions and its internal organisations both in the local language and in English.   
In chapter five, through an analytical approach the real law making power of the 
Iranian Parliament is assessed by considering the different aspects of its relationship 
with the unelected institutions which are involved in the law making process. In other 
words, in this chapter the real power of the parliament in the Iranian political system is 
compared with its formal power i.e. as stipulated in the Constitution and other relevant 
laws and regulations. For doing so the law making power of two different terms of 
Majlis in respect of the budget were chosen for case study and the hypotheses of the 
thesis tested by comparing the power of the Majlis in these two terms in which the 
political composition of the government and legislative power was different. Also the 
relationship of these two aforementioned institutions with unelected institutions i.e. 
Expediency Council and Guardian Council are analysed through descriptive statistics 
and an analysis of them. Information for this chapter was gathered in many different 
ways.    
Since the candidate was the researcher of the Majlis Research Centre there was an 
opportunity for him to see the many phases of the law making process personally and 
therefore some direct observations are used carefully. The major part for which this 
method was used was when the role of the Majlis Research Centre during the annual 
budget bill season was examined. There was also an opportunity for the candidate to 
participate in some specialized parliamentary Commission sessions as an expert on 
behalf of the Majlis Research Centre.  Candidate also had close contact with the Budget 
Office of the parliament during the budget season and chasing the parliamentary process 
of the annual budget bill especially in the Sixth Majlis. Therefore during the data 
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collection process, in addition to direct observation, Candidate could access original 
documents which were available in the Budget Office of the Majlis Research Centre.  
Furthermore, the internet resources including eBooks, and academic articles are 
employed in this research.    
Apart from observation and analysis of the statistical data of the research, which 
were gathered from documents published by the Iranian Parliament Publication, 
interviews with the MPs of the Sixth and Seventh Majlis and experts of the parliament‟s 
research centre were designed during the data collection process. In contrast to the 
second group, most of the parliamentarians, especially members of the Seventh Majlis, 
refused interviews with the excuse of shortage of time. Nevertheless some members of 
the Sixth and Seventh Iranian Parliament were interviewed by using the semi structured 
interview method. They included Seyed Mohammad Reza Khatami, First Deputy 
Speaker of the Sixth Majlis, Bijan Shahbazkhani, member of the Seventh Majlis, 
Ahmad Maidari, member of the Economy Commission of the Sixth Majlis, Reza 
Abdollahi member of the Budget Commission of the Seventh Majlis, Mohammad 
Bagher Bahrami, Chairman of the Internal Regulation Commission of Seventh Majlis, 
Rajab Ali Mazroei a member of the Economy Commission of the Sixth Majlis and Ali 
Ghanbari a member of the Plan and Budget Commission of the Seventh Majlis. Most of 
the aforesaid interviewees refused to answer some questions such as the relationship of 
the law making power of the Majlis and the Iranian political structure. Some of them 
who gave their ideas about that asked the interviewer to delete their answers from the 
interview.  Most of them only preferred to talk about the technical aspect of the work of 
the parliament. Also much practical procedure was known through interview with Ali 
Panahi the Deputy of the Budget and Plan Office and Ali Reza Fayazi the expert on the 
budget of the Majlis Research Centre.  
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Documentary and archival resources analysis is another method which Candidate 
used to assess the law making power of the Majlis. The figures and statistics about the 
numbers of the bills and proposals, parliamentary questions, investigations, 
impeachments and so on were gathered from the official resources of the parliament, 
however in many cases even this official information was not clear and needed to be 
checked again and refined.  The debates of the Majlis sessions during the Sixth and 
Seventh Majlis, especially the speeches which were delivered on the floor were an 
important resource and were used to understand the position and attitudes of the 
parliamentarians.        
Also in chapter five, the results of the questionnaires which have been done by the 
Budget Office of Majlis Research Centre are used.  In this survey through close ended 
questions, the opinions of the MPs in the Sixth and Seventh Majlis about the 
parliamentary stage of the budget process were gathered and analysed.  Nevertheless a 
lack of accessibility to the Commissions‟ deliberations on the budget bill, particularly 
the Consolidation Commission, was one of the major problems in this part of the 
research. Important changes in and adoption of the budget bill at the parliamentary stage 
usually takes place in these Commissions. Information pertaining to the number of 
amendments and the process by which these amendments are inserted in the budget bill 
can help us to understand the law making power of the parliament more clearly.    
 
   5. Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is divided into six chapters as follows:  
  The first chapter as introduction is dedicated to the research methodology within 
which the aims and purposes of the research and the reasons which inspired the author 
to choose the thesis subject are explained. The main and subsidiary questions of the 
research are also proposed in this chapter. Research methodologies which are deployed 
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and the data collection process, in addition to the barriers which hindered and 
challenged the development of the research throughout the information gathering 
process, are discussed. 
  In the second chapter the most important literature relevant to the thesis subject is 
reviewed. Since the Iranian Constitution and its impact upon the law making function of 
the legislature as an external variable is a central factor in this research, the literature 
available about the meaning of a constitution and typologies of constitutions is studied. 
The main part of the literature review is allocated to the legislative studies‟ literature 
especially the external and internal variables and typology of legislatures which is one 
of the main parts of this thesis. In the final part of this chapter the most important and 
notable books and articles which explore the Iranian Parliament are subjected to critical 
analysis. 
The third chapter is allocated to the historical evolution of the Iranian Parliament. In 
the first part Iran is overviewed very briefly and then the Constitutional Movement in 
the Qajar Era, during which the Iranian Parliament was established, is explained. 
Furthermore the separation of power according to the Constitution of 1906-7 is analysed 
and the place of the Iranian Parliament within that is identified. Also the limitations 
which were set up constitutionally are explained. These limitations, which remain in 
place, are a very important part of the study and show the most significant obstacles 
which have affected the power of the Iranian Parliament in different historical periods. 
In other words these limitations have been reproduced during the evolution of the 
parliament in the First and Second Pahlavi Eras, which are briefly discussed. 
The fourth chapter is dedicated to the Iranian Parliament in the Islamic Republic Era 
which is a central part of the thesis. First of all, the political forces which contributed to 
the establishment of the new political system are analysed. It identifies how the duality 
of the aforementioned political forces was reflected in the Iranian Constitution of 1979. 
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On the basis of the aforementioned analysis the key concepts which can explain the 
logic of the distribution of power within the Iranian constitution, and the place of the 
Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis), are discussed. Also by examining the 
relationship of the executive power to parliament and other power centres, the type of 
political regime on the basis of the amended Constitution of 1989 is explained. The 
Iranian political regime is unique due to its particular separation of power which was 
introduced in the Constitution. Then the main political institutions which 
constitutionally are involved in the law making process are identified and are 
categorised into two groups: first, elected institutions comprising the Majlis and the 
executive power, and second unelected institutions comprising the Guardian Council 
and the Expediency Council. On the basis of the analysis which is introduced in this 
thesis it is argued that the relationship of these two types of institutions can give a more 
accurate picture of the Iranian Parliament than the interaction of the executive and 
legislature. The next part of this chapter is allocated to the Islamic Consultative 
Assembly and its functions. Through explaining the various functions of the Majlis, its 
constitutional power is portrayed.  Its power on paper and according to the Constitution 
is explained rather than its power in real politics.  
Theoretical discussions are tested in chapter five. The Sixth and Seventh terms of the 
parliament, dominated by different political forces, are chosen for study and their law 
making power during the budget process analysed. The dichotomy of elected and 
unelected institutions is applied to the case in this chapter. After a brief introduction 
which justifies the selection of the case, the legal framework of the budget bill is 
explained. The main legal limitation of the Iranian Parliament in terms of modifying the 
budget bill which is introduced every year by the executive is identified. Then the 
contribution of the elected and unelected institutions during the budget process is 
explained. The next part of this chapter considers the Sixth Majlis and its political 
 16 
 
context in general. It was stated that the Sixth Majlis dominated by Reformists 
coincided with the Reformist government of Khatami. Majlis and executive interactions 
and the interactions of these two elected institutions with the Guardian Council and 
Expediency Council especially during the budget process are analysed. The same 
approach is deployed for the Seventh Majlis which in terms of political composition 
was in stark contrast to the Sixth Majlis. It is shown how the political composition of 
the elected and unelected institutions can increase or decrease considerably the law 
making power of the Islamic Consultative Assembly. In the last part of the chapter the 
law making power of the Majlis in these two aforesaid terms of the Majlis is discussed 
and the main factors which affected its power are analysed. The overall conclusion of 
the thesis is provided in chapter six.                              
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1. Literature review of constitutions and constitutionalism 
 
Constitutions are essentially the institutional framework within which political power 
in the form of sovereignty originates, establishes, operates, and may be terminated. 
Constitutionalism is a modern concept which has grown up in Western civilization, 
especially in recent centuries (17th century onward) (Judge, 1993); however it is 
noteworthy that the idea of restricting political power has a long history even before 
ancient Greece. Some authors (Lane, 1996) have enumerated three main resources for 
the old version of constitutionalism or the doctrine according to which political rule has 
to be bound by some kinds of limitations: these three sources consist of: 
a) German law and Feudalism 
 b) Roman law or more specifically natural law  
c) Aristotelianism. 
In fact, feudalism prepared the objective circumstances for constitutionalism. With 
the growth of the feudal classes in Western Europe they appeared as a source of power 
which wanted to share in political power with the king (Wormuth, 1949). In fact there 
was a reciprocal obligation between the feudals and the king: “whilst the king was the 
natural, God-given, policy maker he was expected none the less to secure the consent of 
his counsellors – his most powerful subjects.” (Judge, 1993: 29, 30).Before that what 
restricted the power of the kings was customary law which gradually turned to codified 
law. 
Natural law which was raised within Roman law accelerated the development of 
constitutionalism. It contains the equality of all men before law and the protection of 
private property. However at first it justified the natural law of men through divine right 
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but in the course of the Renaissance and religious reformation in Christianity it changed 
due to the process of secularism.   
The influence of Aristotle on constitutionalism was through suggesting the idea of a 
“good” constitution. Aristotle combined elements of oligarchy and democracy to create 
a proper form of government; however he refers to monarchy as a better form of 
government in a good situation. “Aristotle cited Sparta as an example of all three forms 
being compounded into one regime. In the constitutionalist debate in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries similar notions were incorporated into the doctrine of a mixed 
monarchy” (Lane, 1996: 24).   
Apart from these deep roots of constitutionalism, what is crucial here for our 
research is that the movement which happened during the Renaissance. It can be said 
that modern constitutionalism is the offspring of the Enlightenment period in Europe, 
within which some thinkers such as Rousseau, Montesquieu, Hobbes and Locke 
formulated modern concepts such as the social contract, civil society, and the separation 
of powers. Hobbes tried to make clear the concept of the sovereign. In his famous book 
Leviathan he theorised the human nature that man is by nature a selfishly individualistic 
animal and in constant war with all other men. Fear of violence and death is the main 
motive by which men are encouraged to create a state through a social contract and 
submitting the political power to a new institution named sovereign (Macpherson, 
1968). His book “was aimed at addressing the arbitrary abuse of power, and 
constructing the proper ordering of the public sphere” (Butlerichie, 2004: 11). 
After that, Locke contested the concept of the divine right of monarchs in his book 
Two treatises of government in 1690. In this book Locke (1698: 154) wrote that “as far 
as we have any light from history, we have reason to conclude that all peaceful 
beginning of government have been laid in the consent of people”. Social contract was 
the most important of Locke‟s innovations, a fiction designed to orient the terms of state 
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limitation.  He believed that the main tasks of government are to protect the right to life, 
right to freedom and the right to property. He contended that the only way by which 
government can protect these rights is having a popular parliament to limit the power of 
the monarch. Other thinkers also contributed to the idea of a limitation of political 
power, among which Montesquieu is the most famous figure who showed the practical 
ways of controlling the political power in his famous book: The spirit of laws. The 
doctrine of separation of powers was encapsulated by Montesquieu (1992: 48, 49) as 
follows:  
 
 “In each state there are three sorts of powers: legislative power, executive power 
over the things depending on the right of nations, and executive power over the things 
depending on civil right. …. Political liberty in a citizen is that tranquillity of spirit 
which comes from the opinion each one has of his security, and in order for him to have 
this liberty the government must be such that one citizen cannot fear another citizen. …. 
When legislative power is united with executive power in a single person or in a single 
body of the magistracy, there is no liberty, because one can fear that the same monarch 
or senate that makes tyrannical laws will execute them tyrannically…. . Nor is there 
liberty if the power of judging is not separate from legislative power and from executive 
power…..  All would be lost if the same man or the same body of principal men, either 
of nobles, or of the people, exercised these three powers: that of making the laws, that 
of executing public resolutions, and that of judging the crimes or the disputes of 
individuals” 
 
This doctrine brought out the two vital features of the idea: first it is considered to 
prevent the misuse of political power. Secondly, that prevention is achieved by dividing 
power between three branches of government, each of which may check and balance the 
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other. However it is worth noting that “Montesquieu did not believe that formal 
separation alone would allow each to check the others” (Bellamy, 1996: 444).  
  These crucial theoretical attempts may be said to constitute the pillars of modern 
government and are usually enshrined in the constitution. Constitutions are rich 
resources which can show the formula for the distribution of power and the role of each 
branch of government.  They may provide enough information on the basis of which the 
political regime of a country can be recognised.  
Nevertheless, there are many kinds of constitutions. In the same way in which they 
can lead one to understand the puzzle of the complicated relationship between different 
organs of the government they may mislead as well.   
It is stated that “Constitutions are not created in a vacuum as John Stuart Mill 
observed. They “are the work of men. Men did not wake up on a summer morning and 
find them sprung up”. They may …, be imposed from outside or they may be the 
consequence of deliberations by a national elite, possibly with some input from, or 
formal approval by, the citizenry” (Norton and Ahmed, 1998: 188). They are 
complicated phenomena and strongly have connections with the social context, 
historical evolution and the political culture of a given society. It might be said the 
constitution in those societies which are imposed from outside are more complex. So it 
is possible that we have to cope with the different cases where the constitution has 
specific meaning or doing some functions which may be different from their functions 
in other places.   
Therefore the first step in understanding the meanings of a constitution is to clarify 
the different types of the constitution that exist.  
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1.1 Definition of constitution 
As we mentioned before, the modern constitution is the consequence of the 
movement which took place in the 17th century. This word was first used after the 
„Glorious Revolution‟ of 1688 in Britain. The theoretical discussion relevant to this 
concept has been formulated under the term constitutionalism. Therefore it seems 
reasonable to study the meaning of constitutionalism and explain the concept of 
constitution by reference to that. 
To “constitute” in a word means make up, order, form and constitution means “the 
system of laws, customs and conventions which define the composition and powers of 
organs of the state, and regulate the relations of the various state organs to one another 
and to the ptivate citizen” (Hood, 1987 cited in Judge, 1993: 5). Thus a nation‟s 
constitution should pattern a political system. Those kinds of theories which have tried 
to explain the principles of limited constitutional government have been named 
constitutionalism. In other words “constitutionalism is the political doctrine that claims 
that political authority should be bound by institutions that restrict the exercise of 
power. Such institutions offer rules that bind both the persons in authority as well as 
organs or bodies that exercise political power” (Lane, 1996: 19). It was stated that 
constitutionalism “consist in the advocacy of certain types of institutional arrangement, 
on the grounds that certain ends will be achieved in this way, and there is therefore 
introduced into the discussion a normative element based upon the belief that there are 
certain demonstrable relationships between given types of institutional arrangement and 
the safeguarding of important value” (Vile, 1967: 8). We should put stress on this point 
that in many countries the constitution is thought of as an instrument by which 
government can be controlled. In other words, constitutions spring from a belief in 
limited government. Therefore it might be said a democratic constitution is not simply a 
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power-map, which only shows the institutions or persons who are entitled to hold the 
political power. In fact the main aim of constitutions might be said to impose limits on 
the exercise of political power by the main holders of power, and also to guarantee basic 
rights and freedoms and other fundamental values for the society (Barendt, 1998: 3, 4).   
Some authors believe that this term may be used in two senses. One is a broad sense 
covering the real forces that there are in different parts of society including cultural, 
economical, legal, political and social parts.  The second sense is more specific and 
means “the formal written document in which the superficial structure of the state 
institutions are set forth. This is a distinctly formalist notion of constitutionalism” 
(Butleritchie, 2004, 3).  Most of the time when one uses the word constitution, it means 
the second meaning which might be said is the normative meaning of the constitution.  
It is noteworthy to say that there are significant differenc between the authority that a 
text as a constitution expresses and the authority which in reality exists. That is why 
studying the constitutional powers granted to parliament are necessary but not sufficient 
for explaining the power of the different branches of government. The frequent 
discrepancy between formal and actual powers can be found in a specific political 
system. Yet, the analysis of constitutions should never be neglected since it stipulates 
the basic structures, powers and relationships of the different organs of the political 
system.  
 
1.2 Typology of constitutions 
 
There are various kinds of constitutions throughout the world. One of the most 
famous categorizations is that of written and unwritten constitutions. A written 
constitution is a text within which there are articles that establish and regulate or govern 
the government. For instance the US Constitution is one of the most famous written 
constitutions in the world. In contrast there are some countries that do not have a formal 
 24 
 
written constitution in the aforementioned sense, but it does not mean that they do not 
have a constitution at all but there are some other kinds of written documents that have 
constitutional status. The United Kingdom is the foremost example of the second group.  
If one wants to examine the legal framework of political power in a country one way 
definitively is to study the constitution of that country whether written or un-written.  
There are other categorizations of constitutions which refer to the process of 
amending of the constitution. Those constitutions that can be easily amended are 
flexible constitutions and those which can only be amended through difficult and 
complex processes are named rigid constitutions. Federal and unitary is another 
categorization of constitutions which are one aspect of the concept of the separation of 
powers. 
It might be said constitutions often contain four elements: 
 a) The nature of the state whether it is a unitary government or federal government.  
 b) The rights of the individual, which refers to the human rights that protect citizens 
against the power of the government. 
 c) The power of the state through which the separation of powers and the kinds of 
relationship that different branches of government have within the specific political 
system are articulated. 
 d) The procedure for changing the constitution such as amending the articles.  
 However being unitary or federal is very crucial in respect of distribution of political 
power but some authors (Lane, 1996) believe that among these elements two of them 
are essential for constitutions which mean they should contain these two bases:  
a) “the limitation of the state versus society in the form of respect for a set of human 
rights covering not only civic rights but also political and economic rights and  
b) The implementation of separation of powers within the state.   
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While the first principle is an external one, confining state powers in relation to civil 
society {human rights}, the second principle is an internal one, making sure that no 
state body, organ or person can prevail within the state.” (Ibid: 25)   
Regarding the main question of this research what is important for us is the power of 
the state and the way in which powers are separated. 
In comparative politics, political scientists recognise that some countries, especially 
in African and Arab countries and also in some previous communist countries have 
constitutions which lack those fundamental elements.  Some authors (Murphy, 1993: 
196) explain that “constitutional texts fall along a spectrum of authority. At one extreme 
are shams, such as those of Stalin and Mao. At the other extreme should be those whose 
provisions are fully operative”.  However it should be mentioned that it is very difficult 
to find countries that have constitutions that are fully operative even in the countries 
from which constitutionalism has originated. Within this spectrum, we may find some 
kinds of constitutions where political power is totally or relatively concentrated in the 
hands of one person such as a king in monarchical government (Saudi Arabia), or in the 
hands of one party state (Syria, Batth party) or in the hands of specific group such as 
military junta (Pakistan).   
With regard to classification, we may categorise them in four groups:  
 
1.2.1 Guarantee constitutions 
 
These kinds of constitutions often coincide with their definition which acts as a 
framework of the political society and trying to bring the arbitrary political power under 
their control by distributing that through the separation of powers doctrine (Sartori, 
1962).  As we can see in this definition those two elements which we mentioned before 
have been considered explicitly and implicitly. 
 
 26 
 
 
1.2.2 Nominal constitutions 
 
Nominal constitutions refer to those kinds of constitutions which just articulate 
political order, nothing else. They are simply political power maps and show the main 
position of political power organisations within the political system.  They are “the 
collection of rules which organise but do not restrain the exercise of political power in 
given polity” (Sartori, 1962: 861).  
 
1.2.3 Façade constitutions 
 
One may find a formal constitution in these countries which are very similar to the 
constitution in democratic countries; however in real politics the situation is different. 
The function of these kinds of constitution is to deceive. It was stated (Murphy, 1993: 
197) that they “play a cosmetic role, allowing a nation to hide its failures behind 
idealistic rhetoric”. Usually dictatorial or authoritarian states decorate the political scene 
by enacting such kinds of constitutions. Some authors have called them a “camouflage 
constitution” (Lane, 1996). Sartori (1962: 861) dubbed these kinds of constitutions as 
“façade constitutions”. He believes that “they take the appearance of “true 
constitution””. What makes them untrue is that they are disregarded (at least in their 
essential guarantee features). Actually they are “trap-constitutions”.  As far as they are 
not exercised and their rules are not observed particularly by the power holders it might 
be said it is a dead letter.  
 
1.2.4 Contradictory constitutions 
 
There is another kind of constitution which comprises both dictatorial and 
democratic elements which means that at the same time one can find the principle of the 
separation of powers and guaranteeing fundamental rights within the constitution, as 
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well as articles that make these principles vulnerable by the despotic application of 
political power. For instance, in Bahrain the 1973 Constitution starts out by declaring 
that “the system of government in Bahrain is democratic, under which sovereignty lies 
with the people, the source of all powers” (Article 1).  To the principle of popular 
sovereignty the constitution adds talk about the separation of powers: “the system of 
government shall be based on the principle of separation of the legislative, executive 
and judicial powers” (Article 32.a). However, the essence of Arab monarchical rule is 
stated in the following clause: 
 
Legislative power shall be vested in the Amir and the National Assembly in 
accordance with the constitution and the Executive power shall be vested in the Amir, 
the Cabinet and Ministers. Judicial decrees shall be passed in the name of the Amir, all 
in accordance with the Constitution (Article 32.b). 
  
 If one continues to consider Article 33 to 40 of Bahrain‟s Constitution one can 
realise that the Amir and its institutions have a crucial part of the political power and 
therefore cannot be defended on the basis of Montesquieu‟s separation of powers 
doctrine (Lane, 1996). 
It was stated that the principles of separation of powers are one of the core elements 
of the modern constitutions. As Lord Acton the British historian stated “power tends to 
corrupt, absolute power corrupts absolutely”. The foundation for the idea of division of 
function existed in medieval thought, for the idea of function played an important part 
in the papal theory of the division of labour among the offices of the church and the 
royal power. 
In sum this brief introduction reveals that the idea of the separation of power is very 
central. In fact it might be said the constitutionalism movement was nothing but a 
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means to restrain unlimited political power. For the purpose of this research it is crucial 
to know the nature of the Iranian constitution. Which type of the aforementioned 
constitutions is compatible with the Iranian Constitution? Can we recognise all the core 
elements of the constitution in Iran‟s case?  What about the separation of powers? How 
much is the distribution of power which is enshrined in the Constitution reflected in real 
politics? Strictly speaking, where is the place of the parliament in the constitution? 
 
2. Literature review of legislative studies 
 
Legislative studies principally developed in Western societies where the idea of 
democracy originated. In these societies there are political institutions whose tasks are 
to exercise political power democratically. Different varieties of legislatures can be 
found within different kinds of political systems either open or closed, either democratic 
or despotic. Some of them only want to pretend that they care about the voice of their 
people and the system is working according to the citizen‟s wishes, however in reality it 
is vice versa. In contrast in some of them, such as most parliaments in European 
countries, they play a real role within political system; however their functions and the 
degree of their importance differ.  There is plenty of academic literature and research 
about the different aspects of legislatures in these countries, while in those kinds of 
countries that for whatever reason democratic government has been absent for a long 
time it is very difficult to find serious literature which examines parliament. In fact they 
are irrelevant in the decision making process and their main function is legitimizing the 
regime. That is why they may not attract the attention of researchers. Therefore it might 
be said most of the former Third World or current developing countries have suffered 
from a lack of theoretical and practical research. Norton in 1990 wrote that: 
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“[O]f the material that does exist, there is a clear imbalance in country focus. There 
is a mass of literature on the US Congress. There is a substantial amount of material on 
West European legislatures; especially the British Parliament … .There is less but still 
a fair amount of literature on the older commonwealth countries, especially India and 
Canada. There is much less – in some cases, very little indeed - on legislatures in Third 
world and Communist countries. There is now much more than before - legislatures in 
developing countries have attracted greater interest from scholars …”(Norton, 1990: 
7). 
 
 This shortage of legislative studies after the passing of more than one decade since 
Norton‟s report still can be seen in countries such as Iran. If after the collapse of the 
communist bloc (especially in Eastern Europe), legislative studies have grown rapidly 
there following the expanding wave of democracy, in countries such as Iran, the lack of 
these kinds of studies is serious. Furthermore, most of the concepts and procedures 
which have emerged or consolidated in the modern democratic countries are still 
unknown in underdeveloped or developing countries. 
 
2.1 Definition of legislature  
  
Parliaments  prevail all over the world with different names “{y}et what such bodies 
have in common is that they are constitutionally designated institutions for giving assent 
to binding measures of public policy, that assent being given on behalf of a political 
community that extends beyond the government elite responsible for formulating those 
measures”(Norton, 1990: 1). In democratic government it is supposed that the members 
of parliament are the people‟s representatives (according to the social contract) who 
want to apply their right to govern their destiny. In the modern world it is believed that 
laws which are going to regulate human relationships should be made by human 
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agency, through legislative power.  The earliest signs of the emergence of a „legislative 
power‟ was given by the development of a command theory of law; “the view that law 
is essentially the expression of an order or prohibition rather than an unchanging pattern 
of custom, a view that was reinforced by the emergence of the modern notion of 
sovereignty as the repository of the power to issue final commands” (Vile, 1967: 26).  
In medieval ages law was perceived as divine customs which should be applied and 
interpreted by men but not created or changed by them. In other word “in so far as men 
were concerned with „legislation‟ they were in fact declaring the law, clarifying what 
the law really was, and not creating it” (Ibid: 24).     
If one reviews the literature of legislative studies, one can find that definition of the 
legislature according to their function which is not similar in different ages. In the 19
th
 
century legislatures mostly were supposed to be bodies whose main task was to enact 
compulsory rules which govern the conduct of citizens in a specific territory. In this 
century different kinds of parliaments were established in most European countries and 
had the unique power to control the governments. They belonged to an age where mass 
political parties had not yet developed and parliament acted independently from them. 
Nevertheless this situation changed at the end of the 19
th
 century: “Industrialization 
generated an increasingly urban population with no political voice. Pressures for such a 
voice were to result in the widening of the franchise and the growth of political parties” 
(Norton, 2005:  2). Therefore a new competitor emerged in the early 20th century in that 
parties controlled the electoral process and the legislative activities within the 
parliament. Legislators‟ independence significantly decreased especially when the 
political parties with strong discipline emerged. That is why some political scientists 
described the late nineteenth century as the age of legislatures‟ decline. At the outset of 
the twentieth century Lord Bryce (Norton, 1990:  52) wrote “[w]hether or not it be true, 
as is commonly stated, that in European countries the intellectual level of legislative 
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assemblies has been sinking, it is clear that nowhere does enough of that which is best 
in the character and talent of the nation find its way into those assemblies”.  
 More recently the idea of decline of the legislatures has been challenged by some 
political scientists such as Robert A. Packenham. According to his studies of the 
Brazilian Congress, he found that the law making function of the parliament is not 
relatively the most important function of the parliament.  Apart from the law making 
function he found several functions in the Brazilian Congress which he ranked as 
follows: 
 
Table (2-1): The Functions of the Brazilian National Congress 
 
Legitimation 
Latent (through meeting regularly and uninterruptedly) 
Manifest (the formal stamp of approval) 
„Safety valve‟ or „tension release‟ (outlet for tensions) 
 
Recruitment, socialization and training  
Recruitment 
Socialization 
Training 
Decisional or influence functions 
Law- making 
„Exit‟ function (resolving an impasse in the system) 
Interest articulation 
Conflict resolution 
Administrative oversight and patronage (including „errand running‟ for 
constituents)    
Source:  Adapted by Norton, P. (2005) “Parliament in British Politics”, New York, Palgrave Macmillan. p. 9. From 
Packenham, R.A. (1970) “legislatures in political development” in Kornberg, A. and Musolf, L.D. (Eds), in  
Legislatures in Developmental Perspective, Durham, Duke University press  
According to the abovementioned table the law making function of the Brazilian 
Congress is in the lower rank of the table compared with the other functions. 
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Packenham‟s studies indicate another important idea: the law making function of the 
parliament is not the only function of this institution but the numbers of legislatures‟ 
functions and their ranking vary from country to country. It might be said that the 
functions of legislatures differ according to their political system. Some of them are 
mono functional and some are multi functional legislatures. Therefore if the law making 
function of the legislatures is decreased it does not mean that the legislatures have 
declined; there are many other functions which legislatures might exercise strongly. 
 As the table above shows Packenham found that the most important function of the 
Brazilian Congress under the military regime was to provide the moral right for the 
executive which was backed by the military and to attract more support for a non-
democratic political system and legitimize it. In contrast, law making function in 
compare with legitimation function, in reality, was less important. The Congress 
through meeting regularly, openly and uninterruptedly (legitimation as a latent 
function), giving assent to the initiatives and decisions which were taken elsewhere 
(legitimation as manifest function) and releasing tensions through debates which took 
place in the Congress could maximize the legitimation function of the Brazilian 
legislature while its law making power was considerably low (Packenham, 1990). 
Mezey (1979) called these activities which mobilize support for the regime and allow 
the political system to survive as “system maintenance activities”. When citizens feel 
their representatives articulate their interests and reflect their voices, these will 
legitimize the political system.  
Obviously the effectiveness of the “legitimation function” or “system maintanace 
activities” of a legislature largely depends on the capability of the political system to 
convince citizens that members of the parliament represent their will. This critical 
function of the legislatures encourages various types of the political systems (either 
democratic or non-democratic) to keep the legislature in their political system or at least 
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to enshrine it in the constitution. That is why “…different types of the political leaders 
are prepared to tolerate a legislature and to accept the costs that go with such an 
investment because the legislature constitutes a democratic symbol that pays sizable 
dividens in terms of domestic and even international legitimacy” (Ibid: 270, 271).  
The legitimizing function of legislatures is also crucial in the case of the Iranian 
political system where the elements of the theocracy and representative democracy are 
juxtaposed. Law making processes in which both elected and unelected institutions 
participate is one of the most important ways through which the legitimation function is 
fulfilled. Apart from the sessions of the Majlis which have been held at least three days 
a week, a sizable number of measures have been approved by the Islamic Consultative 
Assembly after the Islamic Revolution. The contribution and the role of the Majlis 
during this decision making process will be studied in the following chapters. Does the 
Majlis really matter in this process or is it used only to legitimize the decisions which 
were taken elsewhere?      
 Norton (2005) also challenged the idea of the decline of the legislature by analysing 
the different meanings of legislative power from different points of view i.e. pluralist, 
elitist and the institutional approach and concluded that: “[i]t is thus apparent that the 
perception of the decline of the legislatures derives from a particular view of power. 
Indeed, it can be claimed to be a narrow view, even within a pluralist framework, 
derived primarily from an emphasis on coercion. Because legislatures do not regularly 
say „no‟ to the executive, and substitute policy of their own, they are deemed to be in 
decline. However, once we go beyond the pluralist view, then we can see legislatures in 
a new perspective. The very fact that there are so many of them suggests that there is 
more to them than law „making‟ ” (Norton, 2005: 7). 
Therefore the law making function of the legislature is one amongst several functions 
of the legislature and not necessarily the only one or the most important one. The 
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importance of the law making function of the parliament depends on the many external 
and internal factors.   
 
2.2 Internal and external environment of legislatures 
 
Some authors (Mezey and Olson, 1991: 7, 8) categorise different variables which 
impact on the law making power of the legislatures into two groups: internal variables, 
which refer to internal structures of parliaments, and external variables which are those 
factors which are located outside of the legislatures‟ environment. They explain 
“legislatures are not isolated entities. Rather they are connected to a set of external 
forces, including the executive, the larger electorate to which its members are 
responsible, and in most political systems, organised interest groups. The external 
elements can either constrain or enhance the policy making role of the legislature” 
(Ibid). 
Also internal variables such as the chamber and its agenda setting power are 
important tools to manipulate the policy making function of the legislature. The 
autonomy of the chambers to set their own agenda is one important yardstick which can 
show their power. In addition the situation of the political parties within the legislatures, 
whether they are well organized or not and whether they are under the influence of extra 
parliamentary parties or act independently, are very relevant to the law making power of 
the legislatures.“Political parties function in nearly every legislature to group and unite 
individual legislators behind common policy goals. They also play a role in organizing 
the agenda of the legislature and determining its procedures” (Ibid: 12).  The amount of 
the institutionalization of the parliamentary committees and the quality of their structure 
are among the most important internal variables which can define the power of the 
parliament.  Whether the committees have distinct and autonomous jurisdictions or 
whether their jurisdictions are parallel with the executive departments is an essential 
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factor (Norton and Ahmed, 1999). Another crucial issue is whether the committees have 
the power to set their own agenda, change legislation and take evidence. 
If one considers the external variables which were mentioned before, one may find 
that most of them are designated in constitutions. For instance the relationship between 
different organs of the state and whether they are presidential or parliamentary or hybrid 
is articulated in constitutions. Sometimes they even confine the legislatures‟ procedures 
which impact directly on their role.  
Norton (1998: 6) categorised the variables which shape the relationships of the 
government and legislature under three general headings: “cultural, constitutional and 
political. The political culture, the amalgam of attitudes built up over time toward 
society and the running of the society, will shape both the constitution and how people 
behave politically”.  Most authors deal with at least some of the variables included 
under these general headings when assessing the impact of a legislature‟s external 
environment. For example, Norton and Ahmed (1999: 3, 6) refer to the political culture, 
external patrons, the constitution, administrative structure and the party and electoral 
system, while Norton and Olson (1996:7, 9) consider variables such as the 
constitutional structure, administrative structure, party, and electoral system and interest 
groups. As a whole, the aforementioned variables are to a large degree overlapping; 
therefore, the literature may be said to essentially deal with the same rather than 
different factors.   
 Some constitutions, such as the Iranian, create unique and special institutions which 
are involved in the law making process. Due to the existence of these institutions, the 
functions and importance of the legislature may be different from other parliaments.  
Therefore analysing constitutions is very important in addressing questions such as 
“does the constitution create a presidential, parliamentary or hybrid system? … What 
powers are vested in the legislature? Can it be over-ridden by authorities (the president, 
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the courts, the head of the state, the citizenry through referendum) and if so, under what 
conditions?” (Norton and Ahmed, 1998: 4). 
What is important for us in this research is to recognise those institutions in the 
Constitution which impact on the law making power of the Iranian parliament directly. 
2.3 Typology of legislatures 
 
 In the legislative studies literature the typology of Nelson Polsby is very well 
known. He categorized legislatures in two distinct groups: arena legislatures and 
transformative legislatures. In his point of view the arena-like legislatures are those 
which just discuss the policies which the government bring forward to parliament:  
―Arenas in specialized, open regimes serve as formalized settings for the interplay of 
significant political forces in the life of a political system; the more open the regime the 
more varied and the more representative and accountable the forces that find a welcome 
in the arena‖ (Polsby, 1975: 129,130). He believed that the British Parliament which is 
intertwined with the government and both of them act within a strong party discipline is 
compatible with this category of legislature. On the other hand, in the latter category 
there are strong legislatures that translate political ideas into laws. They are able to 
discard the governments‘ bill and initiate their own policy proposals: ―[They] possess 
the independent capacity, frequently exercised, to mould and transform proposals from 
whatever source into law‖ (Ibid: 129). The U.S. Congress with a complicated committee 
structure which acts relatively independently from outside political parties is the best 
example of this kind of legislature. 
Jean Blondel also contributed to the discussion of legislative typology. He claimed 
that the different viscosity of legislatures can be an appropriate measurement to examine 
their policy making power. In his point of view the amount of resistance that a proposal 
faces within the legislature can define the degree of its viscosity. Blondel (1970:  200) 
categorised legislatures as free and compliant legislatures and explains that “[a]s the 
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legislature becomes freer, the time spent increases and amendments are discussed and 
indeed passed. The origin, number, and fate of these amendments are all indicative of a 
number of steps in the viscosity of the process”. Legislatures with a high degree of 
viscosity are those that can efficiently slow down or completely stop the executive‟s 
bill. In contrast, if the government control all stages of the policy making process and be 
able to pass its proposals easily the viscosity of the legislature is low.  
Also the strength of legislatures was assessed by Mezey utilising two dimensions: the 
policy-making power and public support. In terms of policy making power he wrote: 
―[l]egislatures can be classified as possessing strong policy-making power if they can 
modify and reject executive proposals; legislatures that have no capacity to reject policy 
proposals but can modify them can be said to possess modest policy-making power, 
with legislatures that can neither modify nor reject policy proposals have little or no 
policy-making power‖ (Mezey, 1979: 155, 156). He combined this dimension with the 
support dimension which he defined that as ―a set of attitudes that look to the 
legislatures as a valued and popular political institution.‖ By a combination of these two 
dimensions he identified five types of legislature: active, reactive, vulnerable, marginal, 
and minimal. 
 
Table (2-2): Mezey‟s typology of legislatures: 
 
Policy making power      
 
 
Less supported legislatures 
 
More supported 
legislatures 
Strong                   Vulnerable legislatures     Active legislatures        
Modest                  Marginal legislatures       Reactive legislatures      
Little or none              Minimal legislatures      
Source: Norton. P. (ed), (1990), Parliament in Western Europe, London, Frank Cass.   
 38 
 
Active and vulnerable legislatures are those which can modify and reject executive 
proposals and have highly developed committee systems as a prerequisite for that 
activity. The difference between them is in the degree of public support. He identified 
the US Congress as an active legislature and mentioned “what evidence there is tends to 
suggest that the American people are supportive of the Congress” (Ibid: 169). On the 
other hand, despite the Philippines having a strong legislature, it was not supported by 
the people who “think of legislators as corrupt people bent on enriching themselves as 
part of their duties” (Ibid: 170).  Reactive legislatures have a less influential policy 
making role than active and vulnerable legislatures, and are controlled by the 
government. Although reactive legislatures are able to modify proposals, they cannot 
reject them. He exemplified the British Parliament as a reactive legislature with a highly 
supportive character and stated that “legislators in Great Britain are shaping their 
behaviour to meet the expectations of party elites rather than the expectations of mass 
publics” (Ibid: 172). Marginal legislatures which enjoy low levels of public support are 
those which are dominated by the executive and have modest policy-making 
capabilities. He stated “[t]he legislature created by the 1962 Pakestani Constitution was 
designated to be subordinate to the president with no real power to reject government 
proposals” (Ibid: 173). 
 Minimal legislatures are those which can neither reject the proposals nor amend 
them: 
 
 “Although their membership is popularly elected and their existence and 
prerogatives are formally guaranteed by the nation's constitution, these institutions are, 
in the final analysis, ultimately subordinate to other elements in the political system in 
whose hands actual rule-making power resides. In such a system, the Government 
rarely loses an important vote in the legislature and such a defeat, in the event that it 
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does occur, can provoke a serious constitutional crisis. The Government initiates all 
significant proposals and the legislature is restricted to only the most marginal 
amendments” (Mezey, 1972: 686).  
 
He believed most of the legislatures in developing countries belong to this category 
of legislature. The difference between the marginal legislatures and minimal legislatures 
is that the former “have, while they exist, the tentative support of non-legislative elites, 
minimal legislatures have a more permanent and continuing commitment from elites ...” 
(Mezey, 1979: 175). 
Mezey‟s typology of legislatures was improved by Philip Norton who redefined the 
strong policymaking power of the legislatures in his category. He stated that “Mezey‟s 
definitional distinction between „strong‟ and „modest‟ policy-making power misses, to 
my mind, the essential differences. Strong policy-making power must surely encompass 
the capacity to formulate, to „make‟, policy. The power to reject, especially if only 
occasionally exercised, does not render a legislature a policy „making‟ body” (Norton, 
1990: 4, 5).  Therefore, Norton categorized legislatures in three broad categories: Policy 
making legislatures which can formulate and initiate proposals as well as reject or 
modify them, policy influencing legislatures which can reject or modify the proposals 
but cannot formulate or substitute proposals with their own and finally the legislatures 
with little or no policy effect. These are legislatures with no policy making or policy 
influencing power which means they cannot formulate proposals nor they can modify or 
reject them. 
Although “Mezey‟s classification of legislatures is probably the one that offers the 
most complete perspective on parliament” (Leston-Bandeira, 1999: 25, 26), Norton‟s 
categorization provides a more precise typology through focusing on the policy making 
dimension of parliament; Norton‟s categorization is more appropriate for this thesis 
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which revolves around an assessment of the law making power of the Majlis by 
studying its contribution to budget policy making as a case study.  As it will be 
explained, according to the Iranian Constitution (Article 52) formulating and preparing 
the budget bill is the exclusive authority of the executive and the Majlis can only reject 
“… or move about some of the pieces, but has not the capacity to reconstruct it or create 
a new [budget bill]” (Norton, 1990, 179). Norton‟s distinction between the positive 
power of formulating and making policies and a negative reaction through rejecting or 
amending policies provides a more useful theoretical framework for assessing the law 
making power of the Majlis. Furthermore, this typology has been followed by many 
scholars as it is acknowledged that “Mezey and Norton still provide the most 
parsimonious frameworks for the classification of legislatures” (Judge and Earnshaw, 
2008: 12).           
2.4 Literature review of the Iranian parliament 
  
The Iranian Parliament might be said to be one of the unknown parliaments, 
particularly from a legislative studies point of view, either in the English language 
literature or in Farsi the local language. Until recently (at least to the knowledge of the 
author) one might not find even one book which focuses on the Iranian Parliament and 
analyse it in terms of the theories introduced in the parliamentary studies discipline.  
Most of the literature in this regard comes from other sub-disciplines of political science 
or was written by lawyers. The only article which considered the Iranian Parliament on 
the basis of legislative studies was written in 1975. In the following pages the relevant 
literature will be reviewed. 
As mentioned the first work which was written about the Iranian legislative system 
goes back to 1975 when the contribution of Marvin. G. Weinbaum was published in 
Legislative System in Developing Countries edited by G.R. Boynton and Chong Lim 
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Kim. In this book, different parliaments of the so-called Third World Countries 
(including Japan, Thailand, Colombia, South Vietnam, Kenya, the Philippines, Korea, 
Iran, Turkey and Afghanistan) were examined from a legislative studies perspective. 
In chapter two, comparing these legislatures with their counterparts in Western 
societies, Weinbaum described the Middle Eastern and Asian legislatures as parliaments 
which experienced discontinuity and suspension. Then he explained the theoretical basis 
of the typology. He believes that the legislatures must be analysed ―relative to [an] 
adjacent political system. An ineffectual, unstable parliament in a fragile political 
system must be judged differently from one in a nation with strong institutions. 
Similarly, a legislature that fails to cope with problems of political integration should be 
contrasted with the integrative performances of structures in the same system‖ (p: 35). 
On the basis of this analysis, he suggested five types of legislature in his paper: 
coordinate, subordinate, submissive, indeterminate and finally competitive-dominant. 
The first type of legislature is one where the executive and legislature cooperate with 
each other while at the same time their functions and prerogatives are well defined.  
The second type of legislature comprises those which are subordinate to the majority 
party in the executive with strong party discipline. Unlike the first type of legislature, in 
the second type the parliament is not able to amend the executive‘s bills. 
Legislatures of the third type are described as weak rubber stamp legislatures. In fact 
a submissive legislature ―is a consequence rather than the source of the executive 
power‖ (p: 39). Access to these types of the legislature is not possible because the 
government has manipulated and controlled the electoral system. The majority of the 
government party control the parliament while the government is not dependent on this 
party majority. It might be said that the educational and socializing and legitimizing 
functions are among the most important functions of these types of legislature. For 
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legitimizing the government, it is necessary for the parliament to have sessions only 
occasionally to show that they are representing the public. 
The fourth type of legislature identified by Weinbaum is the indeterminate 
legislature. There is poor interaction between parliament and the executive in this kind 
of legislature. Factions and sectarians who influence local and sector interests constitute 
the majority of the parliamentarians. They ―rarely take the initiative from an executive. 
Their fragmentation precludes the formulation of coherent, alternative programs or 
tackling of those major issues requiring mutual concessions‖ (p: 41). Instead they use 
considerable power to investigate the executive or threaten to use interpellation. 
Dominated by parliamentarians who pursue partial interests and have no strong party 
to control them, the fifth type of legislature is partly similar to the fourth one; however 
unlike indeterminate legislatures, in competitive-dominant legislatures the government 
and parliament have a relatively strong relationship. The interesting point is that in this 
kind of legislature, due to the existence of the highly institutionalized parliamentary 
committees, they can compete with the bureaucracy of the government. ―Committees 
are frequently mini legislatures where rival groups, administrators, and key legislators 
mingle‖ (p: 42). However, as Weinbaum mentioned, this kind of legislature is the 
exceptional phenomenon nowadays.  
Reviewing the Iranian Parliament from the date of its establishment in 1906 till 1975, 
Weinbaum recognised three types of the legislature in this period. He categorized the 
first and second terms of the Iranian Parliament which took place between 1906 and 
1914 as competitive-dominant, where the Majlis operated to limit the unlimited power 
of the monarchy. As will be examined in detail in the following chapters, the Iranian 
Parliament was widely copied from European parliaments such as Belgium and 
Bulgaria, according to which the parliament wielded very strong power against the 
government. Despite many ups and downs, and challenges with the monarchy, the first 
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and second parliaments played an impressive role in establishing the new basic laws, 
scrutinized the executive power and involved themselves in foreign treaties and the 
financial reforms in the country.  The Third Majlis was mostly composed of newly 
elected members and only lasted one year. It was dissolved due to the invasion of 
Tehran by Russian armies. Weinbuaum categorized the Fourth Majlis which was 
formed in 1921 as a transition to an indeterminate legislature. The Fourth term of 
parliament coincided with the new despotic power of Reza Khan who was appointed as 
the prime minister. Majlis resistance against Reza Khan encouraged the new strong 
prime minister to shape a parliament which could be controlled by him. In 1925 Reza 
Khan established a new dynasty of Pahlavi and the Fifth Majlis started its work under 
the absolute power of the Reza Shah. ―Beginning with the Fifth and certainly the Sixth 
Majlis, Iran entered a period of characteristic Type III [submissive legislatures]. 
Parliamentary autonomy disappeared as the Majlis, previously the national forum, 
became an obedient arm of Reza Shah‖ (p: 49). According to Weinbaum this situation 
lasted till 1945 when the Reza Shah fell and abdicated. After this year, the young 
Mohammad Reza Shah succeeded. However, the power of these two kings could not be 
compared. As Weinbaum put it, between 1941 and 1953, the Iranian Parliament became 
more active in all policy areas and the fifth type of the legislature i.e. competitive-
dominant legislature reinstituted; however there were many kinds of resistance by the 
monarchy. After the coup d‘état of 1953 against Prime Minister Mossadegh, a military 
government took control of the executive power and the submissive type of legislature 
restored. From 1953 to 1975 the Shah tried to fasten his control over both the executive 
and parliament. Also political parties‘ activities were banned except those which were 
established and approved by him.  
The work of Weinbaum provides a unique source of literature on the Iranian 
Parliament. He applied his typology to the different terms of the Iranian Parliament 
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which as we will see was reproduced in the parliament after the Islamic Revolution in 
Iran in many ways. He showed that the power and functions of the parliament, except 
for very short periods of time, always were threatened by the main power holder of the 
systems which before the revolution was the monarchy. Nevertheless, Weinbaum‘s 
typology of the legislatures is not straightforward and as clear as those which have been 
introduced by Mezey, Polsby and Norton. Furthermore the work of Weinbaum naturally 
does not cover the period that this research will study; however it is a very appropriate 
resource for the historical perspective of this research.  
One of the seminal works which considered the Iranian Parliament after the Islamic 
Revolution is that of Asghar Schirazi in Constitution of Iran: Politics and state in 
Islamic Republic.  In this book he studied the main political institutions of the Islamic 
Revolution which were established by the Constitution of 1979. Schirazi explained that 
in the Iranian political system there are many different power centres which can be 
categorized into two broad groups: democratic power centres and non democratic ones. 
He believes that the Iranian Constitution is a contradictory one within which power 
holders are in constant struggle. In his opinion the secret of this duality should be found 
in the duality of social power and supporters of the Iranian Revolution of 1979. He 
briefly reviewed the history of the formation of the Iranian Constitution in the first part 
of the book. He noted the story of the first and second draft of the post revolutionary 
Constitution: the former had been drafted by the more secular revolutionary forces and 
the latter by the more Islamist and fundamentalist supporters of the revolution. He 
shows the role of the Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers in the Islamic Republic 
Party in shaping the Constitution of 1979. The attempts of the Islamists who wanted to 
translate the Islamic laws of the Shi‟a faith to the constitution and other institutions of 
the newly established regime are shown in this book. He also examined the process 
through which the first Assembly of Experts which was dominated by the Islamic 
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Republic Party had approved the final draft of the constitution, reflecting the foot print 
of the radical clerically-oriented camp.  His analysis of the historical events which led to 
the establishment of the Constitution of 1979 is very informative. He shows how the 
real political power after the revolution, and in particular during the eight years war 
with Iraq, resided in the hands of the Ayatollah Khomeini as Supreme Religious Leader 
and popular sovereignty was seriously restricted. In Schrazi‘s opinion ―the history of the 
Islamic Republic can in a certain sense be characterized as one in which power has, for 
the most of the time, been increasingly concentrated in the hands of the leader, a process 
which went far beyond the restrictions laid down in the constitution” (p: 61). He 
explains that, despite holding different kinds of elections, real participation of the 
people in these elections can be limited by the unelected institution called the Guardian 
Council. As we shall see, “elections cannot be regarded as an expression of the 
sovereignty of the people because the election regulations do not allow opposition 
candidates to stand” (p: 300). For this reason an increasing proportion of the electorate 
does not exercise its vote. He described the Guardian Council as the shadow of the 
Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis) and stated that not only does the Guardian 
Council parallel the Majlis but also the executive power has a parallel power which in 
Schirazi‘s view is the Leadership Institution. In other words in Schirazi‘s view, any 
democratic institution within the framework of Iranian political system has a 
nondemocratic shadow.  
The work of Schirazi is very helpful in understanding the context within which the 
Iranian Parliament was working after the revolution; however, compared to the 
legislative studies literature the parliament and its place in the law making process 
constitutes only a small part of the book and there is no detailed information and 
analysis of the external influences or internal organisations of the Majlis. Furthermore 
the English translation (the original language was Dutch) of this work was published in 
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1997, since when Iran‘s political system has seen tremendous changes and 
development. Therefore this resource can be used only in historical perspective because 
it has no word about the functions of the Sixth and Seventh Majlis (2000-2008) which 
are chosen as case studies for this research.  
Another work which has contributed to knowledge about the Iranian Parliament and 
is closer to the legislative studies literature is the work of Bahman Bakhtiari 
Parliamentary Politics in Revolutionary Iran, which was published in 1996. The author 
opens the first chapter by briefly explaining the Constitutional Movement which is the 
focal turning point in the history of Iran, which took place between the years 1905 and 
1911. By overviewing the events which happened after the Constitutional Revolution 
Movement the role of the monarchy, government, parliament and political factions in 
shaping the nation's politics are examined. In the following chapters Bakhtiari explains 
in detail the events of the four terms of the Majlis after the Islamic Revolution of Iran 
covering the years between 1980 and 1994. In chapter two the activities of the First 
Majlis during the years 1980 to 1984 are analysed when the character of the Majlis and 
its relationship with other power holder institutions in particular the Guardian Council 
started to be shaped gradually. This trend was accelerated between the years 1984 and 
1988 during the Second Majlis in which the battles between Radical Islamists and 
Conservatives especially over economic policies were increased. After the death of 
Ayatollah Khomeini, which happened during the Third Majlis, the Iranian political 
scene experienced tremendous changes. Ayatollah Khamenie succeeded the Ayatollah 
Khomeini and Hashemi Rafsanjani who was the speaker of the Third Majlis became the 
Iranian President. Hashemi Rafsanjani‟s more open economic policies were resisted by 
the Radical Islamist members of the parliament. In chapter six Bakhtiari considered the 
parliament‟s functions and activities in the first two years of the Fourth Majlis and by 
doing so came to conclusion that, although parliamentary election is not free for all 
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groups, the Majlis is one of the very important institutions which plays an influential 
role in the law making process. He stated that “it should be clear to everyone that the 
parliamentary experience in revolutionary Iran has not been free of electoral 
manipulation. The ruling elite have controlled the access route to the Majlis. Secular 
political groups or parties are not represented in Majlis ...” (p: 235).  He stated that from 
its establishment in May 1980 the Majlis impacts upon many important policies of the 
government and it has been “at the centre of elite factionalism and power rivalry” (p:  
235). He mentions that not only the Majlis actively proposes and debates pieces of 
legislation, but it has also “an important function of providing political and leadership 
training for the top echelon of the ruling elite in power” (p: x). 
Bakhtiari‟s work is a very viable resource for understanding the contribution of the 
Maljis in the law making process. By investigating primary resources he has provided 
very fruitful information and data about the working mechanism of the Iranian 
Parliament. Nevertheless he exaggerated the role of the parliament within the political 
system.  He did not examine the impact of the Guardian Council on the law making 
function of the parliament and just emphasised the role of this Council during the 
parliamentary election process, which is just one important variable for having a 
comprehensive picture of the Majlis. Furthermore, the impact of the Expediency 
Council was not considered which as we will see in the following chapters, has been 
one of the important players in the law making process. Therefore it lacks any 
indication of the interaction of the Majlis with the institutions which surrounded it 
where they have very strong links with the activities of the Majlis.  
The only notable book in the Farsi language which has considered the Majlis in 
detail was written by Mohammad Hashemi; Islamic Republic of Iran‟s Constitutional 
law, first published in 1993 and revised in 2001. This book, which was published in two 
volumes, provides useful information about the legal and religious foundations of the 
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Iranian Constitution, the relationship of the different branches of political power and 
their functions in detail. In the second volume the functions and authority of the 
Leadership Institution were examined separately from other branches of power. In the 
next part, the place of the Majlis within the Constitution was studied. After explaining 
the electoral system of the Majlis, Hashemi discusses the structure and organisation of 
the parliament, including the way that the Specialized Commissions work, the methods 
of voting on the floor and the relationship of the government and Guardian Council with 
the Majlis. It was stated that the President and his consultants and also the Ministers of 
the cabinet have the right to attend on the floor to defend their policies or express their 
points of view regarding political issues of the day. However, they are also obliged to 
attend in the Majlis if the parliamentarians submit them and intend to question the 
President or Ministers or impeach them (p: 117). Also the functions of the parliament 
and individual representatives are categorised into two broad groups i.e. legislation and 
oversight (pp: 129-221).  Hashemi did not recognise any other functions for the Majlis; 
as we will see in the following chapters, many other different functions might be found 
in the Iranian Parliament which are as important as these two. In the third part, the place 
of the Guardian Council in the Constitution, its religious foundation and historical roots 
in Iranian society, its functions and its relationship with Majlis are analysed. In the next 
part, Hashemi explains the executive power and contends that the Iranian political 
regime is a half presidential system since the president is directly elected by the people, 
and a half parliamentary system since his ministers shall be approved by the majority of 
members of the parliament. It seems that Hashemi has not gone beyond the formal 
criteria which are stipulated in the Constitution and the real level of the relationship 
between executive power and the Iranian legislature is ignored. Also there is no 
sufficient explanation of the interactions of the executive power and the legislature in 
the law making process.  
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Hashemi provides good information about the Iranian political system from a legal 
point of view according to the Iranian Constitution. Nevertheless, it remains on the 
surface of that and fails to show the actual and deep roots of the main active political 
institutions, especially those which are involved in the law making process. Strictly 
speaking, his work just describes the main institutions of the political system under the 
shadow of the Constitution and one rarely can find the analysis of their real power. 
Furthermore the place and the role of the political parties, especially within the 
parliament and government, are not mentioned in his work.   
The latest contribution on the Iranian Parliament is titled “Guardian Council: second 
chamber?”  which has been written by Mandana Jalali Naini (2006) and was published 
in The Journal of Legislative Studies.  Reviewing the texts which were written about the 
Iranian Parliament and in the first part of the article she argued that all of these texts 
categorized the Iranian Parliament as a unicameral legislature while in her view it might 
be deemed as a bicameral or even tricameral legislature. She believes that the Guardian 
Council which is not elected by the citizens resembled a second chamber. Using 
comparative methods in her article, she compared the Guardian Council with the 
familiar and unfamiliar second chambers of the different countries and stated that all of 
them have five common functions including examining and revision, initiation, delay, 
representation and oversight functions. Except for initiation, she believes the Guardian 
Council has all the aforementioned functions like other second chambers in the world. 
Referring to Article 93 of the Constitution, which states “without the Guardian Council, 
Assembly shall have no legal validity and creditability”. She states that there is “little 
doubt that the legislature of the country comprises two independent bodies and no law 
can be passed without the consent of the both of the Islamic Consultative Assembly and 
the Guardian Council. It must be noted that the authority to declare legislation 
unconstitutional is also law making and therefore political authority” (p: 204).  
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In the second part of the article, the role of the Expediency Council in the political 
system is examined. On the basis of the cases through which the Council has been 
involved in the law making function, she concludes that the “Expediency Council can 
be regarded as having the characteristics of the third chamber. It has power to make 
laws, decide on new amendments (only disputed ones), and change all existing laws that 
will be in any way affected by their changes” (p: 207).  
In the final part of her work, Naini (2006) analyses the Sixth and Seventh Majlis in 
detail and assesses them on the basis of the conceptual framework of her article. 
Comparing it with the previous Majlises, she believes that the Sixth Majlis was highly 
viscous and an arena-like parliament “[t]he Sixth Majlis, however, can only be 
considered viscous if assumed bicameral. Had the parliament really been unicameral, 
the government and the majority in the ICA [Majlis], would have had no problem 
passing any piece of legislation as the reformers had an overwhelming majority in the 
ICA” (p: 216). Naini predicted that the Seventh, dominated by the same political camp 
as the executive power and the Guardian Council, would be a weak legislature where 
the government could pass its bill easily. Furthermore Naini states that the Seventh 
Majlis “will gain bargaining power with the Guardian Council, leading to a positive 
drift between the two chambers (preferring to resolve the issues through navette)” (p: 
216).  
The work of the Naini is a very good attempt to uncover the unknown aspects of the 
Iranian Parliament and its functions. Using the theoretical frameworks and terminology 
of legislative studies for analysing the Iranian political system is quite unprecedented in 
this area. Nevertheless, it seems Naini did not start from an appropriate point. Without 
understanding the theories and the philosophies which stand behind the establishment of 
these institutions (Guardian Council, Expediency Council), one may not properly 
analyse their functions and features. Furthermore the impact of the political factions was 
 51 
 
not mentioned in the article, while this variable plays a very important role for assessing 
the law making power of the parliament.  In this research, the composition of all the 
institutions which are involved with law making processes, whether they are 
Conservative or New Conservative, or Reformist, will be examined in detail in the 
following chapters.                              
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  1. Introduction 
Iran geopolitically is one of the most important countries in the Middle East. The 
Islamic Revolution of Iran which took place thirty years ago proposed a special kind of 
political system which has been difficult to categorise. Internationally the anti-Western 
policy of Islamic Republic governments has been challenged by the main players of 
international politics. Internally, particularly after the ending the war with Iraq and the 
Post Khomieni Era, the unique structure of political power of Iran has been challenged 
by many political factions, both those who are inside of the main political power circle 
and those who are outside. There is a form of political arrangement in Iran which has 
resisted strongly any kind of reform. It seems the system of decision making in the 
Iranian political system is unique in many ways. In this research we want to explore the 
place of the parliament in the decision making process. An evaluation of the law making 
power of the Majlis within the political system which is defined in the Constitution is 
the heart of this thesis.   
          
2. Iran: overview 
Iran, officially the Islamic Republic of Iran, is located in the South West of Asia and 
has common borders on the West with Turkey and Iraq, on the East with Afghanistan 
and Pakistan, on the North with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan. The total area 
of Iran is 1,648,000 sq km and it is the second largest country in the Middle East, after 
Saudi Arabia and the 18
th
 largest
  
 country in the world (Msn Encarta, 2009). Tehran, the 
largest city of the country, is the capital of Iran, and the main branches of the 
government and the commercial, educational, financial, industrial, and publishing 
centres are located there. 
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                               Source: http://www.geographic.org/maps/new2/iran_maps.html 
 
2.1 Political system 
The place which today is called Iran (the land of Aryans), in the 6th century BC was 
the centre of the Persian Empire, the world‟s preeminent power at that time. Iran was 
ruled by kings (or Shahs), for a long time and consecutively, from 1501 until 1979, 
when the monarchical system of government was overthrown by a revolution which 
was led by the clergy Shias.  “The long history of Iran – two thousand five hundred 
years of recorded history - has been impressed by the institution of monarchy and also, 
since the arrival of Islam, by Shi‟ism. These two important factors, the institution of 
monarchy and Shi‟ism, have shaped much of what has happened in Iran in the last 
millennia, and the modern history of Iran very much reflects that” (Mibagheri, 2003: 
38).  
Shi‟ism can be traced back to the era of the Safavid dynasty which was established in 
Iran by the first King Ismail Safavi in 1501 during whose reign the Iranian people 
converted from Sonni to Shia. The Safavid, who had Shi‟a faith, was a “Sofi group in 
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Ardabil [which] managed to suppress all other tribes and power centres and finally unite 
the whole country in such a way that some have named their ruling as the first Iranian 
national state after the invasion of Persia by the Arabs” (Rasekh, 2008: 75). 
 Although the ruling dynasty changed after the Safavid Era, the system of 
government did not change significantly until 1906, when a popular revolution forced 
the Shah to accept a constitution that limited his powers. In fact the history of the 
modern politics of Iran dates from the early 20th century in the Qajar Era when the 
Constitutional Revolution of Iran took place. The Constitutional Revolution was the 
first movement of the Iranian society toward modern government and the rule of law. 
As we will discuss later, the history of parliament in Iran dates from this era.  Following 
the overthrow of the Qajar Dynasty in 1925, Reza Khan established the Pahlavi Dynasty 
which was continued by his son Mohammad Reza Shah from 1941 till 1979. In the 
Reza Shah Era the modernization process was started and was accelerated in the 
Mohammad Reza Shah Era.  Plans such as developing large scale industries, 
implementing major infrastructure projects, building cross country rail roads, 
establishing the national public education system, reforming the judiciary, and 
improving the health care system was carried out in the First Pahlavi Era.   
Implementation of these wide-ranging economic development programmes culminated 
in industrialization and urbanization of the country. As a result of these development 
plans two new groups, a middle class of professionals and technocrats and a working 
class engaged in manual and industrial labour, emerged. In the era of Mohammad Reza 
Shah Pahlavi, these development programmes continued and deepened, and the 
aforesaid two new social groups gradually expanded. Factory manufacturing 
experienced periods of rapid growth and trade and commercial activities developed with 
the country's increasing urbanization. As we will see in following chapters, both of 
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these groups - especially the middle class which divided into secular and religious 
factions in the 1970s - contributed to the overthrow of the Shah in 1979.  
The Islamic revolution of 1979 was one of the most important turning points of 
Iranian history and culminated in the rule of the clergy headed by the Ayatollah 
Khomeini. Following the collapse of the Pahlavi Dynasty, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
was established through a referendum held in the February 1979. Ayatollah Khomeini 
became spiritual leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran and a new constitution 
established (amended in 1989). In the Iranian political system the Supreme Leader is the 
highest official and power holder of the country who has a broad number of powers and 
authorities. The three branches of government consist of the executive, legislative, and 
judicial power working under the supervision of the Supreme Leader. 
The war of Iraq against Iran which started shortly after the establishment of the new 
political system and lasted for eight years (1980-1988) affected all affairs of the 
country. In particular it prevented the political system developing toward more open and 
democratic government. One year after the ceasefire Ayatollah Khomeini passed away 
and Ayatollah Khamenie, who was the President of Iran from 1981 till 1989, succeeded 
him. After his appointment by the Council of Experts, Hashemi Rafsenjani was elected 
in 1989 as Iranian President and served for two consecutive terms until 1997. 
Mohammad Khatami was then elected as president for two consecutive periods known 
as the Reform period. Although Reformists won the Sixth Parliamentary Election of 
2000, the Reformist Movement failed to reach its goals and the New Conservatives 
returned to power. In 2004 most of the Reformists candidates were disqualified by the 
Guardian Council and therefore the Conservative camp took the majority of seats in the 
Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis). In the following year and through a 
complicated process which will be discussed, Ahmadinejad, one of New Conservative 
and radical politicians was elected as a head of the executive.  Studying the relationship 
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of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, or Majlis, with other parts of the political power 
particularly the executive power is the central point of this research. 
 
Table (3-1): List of Presidents of the Islamic Republic of Iran (1980-Present) 
Name Took 
Office 
Left Office Political Party 
Abolhassan Banisadr 4 February 
1980 
22 June 1981 
(impeached) 
Independent 
Provisional 
Presidential Council 
22 June 
1981 
2 August 1981 
(assassinated) 
                      - 
Mohammad Ali 
Rajai 
2 August 
1981 
30 August 1981 Islamic Republic Party (IRP) 
Provisional 
Presidential Council 
30 August 
1981 
13 October 1981                        - 
 
Ali Khamenei 
13 October 
1981 
3 August 1989 Islamic Republic Party (IRP) until 1987, 
Combatant Clergy Association since 1987 
Akbar Hashemi 
Rafsanjani 
3 August 
1989 
3 August 1997 Combatant Clergy Association  
Mohammad Khatami 3 August 
1997 
3 August 2005 Association of Combatant Clerics) 
Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad 
3 August 
2005 
Present Alliance of Developers of Islamic  
 
              
2.2 Population and minorities 
 
According to the Iranian statistical centre, the population of Iran was estimated at 
70,495,782 in 2007. The population growth rate of Iran between the years 1956 and 
1986 was more than 3 percent per year while it declined by 1/6 percent in the mid-
1980s after the government started to control the population growth rate. “There have 
been 17501771 families in 1385, [2005] of which 12405584 units reside in urban and 
5074866 families in rural areas. 21321 families have been reported unsettled 
households” (Iranian Statistical Centre, 2008).  
Iran‟s population is made up of numerous ethnic groups including Persians (51%), 
Azaris (Turks) (24%), Gilaki and Mazandarani (8%), Kurds (7%), Arabs (3%), Baluchi 
(2%), Lurs (2%), Turkmans (2%) and others (1%). Also there are different religious 
groups of which the Shi‟a Muslims constitute the majority with 88 percent of the 
population. Sunni Muslims with 8 percent of the population are the largest minority of 
the country. Other religions - Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians and Baha‟is - make up the 
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rest of the religious minorities of the country. According to Article 12 of the Iranian 
Constitution the official religion of Iran is Islam and the Twelver Ja'fari School, and this 
principle will remain eternally immutable. Other Islamic schools are to be accorded full 
respect, and their followers are free to act in accordance with their own jurisprudence in 
performing their religious rites. Jafari Shia Islam has been the official religion of Iran 
since the 16th century. Jafaris believe that there are 12 legitimate successors, or Imam, 
to the Prophet Muhammad, and because of that they are called Twelvers. Followers of 
Shi‟a Islam disagree with Sunni Muslims over the rightful succession to the Prophet 
Muhammad, the founder of Islam (Sivan, E.  1989). Iran‟s 1979 Constitution assigns to 
the Shi‟a clergy important political leadership roles in the government which influence 
all parts of the political system. 
Apart from Sunni‟s, Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian Iranians are the only 
recognized religious minorities. Within the limits of the law, they are free to perform 
their religious ceremonies, and to act according to their own principles in matters of 
personal affairs and religious education (Article 13).  
Religious minorities are not allowed to take certain key political positions such as 
Religious Leadership, the Presidency (Article 144), Commandership of Islamic Armies 
(Article 144), Judgeships (Article 163), and membership of the Guardian Council.  
 Furthermore, religious minorities are not eligible to become members of the Majlis 
(the Islamic Consultative Assembly) through the general elections. Christians, Jews and 
Zoroastrians can only be elected for the specific seats allocated to these minorities. 
According to Article 64 of the Constitution: one seat for Zoroastrians, one seat for Jews, 
one seat for Assyrian and Chaldean Christians, one seat for Armenian Christians in the 
North and one seat for Armenian Christians in the South are allocated in the Islamic 
Consultative Assembly. However, these minorities are unable to play an influential role 
in mainstream politics. Some of the non-recognized religious minorities are totally 
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excluded from any parliamentary representation since they can neither vote nor be 
elected. Finally, non-Muslims cannot become members of the very influential 
institution the Guardian Council. 
 
 2.3 Political Economy 
 
Prior to the exploration of oil, the economy of Iran was based upon agriculture and 
farming; however because of the difficulties in climate and topography, and also the 
primitive method of farming the productivity has been always low, even in recent years.  
There are few places except the North of Iran that are continuously cultivated and most 
parts of that have suffered from shortage of water sources: 
 
 Aridity probably played a basic role in shaping the structure of the Iranian political 
economy. There are two main reasons for this. First, it served to create isolated and 
autonomous village units of production, none of which could produce a sufficiently 
large surplus to provide a feudal power base; and second, given the expanses of the 
region, the collective surplus of all or most of the isolated villages was so large that, 
once taken by an 'external force', it could be used as the economic base of a 
countrywide arbitrary state or empire ( Katouzian, 1997: 69).  
 
 Discovery of oil by the British not only changed the macro-economic situation of 
the country but also shaped its political, cultural, and sociological face in the course of 
one-hundred years from the date of its exploration. The economy of Iran, which has the 
world‟s third largest oil reservoir, in major part is based on oil and gas revenues. Apart 
from agriculture, trade, mining, taxes and the other sectors, only the oil industry 
constitutes approximately 50 percent of the central government revenues and one-fifth 
of the GDP “Nominal GDP for the 2006-2007 financial years was estimated by the IMF 
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at IR, 2,065, 865m. (US $ 223,530m.) , based on the market exchange rate, while per 
capita GDP was $ 3,258” (Siddiqi, 2008: 428). Therefore the Iranian economy is deeply 
dependent on the oil revenue 80 percent of which is owned or controlled by the state, 
weakening the private sector.  It was stated that “the oil-based economy has widened the 
gap between the government and the people and added fuel to the fire of despotism” 
(Rasekh, 2008: 78).    
Development plans have a crucial role in the economy of Iran. After the revolution 
four Five-Year Development Plans have been created by the government for changing 
the state oriented economy and making the private sector more powerful.  But there are 
many doubts about the success of the recent efforts toward macro economic reforms. 
Some authors believe that because of the ample dependency of the government on 
“windfall oil revenue”, the Five-Year Development Plans have not met their targets. 
“Not only has there not been the necessary infrastructure - such as experts and private 
institutions - policy making in the country has also suffered from fundamental 
deficiencies. These relate to elements such as inflexible calculation, partial or factional 
(vis-a-vis national) interest orientation, disregard of international experience and 
resources, a very low knowledge of managerial skills and principles and ambiguity in 
key concepts in the field of development and growth” (Rasekh, 2008: 77, 78).   
Five-Year Development Plans as mid term development plans and annual budget 
bills as short term plans of the country are the very important documents which the 
executive power and the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis) involve themselves in. 
The executive power prepares the plans and submits them to the Majlis and 
parliamentarians in turn have the right to accept, reject or amend the executive‟s 
proposals. This stage of the policy making process is a very appropriate one to assess 
the real power of the Majlis which will be done in the following chapters.  
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2. Constitutionalism in Iranian context: historical perspective  
If one traces back the important and modern political institutions such as parliament 
in Iranian history, one may not go further than the early 20
th
 century. Before this time 
what was predominant in Iranian political history was an arbitrary state and society 
within which the strongest tribe ruled. Some authors (Hass, 1946: 94-106) describe 
Iranian society before the establishment of modern government as follows:  
 “[D]espotism has been in the past the form of government in Iran as in practically 
all Asiatic countries…. {T}he ruler in Iran faces a mass of people who are all equally 
subjected to his will. The reason for this typically Asiatic phenomenon is the lack of an 
aristocracy in the proper sense of the term, such as we find in all Western countries …. 
In Iran no such distinct nobility has ever developed. The Persian kings do not feel it 
necessary to rely on a privileged class, and they would have resented the mere existence 
of such a group limiting their power.”  
   Historians identified different causes for this character of Iranian society but there 
is a clear consensus that despotism and autocracy have prevailed for centuries in various 
eras of Iranian history. “It was a society in which the ruler was absolute, in which there 
was no separation between Church and State, [religion and government] but which 
contained certain inherent tendencies towards extremes, a society in which the 
individual's sense of social purpose was fulfilled through the corporation or group; a 
society in which political obligation did not rest, even implicitly, on a contractual basis” 
(Lambton, 1957: 15). Katouzian (1997), one of the most prominent theorists of Iranian 
political history, mentioned that in Iranian society only the state had an exclusive right 
of property, not the people. They had the privilege to use the properties of the state and 
the rulers were able to withdraw this privilege whenever they wished and as result of no 
ownership right no aristocracy formed in Iranian society.  
 62 
 
He explained that, despite trading being one of the dominant dimensions of the 
Iranian economy, the failure to accumulate commercial capital prevented the formation 
of the bourgeoisies. Katouzian (1997) believes that where social classes have had an 
important role in European societies in the establishment of their state, this relation was 
the other way round in Iran. These and many other essential differences which have 
lasted a long time from the early Iranian history impacted on modern Iranian society, in 
particular its political institutions.           
From the early 19
th
 century onward Iran familiarized itself with European modernity 
in different ways. The administrative, military, educational, and economic reforms 
which were implemented by the Iranian great minister Mirza Taghi Khan Amir kabir, 
improved transportation and communication systems which eased merchants and 
students' travel to European countries; the Russian Revolution of 1905 acted as a strong 
pattern for uprising against absolutist power; familiarity with the Young Ottoman 
Movement, economic malaise which was started from late 19
th
 century  weakened the 
monarchy of Qajar, and many other reasons contributed to the request for a 
constitutional monarchy, and demands for democratic government, the rule of law and 
political participation (Lambton, 1975). For the first time and in the course of the 
Constitutional Movement, concepts such as codified law, constitution, and separation of 
powers doctrine, justice, rights of the people and national consultative assembly 
(parliament) were proposed.  
It is noteworthy that classical historians of Iran strongly believed that the 
aforementioned concepts propagated by Westernized intellectuals awakened the 
sleeping public at the end of the 19
th
 century, and thereby led the way to the national 
resurgence of the early 20
th
 century. The main contemporary historians in Iran, such as 
Fereydun Adamiyat, Ali Shamim, Ibrahim Safa'i, and Hafez Farman Farmayan “have 
likewise stressed that the ideological foundations of traditional despotism were 
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undermined by the introduction of the modern concepts of patriotism, secularism, and 
liberalism. This interpretation is typified by a recent popular history of the constitutional 
movement” (Abrahamian, 1997: 384). 
 It might be said that three groups of political activists with different social 
backgrounds and  ideologies (who established the political parties in later decades) 
united for pursuing this aspiration that in turn have had their main role  shaping the new 
political system and creating a kind of perplexity within that. In the following pages the 
role of these three groups in shaping the political system will be discussed.  
The first group of these social forces comprised Iranian intellectuals and traders who 
came back from the West to Iran and who had interacted closely with Western society 
and encountered some philosophies such as the politics of representative government, 
modern education and secular law. They were advocates of secularism, liberalism and 
nationalism. “The intellectuals were strongly influenced by French secular thought, but 
few, if any of them, publicly advocated secularism, though many wished to curtail the 
influence of the religious classes in political life. It is interesting that great emphasis 
was laid on the separation of the legislative, executive, and judicial powers when the 
Constitution was drawn up …” (Lambton, 1975: 17). 
One of the most famous figures of these groups of intellectuals was Mirza Malkam 
Khan who introduced the above mentioned concepts in his book named Booklet 
inspired by the unseen or the book of the reform. He also published a newspaper in 
London named Qanon (constitution) in the early 1890s and proposed that: 
 “[A]t least one hundred of the great mojtaheds, [high ranking clerics] the renowned 
learned men, and savants of Persia be gathered in a national consultative assembly 
(majles-e shoray-e melli). They should be held responsible and given the full authority, 
first, to establish, codify, and officially proclaim the laws and principles that are 
necessary for the reorganization (tanzim) of Persia. Second, according to an orderly 
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arrangement, the national consultative assembly [parliament] should hold itself as the 
guardian, the overseer, and the agent for the execution of the law” (Qaanon 9, n.d. 
[1890], pp. 1-2; 6, 18 July 1890, p. 2(Amanat, 2005).    
He wrote about the natural rights of the people and stressed their duty toward their 
fatherland; however he declined to direct criticism at Naasáer-al-Din Shah. It is 
noteworthy that Malkam Khan wanted to show that not only these Western concepts 
and institutions are not against Islamic rules but also it is possible to draw them out 
from the Quran or other Islamic source of rules (Ajodani, 2003: 281-361). As we will 
see later, this kind of approach has had a tremendous impact upon the functions and the 
nature of important political institutions such as parliament. 
Apart from Malkam Khan there were some other anti religion and secularist 
intellectuals like Akhondzadeh who emphasized Western modernization and avoiding 
absorbing modern concepts with religious traditional concepts (Amanat, 2005). As a 
whole this group of activists represented the middle classes and stressed political reform 
through establishing democratic government. 
The second group who had a great impact upon the Constitutional Movement in Iran 
composed clerics and religious leaders. As a whole their influence upon politics of Iran 
is undeniable. They have been among the major players in important political 
movements since the 19
th
 century, including the Tobacco Protest Movement of 1890-
1891, the Constitutional Revolution Movement of 1905-1911, the Oil Nationalization 
Movement of 1951-1953, and the most important of all the Islamic Revolution of 1979. 
They had the exclusive authority to interpret the Shi‟a laws and according to one of 
their most famous interpretations “all temporal rulers are illegitimate and came 
increasingly to assert that legitimate guidance, pending the return of the 'hidden' Twelfth 
Imam, is to be found in the Shi'a religious leaders, the mojtaheds; [high ranking cleric]” 
(Keddi, 1971:  5). Also they had the exclusive right to receive religious taxes, called 
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Khoms and Zakat, and administer the state-donated religious endowments (Waqf). 
Furthermore  “identification of the ulama [high ranking clergy] with the popular anti-
foreign cause ever since the first wars against Russia in the early nineteenth century” 
(Ibid) gave them social and cultural hegemony throughout Iran.  They were one of the 
only power centres who could publicly criticise the government and its policies. 
Ordinary people could expect them to mediate with the state for protecting them from 
the arbitrary acts of the kings and owing to this reason the clergy had a very close 
relationship with the Iranian population. 
During the Constitutional Revolution they advocated an Islamic society by giving 
precedent to the national will and clerical authority in the sense that they set out to 
move back traditional overarching structures of monarchy and clerical hierarchy from 
direct governance while maintaining the Islamic character of state and society. For 
instance Ayatollah Mohammad Hosien Naini as a modernist cleric was among one of 
those groups of clerics who believed Islam and particularly Shiism demanded such a 
political system which secured the rights of the people and justice. They argued that this 
kind of political system should be democratic government. Some high ranking clerics 
such as Abdollah Behbahani and Sayyed Mohammad Tabatabaee also participated in 
the Constitutional Movement and justified the establishment of new political 
institutions. However it should be mentioned few people especially among the clergy 
clearly knew what the constitution meant and what implications it had. They supported 
the Constitutional Movement only because they thought it brought security and 
prosperity for the country and were never familiar with the functions and foundations of 
constitutionalism and constitutional governments which prevailed in European countries 
(Milani, 1994).    
On the other hand this group of clerics was countered by the traditionalists who 
criticized the constitutionalist approach and instead of secular constitutionalism 
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proposed Islamic constitutionalism. The most prominent figure of them was Shykh 
Fazlollahe Nuri who introduced Mashrote-h Mashroe-ah which might be translated as 
Constitutionalism in an Islamic framework. The idea of the traditionalist clerics such as 
Shykh Fazlollah Nuri, who had a great impact upon the nature and functions of political 
institutions, will be discussed in detail in the following pages.  
The last group of activists during the Constitutional Revolution was the urban 
merchants or bazaars, small landowners, workshop owners who supported the two 
aforementioned groups, particularly the clergy.  Merchants and clergy had a very close 
relationship and had common interests. Most of the mosques were located at the centre 
of bazaars which the merchants attend for praying or asking their religious questions. In 
the absence of modern government for promulgating commercial rules and regulations 
which was necessary for the day to day affairs of the merchants, the clergy provided the 
rules according to the Shari‟a laws and in return merchants furnished clergy with special 
kinds of funds called Khoms and Zekat. Therefore merchants and clergy were 
traditionally tied together and formed a kind of unofficial alliance which in the mid-19
th
 
century increased significantly as Western penetration and attempts by the state to 
modernize itself threatened the economic position of both groups.  
 Historians stressed (Abrahamian, 1997: 388) the role of the merchants and trader 
classes in the Constitutional Movement, whose interests were affected by the ruling 
government. Many factors encouraged merchants to move against the ruling 
government and ultimately support the Constitutional Movement. For instance by 
alluding to tariff policies according to which foreigners were subject to a two percent 
valorem duty while their Iranian counterpart had to pay duty at five percent that 
obviously favoured foreign merchants, importing finished goods that competed with 
domestic manufactures and undermined local crafts and industries, and concessions 
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which were granted to the foreigners, were among the main factors which endangered 
the Iranian merchants‟ interests (Bakhash, 1991: 1485).  
After the assassination of Naser al-Din Shah in 1896, who was a despotic ruler, 
Mozafar al-Din Shah succeeded him. Since Mozafar al-Din Shah was less despotic than 
his predecessor, opposition groups found good opportunities for achieving their main 
goal which was the establishment of a constitutional monarchy. 
Mozafar al-Din Shah was confronted with an economic crisis that led him to take 
loans from Britain and Russian. Furthermore Amin al-Dowleh, the premier of the new 
king, wanted economic reforms particularly in tax and financials affairs. Therefore a 
Belgian named Joseph Naus was employed by the Iranian government to institute a tax 
reform law. He set out a series of strict financial policies and laws which disappointed 
the prominent merchants and traders and also these measures frightened the clergy who 
viewed recent events as a serious threat to their pockets. At the same time political 
oppositions including high ranking clergy such as Seyyed Abdollah Behbahani and 
Seyyed Mohahhamad Tabatabaee started a movement against excessive and foreign 
intrusion and gradually anti governmental agitation turned into organized movement. In 
fact a temporary coalition was formed between three aforementioned segments of social 
powers which had essentially different approaches toward political power (Bayat, 
1991).  
Eventually an event which happened in 1905 paved the way for the revolution. A 
small group of well-known sugar traders was punished by the ruler of the Tehran Alla 
al-Doleh and forced to lower the sugar price. Following that many merchants and 
traders protested against the ruler of Tehran and were supported by prominent clerics 
and theological students, political activists and laymen. After many ups and downs the 
protesters decided to retreat to a shrine in the south of Tehran while demanding that the 
King dismiss Premier Ain al-Doleh, the ruler of Tehran, Joseph Nuas and most 
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important than all of them was the establishment of  a Eddalat Khaneh (House of 
Justice). 
Although the King dismissed the ruler of Tehran and promised to create the House of 
Justice, his premier remained in office and after six months, his promise for establishing 
the House of Justice was not fulfilled. Following this, protesters several times reminded 
the King of his promises. One of the Reformist clerics Seyyed Mohammad Tabatabaee 
wrote a letter and requested the King to fulfil his promises. For the first time under the 
influence of Mirza Malkam Khan there was a demand to establish a parliament which 
represented the people (Kermani, 1970: 338-340). It seems from this point on, the 
demand for the House of Justice turned to a demand for a national assembly or 
parliament. 
Since protesters received no reply from the King the confrontation between 
government and the reformists increased and, after the death of fifteen people during the 
protest, they decided to leave Tehran and retire to a shrine city, Qom. At the same time 
another group of protesters including clerics, theological students, merchants, tradesmen 
and laymen gathered in the garden of the British embassy in Tehran. Some historians 
believe that the demands for a national assembly (parliament) rose during the retirement 
of the protesters in the British embassy; however as mentioned earlier, most of those 
who proposed this demand seemed to have no clear idea about the rule of law and the 
foundation of modern government (Martin, 1989). 
Eventually Mozafar al-Din Shah accepted the demands of the protesters including the 
establishment of the parliament and issued the following decree:   
 
“Whereas God Most High (glorious is His State!) hath entrusted to our hands the 
direction of the progress and prosperity of the well-protected realms of Persia, and hath 
constituted Our Royal Personage the Guardian of the Rights of all the people of Persia 
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and of all our loyal subjects- therefore on this occasion, our Royal and Imperial 
judgment has decided, for the peace and tranquillity of all the people of Persia, and for 
the strengthening and consolidation of the foundations of the State, that such reforms as 
are this day required in the different departments of the State and of the Empire shall be 
effected; and we do enact that an Assembly of delegates elected by the Princes, the 
Doctors of Divinity ('ulamá), the Qájár family, the nobles and notables, the land-
owners, the merchants and the guilds shall be formed and constituted, by election of the 
classes above mentioned, in the capital  ִ Tihrán; which Assembly shall carry out the 
requisite deliberations and investigations on all necessary subjects connected with 
important affairs of the State and Empire and the public interests; and shall render the 
necessary help and assistance to our Cabinet of Ministers in such reforms as are 
designed to promote the happiness and well-being of Persia; and shall, with complete 
confidence and security, through the instrumentality of the first Lord of the State, submit 
[their proposals to Us], so that these, having been duly ratified by Us, may be carried 
into effect. It is evident that, in accordance with this August Rescript, you will arrange 
and prepare a code of regulations and provisions governing this Assembly, and likewise 
the ways and means necessary to its formation, so that, by the help of God Most High 
this Assembly may be inaugurated and may take in hand the necessary reforms. We 
likewise enact that you should publish and proclaim the text of this August Rescript, so 
that all the people of Persia, being duly informed of our good intentions, all of which 
regard the progress of the Government and People of Persia, may, with tranquil minds, 
engage in prayer for Us” (Mu zaffaru'd-Din Shah, 1906). 
 
 Following the issuance of this decree the high ranking clerics returned from Qom 
and the protesters ended their retirement in the British embassy. After that the election 
law was drafted by the notables and the King ratified the first election law on 9
th
 
 70 
 
September 1906. Shortly after that date an election was held in Tehran and other 
provinces of Iran and the inauguration ceremony of the first Iranian Parliament took 
place in Tehran on 7
th
 October 1906. 
The first task of the newly established parliament was to draft a constitution as a 
fundamental law within which the form of government and the main bodies of that 
would be determined. A committee of parliamentarians was formed to prepare the draft 
of the constitution. “First convened as a constituent assembly to draft the fundamental 
laws, the Majlis [parliament], culminated a nationalist movement that had allied 
European-oriented Reformists, a traditionalist merchant class, and a Conservative clergy 
against an autocratic monarch. The 1906-07 Constitution sought a limited monarchy 
and ministerial accountability by vesting impressive powers in the Majlis [parliament] 
to deal with the economy, foreign treaties and agreements, and succession to crown” 
(Weinbaum, 1975: 47). The Belgium Constitution of 1831, the Bulgarian Constitution 
of 1879 and the Russian Constitution proclaimed by the Czar earlier in 1906 were the 
main sources of the drafters in writing a modern constitution (Amir Arjomand, 2005). 
Despite using modern patterns of constitutions, it has been argued that the drafters of 
the first Constitution of Iran “knew very little of constitutional theories. Long tradition 
and background in the field of political philosophy was absolutely lacking. The 
Constitution of Iran therefore does not have a national scholastic history in which one 
may find the origins of the concepts expressed in the instrument” (Farmanfarma, 1954: 
243). It was mentioned in previous chapters that constitutionalism, separation of powers 
and sovereignty of the people through representative democracy had a long tradition in 
the political philosophy of Western societies while this tradition was absent in Iranian 
history. Intellectuals who introduced these concepts to Iranian society tried to implant 
them in a society in which the main character of its political system was despotism. 
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3.1 Separation of powers according to the Constitution of 1906-1907 
 
 As already mentioned the basic model according to which the committee of drafters 
determined the form of the Iranian political regime was the parliamentary model of 
Belgium. The first Iranian Constitution of 1906 which in large part was in accordance to 
the Belgian (1831 amended in 1893) and Bulgarian (1879) Constitutions consisted of 
one short preamble and 51 articles. Since the articles set out in the Constitution of 1906 
were assembled hurriedly and unsystematically a new committee consisting of 
prominent constitutionalists was formed to prepare a Supplement to the Constitution. 
The Supplement consisted of 107 articles which in Article 26 expressly affirmed 
popular sovereignty.  A systematic separation of powers was accepted and legislative, 
executive and judicial powers were enumerated in the Constitution. The legislative 
power, whose main function was to make and adapt the laws, was derived from his 
imperial Majesty and parliament. The executive power was reserved to the king, and the 
judicial power was kept to the religious courts in matters relating to Islamic laws and 
ordinary courts in secular matters. 
  The right to govern was thought to be a trust that belonged to God which was given 
to the king by the nation. According to Article 48 “[t]he choice of officials as heads of 
the various government departments, whether internal or foreign, subject to the approval 
of the responsible Minister, is the king's right, save in such cases as are specifically 
excepted by the law; but the appointment of other officials does not lie with the king, 
save in such cases as are explicitly provided for by the Law.” Nevertheless the king was 
free of responsibility in that they were responsible for all matters to both chambers; 
whenever ministers were summoned by one of the chambers, they were required to 
appear before it. Ministers, besides being individually responsible for the affairs of their 
own ministries, were also jointly responsible for general matters before the two 
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chambers, and were collectively bound for each other's actions (Articles 60, 61). Both 
chambers could call ministers to account and bring them to trial. The responsibility of 
the ministers and the punishments to which they might be liable were specified by law. 
According to Article 67 “ if the National Consultative Assembly or the Senate shall, by 
an absolute majority, declare itself dissatisfied with the Cabinet, or with one particular 
minister, that cabinet or minister shall resign their or his ministerial functions.” 
The king had authority to dissolve both chambers separately or at the same time. He 
needed to mention the reason for the dissolution in any case and the new election should 
start one month after the dissolution decree.   
The king was the commander in chief of all land and sea forces and the declaration 
of war as well as conclusion of peace were his special rights (Articles 50, 51). Also it 
was a prerogative of the king to grant military ranks, decorations and other distinctions 
in conformity with the law. 
The Judicial power was the official authority to which public grievances could be 
submitted. The President and the members of the courts were chosen according to the 
laws.  There was a kind of duality in the judicial power in that religious matters were in 
the authority of clerics possessing the necessary qualifications, who controlled the 
religious court, and other disputes were in the jurisdiction of the court of justice.  
 
3.2 The place of the first Iranian Parliament in the Constitution of 1906- 1907; 
Qajar Era 
 
     Parliament was declared the representative of all people and became the country's 
central institution. According to Article 30 of the Supplement to the Constitution “ [t]he 
deputies of the National Consultative Assembly and of the Senate represent the whole 
nation, and not only the particular classes, provinces, departments or districts which 
have elected them”. The parliament was the symbol of constitutionalism and the 
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government justified its policies by citing the fact that applicable laws had been passed 
by the parliament. In legislative terminology it seems that the Iranian Parliament was 
expected to fulfill the legitimizing function for the political system when it experienced 
a legitimacy crisis.  
The legislative power was shared by the Shah, the Majles, and the Senate, each with 
the right to initiate legislation (Article 27). In fact, all laws necessary for the 
consolidation of the foundation of the state and regulations of the affairs of the country 
might be initiated by the aforementioned authorities but they were to be approved by the 
National Consultative Assembly eventually. 
At least fifteen members of the parliament could introduce a proposal and then it 
might be discussed in plenary session or in committee. If a bill presented by a minister 
was not accepted by the National Consultative Assembly, it was to be returned to the 
minister with the Assembly's observations. The minister concerned might accept or 
reject the Assembly's criticisms and present the bill again to the Assembly. The 
members of the Assembly were to declare their denial or acceptance of the proposal and 
no one might influence their vote by promises or threat. The enactments of the lower 
chamber had to be approved by the Senate and then they were submitted to the 
sovereign by the head of the government and came into effect, after receiving the royal 
approval. 
The members of the parliament had the right to examine and question all the 
problems of the country which they thought necessary. While the king was free of 
responsibility before the parliament, the right of parliamentarians to investigate 
ministers and dismiss them was recognized in the Constitution (Articles 65, 67). 
Whenever the parliament observed a violation or negligence in the application of the 
laws it was to inform the minister responsible for it and he was to provide the necessary 
explanation. If any minister, contrary to one of the laws enacted and approved by his 
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Majesty, fraudulently issued written or verbal orders on his Majesty's authority and used 
such orders as an excuse for his negligence and lack of attention, he was, according to 
law, responsible to his holy Majesty personally. If a minister was unable to give an 
acceptable report of any affair according to the laws approved by his Majesty, and if it 
was agreed that he had acted contrary to the law or that he had transgressed the limits 
imposed on him, the parliament was to request his Majesty to dismiss him, and if his 
treason was proved before the court of justice, he could no longer be eligible for public 
office. The responsibility of the ministers was before both chambers of the parliament in 
that whenever they were summoned by one of those chambers they were required to 
appear before it. Apart from their individual responsibility they were jointly responsible 
for the general subjects relevant to the whole government. Although, the scrutiny power 
of the parliament was emphasized in the Supplement of the Constitution by stressing the 
responsibility of the Ministers, at the beginning of the new form of government they 
refused to be answerable to the parliamentarians and believed they were accountable 
only to the king (Adamiyat, no date). 
 Parliament had the right, whenever it considered it necessary, to present a 
petition to his Majesty via a committee composed of the President and six 
members chosen by the six classes of deputies. 
Nobody could challenge a member of the parliament on any ground without the 
knowledge and approval of the Assembly, and if by chance a member had openly 
committed a crime, felony or misdemeanor and had been arrested, no penalty could be 
exercised upon him without parliament having been advised.   
As was mentioned, the first Iranian Parliament had two chambers: the lower chamber 
with its members elected by the people and upper chamber or Senate - Article 43 of the 
Constitution gave authority to the king to nominate thirty of the sixty senators and the 
rest were to be popularly elected (Article 45). The members of the Senate were elected 
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from amongst the well-informed, discerning, devout and respected persons of the 
country. “The idea of a bicameral legislature, consisting of a chamber of deputies 
(majles) and a senate, was also taken from the Belgian Constitution, though the 
requirement that half the Senate was to be appointed by the Shah suggests some 
influence from the Russian Constitution proclaimed by the Czar earlier in 1906” (Amir 
Arjomand, 2005).  
After the formation of the Senate all proposals were to be approved by the two 
chambers; if the proposals emanated from the Senate or from the cabinet they were first 
to be critically revised and discussed in the Senate and approved by a majority of votes; 
they were then submitted for the approval of the lower chamber. However, proposals 
emanating from the lower chamber were to go from there to the Senate, except for 
financial questions which were reserved for the lower chamber. The decision of the 
lower chamber on financial matters was brought to the notice of the Senate and the 
lower chamber was free to accept or reject its observations (Articles 43-47). When the 
Senate and National Consultative Assembly could not reach agreement about the 
proposal or bill which had been sent twice from one chamber to another, a joint 
committee, comprising an equal number of deputies of both chambers, was to be formed 
and present a report to both chambers. If the report was approved by both chambers then 
it was submitted to the king for his signature. In the event that the Senate was not in 
session, proposals were to be voted on by the lower chamber alone, and after receiving 
the Royal signature they were put into effect. 
Although the Senate was provided for in the first Constitution of Iran it was only a 
formality since the next Article (44) stated that the rules and regulations of the upper 
chamber had to be ratified by the lower chamber. The creation of an upper house was 
not meant to challenge the larger assembly. “The insignificance of this change was 
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demonstrated when no Senate convened for another forty-three years” (Bakhtiari, 1996: 
7, 8). 
The regulation of financial questions, adjustment of the budget, changes in taxation, 
the acceptance or rejection of duties, international treaties and foreign loans, 
monopolies and government finances were to be approved in the National Consultative 
Assembly (Abrahamian, 1997: 338, 339). According to Article 96 “[t]he National 
Consultative Assembly shall each year by a majority of votes fix and approve the 
budget”. Also no tax might be imposed unless in accordance with the law and the 
amount of taxation was to be determined and ratified every year by the majority vote of 
the National Consultative Assembly (Articles 94-100). The parliament‟s approval was 
necessary for all transfers or sales of the revenues or properties of the State or the 
country. The State could not grant any concession for the creation of any kind of 
company and public partnership without asking authorization from the parliament. 
There was an Accounts Tribunal whose members were elected by the National 
Consultative Assembly for a specific period of time. Their tasks were to verify and 
control the accounts of the Ministry of Finance and audit the various accounts of all 
departments of the government. It was also to monitor the government so that no item 
of expenditure embedded in the budget exceeded the fixed limits or underwent any 
change or alteration, and that each sum was expended on the goal for which it was 
appropriated.   
It is noteworthy that the first Iranian Parliament had seven permanent committees 
which paralleled the executive departments. They were proposed by the 
parliamentarians Seddigh Hazrat and Ehtesham el-Saltaneh for examining government 
bills, and scrutinizing the executive power and the ministerial affairs within it. 
Ehtesham el-Saltaneh emphasized the role of parliamentary commissions and stated that 
they should review the executive's bills in the first instance and make it easier for the 
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whole chamber to consider it. He also added that the decision of the commissions 
should be approved by the parliament (Ibid: 379). Apart from this committee, the 
committee of justice, financial committee, internal affairs committee, petition 
committee, foreign affairs committee, and the committee of parliamentary 
administration were established in the First Iranian Parliament.  
   
3.3 The main limitations upon the law making function of the First Iranian 
Parliament 
 
As we mentioned above the Constitutional Movement in Iran whose focal point was 
the demand for the establishment of the parliament was the result of a coalition of three 
main social segments of Iranian society. Although the role of the Iranian secular 
intellectuals who proposed the new concepts such as popular sovereignty, separation of 
powers and accountability, equality of citizens before the law regardless of their 
religious identity, freedom of press and so on was indispensable, the role of the clerics 
especially in the initial phase also was important. In fact they gave more legitimacy to 
the Constitutionalism Movement and had an undeniable role in mobilizing crowds.   
The temporary union between secular intellectuals and a group of hardline clerics 
however began to collapse very soon. The apparent secularist drift of the constitutional 
amendments intimidated the Conservative clerics in the parliament. Constitutionalists 
were challenged by this group of clerics who warned that a law other than Islamic law 
might come to be officially in force. Shaikh Fazlollah Nuri as their leader requested the 
rejection of non Shi‟a Moslems from the parliament and argued that the national 
constitution was quite contrary to Islam, because the Quran as an Islamic religious text 
was the only true constitution of the Moslems. Ayatollah Nuri questioned the legitimacy 
of the Majlis as a legislative body and stated that it may only have authority to 
investigate and regulate the arbitrary actions of state officials (Kasravi, 1999). He also 
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believed that the imported Constitution was incompatible with Shi‟a doctrine. He 
suggested, therefore, that the Mashroteh (rule of law) be replaced by Mashrueh 
(according to Islamic law) and, in addition, since the Constitution was European, the 
clergy should have the authority to make necessary alterations to it so that it conformed 
to the Shari‟a. 
 He proposed the establishment of a committee consisting of Shi‟a clerics to monitor 
legislation passed by the parliament ensuring non discrepancy with existing Islamic 
laws or Shari‟a. Although the constitutionalists and clerics such as Seyyed Mohammad 
Tabatabaee and Abdullah Behbahani disagreed with this idea, Conservative clerics 
succeeded in establishing the aforementioned committee proposed by Nuri. Under their 
influence in the preamble of the Constitution the purpose of the parliament was defined 
as follow: “to promote the progress and happiness of our kingdom and people, 
strengthen the foundations of our government, and give effect to the enactments of 
Islamic law of His Holiness the prophet. Article 1 of the Supplement specifically 
affirmed that the official religion of Persia was Shi‟a Islam” (Amir Arjomand, 2005). 
Article 2 of the Constitution which left the imprint of Nuri's and the fundamentalist 
clergy‟s ideas and tremendously influenced the political structure of Iran for more than 
one century, is as follows: 
 
“ At no time must any legal enactment of the sacred national Consultative Assembly , 
establish by the favour and assistance of His Holiness the Imam of the Time ( my God 
his blessed Advent), the favour of His Majesty the Shahanshah of Iran (may God 
immortalize his reign), the care of the proofs of Islam (may God multiply the likes of 
them), and the whole people of the Iranian nation, be at variance with the sacred 
principle of Islam or the laws established by his Holiness the Best of Mankind (on home 
and on whose Household be the blessings of God and his peace). It is hereby declared 
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that it is for the learned Doctors of theology … to determine whether such laws as may 
be proposed are or are not in conformity with the principles of the Islam, and it is 
therefore officially enacted that there shall at all times exist a committee composed of 
not less than five Mujtahids or other devoted theologians, cognizant also of the needs of 
the time. the ulama and proofs of Islam shall present to the National consultative 
Assembly the names of twenty of ulama who possess the attributes mentioned above, 
and the members of national consultative Assembly shall, either by unanimous 
acclamation, or by vote, designate five or more of these, according to the exigencies of 
the moment, and recognize them as members, so that they may carefully discuss and 
consider all matters proposal which is at variance with the Sacred law of Islam.. In 
such matters the decision of this religious committee shall continue unchanged until the 
appearance of His Holiness the proof of Time (May God hasten his glad Advent)” 
(Bakhtiari, 1996: 8, 9). 
 
Therefore by the inclusion of this article parliament adapted the Belgian Constitution 
to suit it to the Iranian situation in that in a number of articles the importance of religion 
and religious leaders was acknowledged. The above-mentioned article theoretically 
gave veto power to the committee of clerics and opened a way for the establishment of a 
quite undemocratic institution to limit the legislative power of the parliament; however 
not in the Quajar, First and Second Pahlavis, in that its implementation was never 
completed in these eras. The pro-constitutionalist politicians who dominated the 
parliament made sure of this by modifying Article 2, giving the parliament control over 
the appointment of the clerical committee, so no Guardian Council was convened until 
the 1979 Islamic Revolution of Iran when the Consultative Assembly went under the 
full control of the Guardian Council composed of high ranking clergy (Abrahamian, 
1998: 338, 339). 
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 The second limitation was the potential and traditional power of the monarchy 
which remained untouched. Azimi (1989: 6) one of prominent analyst of Iranian 
political history, mentioned that: 
 
 “Although the diffusion and depersonalization of political power was commonly 
taken to imply that the legislature, the executive and the judiciary were to be revitalized 
and were to assume their constitutionally defined authority, in practice there were many 
obstacles. In the case of the Majlis [parliament] the problem arose from its underlying 
legal procedural provisions as well as its place within the institutional-structural 
configuration of the body politic. In the case of both the monarchy and the executive, 
their formally defined authority was not commensurate with their actual share of 
power”.  
 
It could be said that the power of the parliament was extensively and formally 
spelled out in the Constitution and its supplement but in reality no bill ratified by the 
parliament could become enforceable law without consent and the signature of the king. 
Moreover the parliament was not empowered to over-ride the decision of the king. The 
distinction between the executive authority of the king and the independence of the 
legislature had been blurred and all were merely part of the monarch's executive arm. 
All important decisions were taken by decrees of the king and there were no checks and 
balances. However it should be noted that in practice the First and Second Majlis in the 
Qajar Era exerted the constitutionally recognised power of the parliament vastly. “The 
First Majlis got off to an impressive start. Smooth adoption of formal rules and a 
consciousness of precedents paved the way for orderly and productive sessions” 
(Weinbaum, 1979: 47). In fact there might be found a kind of converse relationship 
between the power of the monarchy and power of the parliament in that whenever the 
 81 
 
monarchy weakened, the Majlis was able to enjoy its constitutional authority and 
making it a reality and whenever the despotic power of the monarchy increased the 
power of the Majlis was sacrificed. Therefore, it might be said that despite the first 
limitation which was influential the second one i.e. the traditional power of the 
monarchy impacted on the functions of the parliament broadly. This can be shown 
clearly in the First and Second Pahlavi Eras which will be discussed in the following 
pages.       
 
4. Parliament in the First Pahlavi Era 
 
World War I brought a severe deterioration to Iranian politics and economy. The 
Russian and British clash with the Ottoman Empire and Germany inevitably spilled into 
Iran and finally led to the Russian and British occupation of the country. Ahmad Shah 
succeeded his unpopular father Mohammad Ali Shah at the age of twelve.  
By 1920 there was a kind of anarchy in the political scene of Iran. Some regional 
leaders such as Mirza Kochak Khan, who was a leader of the Jangal Movement in 
Gilan, Mohammad Khiabani in Azarbaijan, and a Cossack officer Reza Khan, tried to 
take control of the political power of the whole country.  
In 1921, Col. Reza Khan, the main military commander, carried out a coup and after 
two years became the prime minister and the Majlis confronted a newly decisive and 
expansive executive power. He arrested the leading politicians, and, while remaining 
behind the throne, consolidated power in his own hands. In 1926 he deposed the 
Quajars and established his Pahlavi Dynasty. Between 1921 and 1925 Reza Shah 
focused on the country's security and army forces and crushed all forms of dissent and 
traditional tribal oppositional movements.  His reputation for uniting the country earned 
him the status of Prime Minister in October 1923, while at the same time he retained his 
powerful post of Minister of War.  Reza Shah became the ruler of Iran shortly after 
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Ahmad Shah, last of the Qajar Dynasty, left Iran for Europe indefinitely. This was also 
the year that Mustafa Kamal Ataturk abolished the Ottoman Dynasty and introduced a 
republic in Turkey. “Reza Khan seemed to have been following the event in Turkey and 
entertaining the idea of a republic” (Bakhtiari, 1996: 23).   
Between 1926 and 1941, he brought tremendous changes in political institutions, the 
economic situation and the social structure. He wanted to restore the ancient Pre-Islamic 
heritage and mould Iran on a Western political model while preserving his dictatorial 
power. 
 During the Reza Shah Era the impact of clerics and clerical institutions became 
marginal in politics and Shari‟a and Islamic law under the secularization and 
modernization programme of the Shah partly was set aside (Moaddel, 1986). In this 
period the provision of Article 2 of the Constitution of 1906-7 according to which a 
committee of high ranking Shi‟a clerics could monitor legislation passed by the 
parliament became a dead letter, and the religious courts gradually departed (Amir 
Arjomand, 2005). In addition, he reduced the number of clerics in the parliament so that 
“their number fell from twenty-four in the Fifth Majles to six in the Tenth Majles” 
(Abrahamian, 1982: 140).   
 This meant that the first aforementioned limitation upon legislative power which had 
been established in the Constitution of 1906-7 did not work. Yet the second limitation 
upon the parliament was empowered in the First Pahlavi Era. Despite establishing the 
modern constitution which was designed according to one of the democratic 
governments (Belgium) the Iranian political system essentially remained a traditional 
one within which the divine right of the king was its main pillar and parliament became 
an appropriate instrument to legitimize his concentrated political power.    
The socio-economic reforms which Reza Shah brought were at the expense of 
political development and the rule of law. Relying on his military power, he allowed no 
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political opposition party and group to grow and therefore there was no influential and 
independent political power to challenge his authority and policies. “During his reign, 
Reza Shah used the Majles [parliament] to hide his military autocracy. Elections were 
held every four years, and deputies had regular sessions with all the trappings of 
parliamentary government-rules of order, regulations, and elaborate committee systems.  
The Constitution was observed to the letter of the law. But in reality the Shah informed 
the police chief whom he wanted in the Majles [parliament]. The police chief informed 
the interior minister. The interior minister informed the provincial governors. And the 
provincial governors, who supervised the elections, made sure that the right names 
came out of the ballot boxes. Handpicked assemblies then rubber-stamped all the Shah's 
bills, decrees, and appointments. When the occasional deputies failed to do his bidding, 
they found themselves in jail” (Abrahamian, 1998: 339). Therefore he had a great deal 
of personal influence on the members of the legislature and the bills and private 
proposals which were introduced to the parliament.  
After seizing the Crown, Reza Shah eliminated anyone who remotely challenged his 
authority gradually turning the country to one-man rule. His brutal dictatorship was 
hardly contested. 
The parliament rarely had decision making power in the different affairs of the 
country in the Reza Shah Era. For instance the only significant activity of the Fourth 
session of the parliament which was formed in the First Pahlavi Era was the ratification 
of the bill according to which parliament set aside the Anglo-Iranian agreement and 
gave the government full capacity to disallow any attempts by foreign powers to 
interfere in the internal affairs of Iran. In the Fifth and Sixth terms of parliament which 
coincided with increased power of the Reza Shah, “parliamentary autonomy 
disappeared as the Majlis, [parliament] previously the national forum, became an 
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obedient arm of the Reza Shah” (Weinbaum, 1975: 49).  Nevertheless the parliament 
continued to be a valuable forum for debates on national interests.  
It is noteworthy that Reza Shah did not abolish the formal institutional and 
ceremonial framework of parliamentary government which was established according to 
the Constitution of 1906-7; however his actual way of ruling was not that much different 
from despotic rule before the Constitutional Revolution. One author stated that: 
 
 “According to the spirit of the Iranian Constitution, the Majlis [parliament] was the 
cornerstone of constitutionalism. The Constitution, reflecting the anti-despotic spirit of 
the constitutional revolution as well as influenced by the Belgian and French 
Constitution on which it was based, had been drafted in such a way as legally to prevent 
the emergence of dictatorship. This accounts for the lack of any provision or 
arrangement in it for the dissolution of the Majlis, which was therefore in a very strong 
position. The fact that Reza Shah simply by pass the constitution while preserving the 
façade of parliamentary arrangement left the legal potential of the Majlis intact” 
(Azimi, 1989: 6).  
 
In fact in the Reza Shah Era it was not the Constitution that delimited monarchical 
prerogatives but the real structure of political power which was vested in the hands of 
the king.  Neither the executive power nor the parliament had ultimate power in their 
hands but both of them were subordinate to the institutionalized power of the monarchy 
which was in turn linked to the military establishment. If one considers the Constitution 
of the Reza Shah Era one would see that it clearly confined the monarchical functions to 
the merely ceremonial power but the fact that cabinet sessions should be held in the 
presence of the Reza Shah gave him significant power in political affairs and 
particularly the implementation of the executive power. In parliamentary governments 
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the cabinet has real political power while in Iran under the First Pahlavi Prime Minister 
and his Ministers were surrounded by two centres of political powers: the King and the 
parliament. The power of the King originated from real political power structure but the 
power of the parliament was according to articles of the Constitution. “With the 
reduction of parliament to a rubber stamp, the Shah was able to hand pick his cabinet 
ministers. Whereas previous monarchs had formed cabinets only after extensive 
consultation with leading politicians, Reza Shah developed the new procedure of first 
choosing the Prime Minister, and all his Ministers and then sending them off to the 
Majles [parliament] to obtain the necessary but routine vote of confidence” 
(Abrahamian, 1982: 138).        
This potential power of the parliament which was founded in the Constitution 
generated a particular kind of relationship between parliament and the executive power 
in the Second Pahlavi Era; this will be examined in the following pages. 
 
5. Parliament in the Second Pahlavi Era  
 
The rule of the Reza Shah was ended by the Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran and his 
son Mohammad Reza Pahlavi ascended the throne after his father was exiled into South 
Africa in 1941. 
The occupation of Iran during the Second World War like the First one caused 
political distress and economic chaos which resulted in the weakening of central 
government and then brought to Iran a significant amount of political liberty. In these 
circumstances a new democratic period was started and the deputies had an appropriate 
opportunity for becoming prominent again.  Central power collapsed and the new and 
very inexperienced Shah, Mohammad Reza succeeded his father. “The invasion, 
therefore, destroyed two important pillars of stability in the country, and with political 
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differences on the rise, the Majles [parliament] became a microcosm of the country with 
factions emerging from a long period of repression” (Bakhtiari, 1996: 27).    
Restrictions upon the freedom of press were removed and political parties‟ activities 
were allowed. Parliamentary elections became necessary instruments for legitimizing 
Mohammad Reza Shah's regime and the old practice of taking a vote of confidence 
from the parliament was restored until 1949. “From 1941 to 1953, when a coup 
supported by the U.S central intelligence agency established Mohammad Reza Shah's 
autocracy, the Majles [parliament] played a central role in drafting laws, passing 
budgets, and choosing cabinet ministers, including prime ministers. It failed, however to 
exert influence on the War Ministry” (Abrahamian, 1998: 339).  
As stated before, according to the Constitution of 1906-7 and its Supplement 
parliament was invested with tremendous power; however, during the Reza Shah Era it 
was inefficient due to his despotic way of the ruling the country. One of those characters 
which empowered the parliament against executive power and restored again in the 
Mohammad Reza Shah Era was the power of the parliamentarians to submit many 
motions of interpellation, without any regard for the timetable of the Majlis. “This could 
be done by one deputy or a group of deputies, against individual ministers, a number of 
ministers or the prime minister, who then had to attend the Majlis within a month, 
answer the interpellation and the demand for a vote of confidence, which if denied put 
an end to the life of the cabinet” (Azimi, 1989: 7, 8). This imbalance of political power 
between the parliament and the executive power can be realized by comparing the Reza 
Shah and the earlier years of Mohammad Reza Shah Eras. During the sixteen years of 
Reza Shah Era there had been just 8 Prime Ministers, 10 Cabinets, 50 Ministers who 
occupied the 198 cabinet posts while in the sixteen years of Mohammad Reza Shah Era 
there were 12 Prime Ministers, 31 Cabinets and 148 Ministers who occupied the 400 
cabinet posts (Abrahamian, 1982: 170). 
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The second character of the parliament which enabled members to impede the 
function of the executive power and even the legislative task of the parliament was the 
principle of the quorum. The Majlis could have an official session only if at least two-
thirds of parliamentarians, apart from the representatives of Tehran, attended the 
session. Three-quarters had to be present to enable a vote to be taken and a majority 
required more than half of those present to record a vote of approval. “This had been 
intended to prevent the approval of hasty and insufficiently backed bills and to provide 
the minority with the opportunity to hinder the imposition of Cabinets by majority” 
(Azimi, 1989: 8). But parliamentarians used this power frequently in that they often 
absented themselves from the parliament in order to block a quorum.  
The third character of the parliament which functioned as an obstacle against 
executive power was the procedure of the parliamentary committees. If the cabinet 
proposed a bill without urgency, it was sent to the parliamentary committees 
automatically within which it was left for a long time or sometimes for ever. 
These factors along with intense factionalism and provincial attitudes of the majority 
of parliamentarians, as well as their inability to understand their public duties and to put 
them before their private interests, precluded the parliament from being an important 
institution that acted positively (Weinbaum, 1975). 
Regarding this imbalance of power which paralyzed the executive power, 
Mohammad Reza Shah insisted upon a revision of the Constitution. Also he mentioned 
that the Senate, should be convened. By November 1947 the Shah had proposed 
concrete plans for revising the Constitution and establishing the Senate, and he 
continued to press these aims throughout 1948. A bill to organize the Senate, which had 
been submitted to the parliament a year earlier, was passed in May 1948.  
After an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Mohammad Reza Shah in 1949, 
parliament agreed to establish a constituent assembly to amend the Constitution. Under 
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martial law the election for the constituent assembly took place, and three weeks later 
the assembly, following Mohammad Reza Shah‟s idea, voted to delete Article 48 of the 
Constitution of 1906-7. The amended Article gave the Shah the power to suspend the 
Majles and the Senate, separately or together, only if he provided a reason for the 
suspension. “An “additional article” (asál-e elháaqi), passed by the constituent 
assembly on Taqizaada's recommendation, provided for amendment of the Constitution 
by an elected constituent assembly proposed by majorities of two-thirds in both houses 
and approved by the Shah” (Amir Arjomand, 2005). 
In practice from 1949 onward, Mohammad Reza Shah failed to ask for the vote of 
confidence when choosing a prime minister. Although there were many protests by the 
parliament against this approach of the king, he continued to do so in following years as 
well. One of the prominent parliamentarians who was against that attitude of the King 
was Mossadegh. When he was nominated to be Prime Minister, the practice of asking 
for a vote of confidence by parliament was revived. During his two years government 
and under his pressure the nationalization of the oil industry went on and parliament had 
a considerable role in the political scene during this time.  
The period of parliamentary supremacy came to an end with the coup d'etat in 1953 
against Mossadegh and he was arrested by Pro-Royalist Armed Forces under General 
Faazololah Zahedi. A military government was convened and political party activities 
were banned. In 1955 Manuchehre Eqbal became Prime Minister who expressly said 
that he was the servant of the Shah and was not responsible to the Majlis. “Once again, 
speedy approval of the legislation was largely guaranteed, and the Majlis committees 
surrendered their claims to expertise, mainly to the government technocrats of the Plan 
Organization and the National Iranian Oil Company” (Weinbuam, 1975: 52). After that 
the amendment of the Constitution was no longer the main concern of Mohammad Reza 
Shah.  “In May 1961 Mohammad Reza Shah used the power granted him in amended 
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Article 48 of the constitutional law in order to dissolve the Majles and embark on his 
program for land reform, subsequently known as the White Revolution” (Amir 
Arjomand,  2005).  The White Revolution was a policy package through which the Shah 
was seeking a number of economic, social, and political modernizations.  
As a matter of fact the White Revolution which began in 1962 merely marked the 
end of a parliamentary democracy and the beginning of the absolute monarchy during 
which more than 600 decrees were issued. During this period which lasted until 1979, 
the Shah ruled absolutely which means prime ministers and cabinets were totally 
subservient to him; elections were rigged; only political parties that supported the Shah 
were allowed to function and the press was strictly controlled. Only two parties of 
Hezbe Iran e Novin and Hezb e Mardom which were created by him were allowed to 
act; however after moving more toward absolutism the two aforementioned parties were 
dissolved as well and were replaced by one party named Rastakhiz. In fact during this 
time the party politics of Iran experienced the one party system which was totally under 
the control of Mohammad Reza Shah.  
  In these circumstances almost all political powers ultimately vested in the Shah and 
most of the deputies were handpicked. Not only did the parliament not have a 
representative character but also it once more became the rubber stamp for a royal 
dictator. Like his father, Mohammad Reza Shah‟s ambition was Westernizing Iranian 
society.  However, Reza Shah and his son mostly emphasised the technological aspects 
of Western civilization and they showed less interest in some basic values such as the 
rule of law, liberties or political ideas such as parliamentary rule and political 
participation. Each mostly stressed the “creation of Western-style armies, a secret 
police, and efficient bureaucracy to implement his plans. Under no circumstances would 
he allow Western-style institutions like a parliament to be part of the decision-making 
process in Iran. Therefore, from 1964 to 1978, while he brought several dramatic 
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economic changes in the country, Mohammad Reza Shah was more than ever the 
absolute ruler of the country…” (Bakhtiari, 1996: 47). 
  
 6. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter the historical background of the Iranian parliament in the context of 
Constitutional Movement has been explored. It was shown how Iranian modernists, 
mostly including Pro-Western intellectuals, introduced the modern political philosophy 
of the West to Iranian traditional society whose main political character was autocracy 
and despotism. The influence of the Western pattern to shape the new political system 
was undeniable as the drafter of the first Iranian Constitution mostly translated the 
Belgian and Bulgarian Constitutions and some part of the French Constitution word by 
word. 
By explaining the social forces that backed the Constitutional Movement which was 
reflected in the Constitution, the root of the main limitation upon the power of the 
parliament in Constitution was shown. Although the parliament and parliamentary 
government were at the centre of the social forces there were some strong institutional 
obstacles which precluded the modernists from establishing a legislature which operated 
like its counterparts in the West: 
 First the traditional and Conservative socio-political forces of the Constitutionalism 
Movement in Iran challenged the new political concepts and institutions in favour of 
Islamic rules. Some high ranking clerics denied support to the ultimate power of the 
parliament and wanted to limit its power. The creation of a committee of high ranking 
clergy for supervising the laws and regulations approved by the parliament was the 
result of their attempts. Although this institution was weakened and did not operate 
during the First and Second Pahlavi Eras it played a main role after the establishment of 
Islamic government following the 1979 Revolution. The religious nature of some 
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articles of the Constitution (mainly Article 2) and the secular roots of the rest of the 
Articles and the essence of the Constitution itself created a kind of duality, which was 
the main character of the Iranian Constitution of 1906-7. The Iranian Constitution can 
be categorized among the contradictory constitutions which contain heterogeneous 
elements. 
The second obstacle which limited the parliament in functioning strongly was the 
form of real separation of powers in the political structure. As it was explained, the 
main goal of the constitutionalists was to limit the absolute power of the monarchy. So 
in the Constitution the heart of the political power was vested in the parliament.  
Although the king had some privilege according to the Constitution especially in 
relation to executive power, his formal and constitutional power was tremendously 
constrained in the first Iranian Constitution and its Supplement. As a matter of fact the 
new political regime, which was copied from the Belgium Constitution, would be a 
constitutional monarchy according to which the king or queen acts in all matters on the 
advise of cabinet and their authority is rather symbolic and formal than real. But this 
system which was framed in the Constitution failed to apply in real politics. Since the 
king was commander in chief and because of the institutionalized nature of the 
monarchy in the political structure of Iran, he was able to dominate the executive power 
and then impact upon the composition of the parliament. He could intervene in the 
elections and handpick the deputies and as result subordinate both the executive power 
and parliament to the monarchy, except in a short period of time in  which the monarchy 
was weakened as a result of external variables such as war or economic crisis, which 
was the case especially in First and Second Pahlavi Eras. During these periods the 
distinction between the executive power of the king and the independence of the 
parliament and the judiciary had been weakened and all were under the control of the 
monarchy. All important decisions were by decree. The king as commander in chief 
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supported by his army against his opponents and it was the country's only institution 
around which all powers revolved without any checks and balances. 
 On the basis of this analysis of the evolution of the first Iranian Parliament and its 
limitation one may categorise the Iranian Parliament as a rubber stamp of monarchical 
decisions with minimal or little law making power. Although constitutionally the 
Iranian Parliament was not weak in relation to the executive power i.e. prime minister 
and his cabinet, in practice it was powerless in front of the monarchy. To put it another 
way, it might be said that there was an imbalance in the relationship between the 
executive and parliament in favour of the latter but finally both of them were 
subordinate to the monarch.                   
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1. Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, it was stated that Mohammad Reza Shah from the 1960s 
onwards became more autocratic than before and during these years he dissolved the 
parliament and ruled by decree. In the 1970s, apart from those political parties which 
were created by Mohammd Rezah Shah himself such as the New Iran Party or 
Rastakhiz Party, there was no independent opposition party and this empowered 
radicalism in Iran.  
The despotism of the Second Pahlavi Era, along with many other socio-economic 
problems (including land reform, increasing the oil price in 1973,  urbanization, 
increasing poverty, and so on) in the 1960s and 1970s led to the second revolution of 
Iranian society which caused upheaval in the ruling class and political system. The same 
approach which was used to analyse the Constitutional Revolution, according to which 
the social forces behind the revolution was explained, is employed to explain the 
political system of Islamic Republic Revolution.      
 
2. Political factions in pre and post revolutionary Iran 
 
As a whole, those political forces which constituted the main blocs of political power 
that participated in the second revolution and played an important role in forming the 
structure of political power after the revolution might be categorized into two broad 
groups and parties: religious groups and parties and secular ones.  
The first category might be divided into two important groups: Islamic 
fundamentalist groups and Islamist radical groups and parties (Bashiriyeh, 2002: 27).   
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Non liberal and Islamic fundamentalist groups mainly included clergy who “were not 
content with a change in the political system from the monarchy to a republic; their 
main objective was the unification of the religion and the state” (Bashiriyeh, 1984: 128). 
They were formed mostly according to the ideas of the Aytollah Khomeini who 
gradually rose to a very popular position in the course of pre –revolutionary events, and 
supported the establishment of a religious government through which it would be 
possible to implement the Islamic laws. Ayatollah Khomeini's leadership was certainly 
a major factor in the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and his key political ideas 
were advanced in the book named The Rule of Theologian. This was one of the main 
sources of the current Iranian Constitution. In this important book he stated that Velayat 
e Faqih (the rule of the theologian) means leading and administering the society 
according to the commands of God and implementing the provisions of the sacred law. 
He strongly rejected the separation of religion and politics as a Western idea, and 
“argued that in the absence of the divinely inspired Imam, sovereignty devolves upon 
qualified jurists or Shi'ite religious leaders, as the authoritative interpreters of the sacred 
law, who are entitled to rule” (Amir Arjomand, 1988: 99). 
 He stated that since the rule of Islam is the rule of law only the clergy and no one 
else should take the political power in Islamic society. They are the ones who can 
govern as God ordered and the contemporary jurist is the successor of the Prophet 
Mohammad. Whatever is entrusted to the Prophet has been entrusted by the Imams to 
the jurists. The jurists have authority on all matters. He theorized the power of the jurist 
in the implementing of the sacred laws as follow: 
 
“Who was to hold the executive power? If the Prophet (s) has not appointed a 
successor to assume the executive power, he would fail to complete his mission, as the 
Quran testifies. The necessity for the implementation of the divine law, the need for 
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executive power, and the importance of that power in fulfilling the goals of the 
prophetic mission and establishing the just order that would result in the happiness of 
the mankind all of this made the appointment of a successor synonymous with the 
completion of the prophetic mission” (Khomeini, Rohollah, 1970: 16).  
 
This approach toward political power has historical roots. In Iranian ancient times, 
before the Islamic period, the possession of 'God's Grace' (Farrah-ye Izadi) justified the 
position of the power holder and after the invasion of Iran by the Arabs during which 
time Islam became the dominant religion of the country, the same philosophy 
legitimized the power of the ruler by giving titles such as ―Shadow of Almighty‖ and 
the ―Centre of Universe‖. ―The Qur'anic verse which orders the believer to obey 'God, 
the Prophet, and the holders of authority (ul al-Amr) among you'  ... was often invoked 
to legitimize earthly rule, is ambiguous, and so it has been subject to various conflicting 
interpretation‖ (Katouzian, 1997: 60).  
During the Safavid Dynasty between the years 1501 and 1722 in which Shiism 
became the official faith of the Iranian people, Safavid rulers called themselves zelollah 
or the shadow of the God. The Shah ―was living emanation of the godhead, the shadow 
of God upon earth. ... As representative of the Mahdi, the Safavid Shah was closer to the 
source of absolute Truth than were other men, and consequently disobedience on the 
part of his subject was sin‖ (Savory, 1980: 33).    
  This way of legitimizing political power, which is very similar to possession of the 
Grace of God, might be said to be the key to understanding the complicated puzzle of 
political power in Iran.      
    On the basis of such political philosophy Ayatollah Khomeini also expressed his 
view about the laws which should be enacted in Islamic society by saying that 
according to the Quran the ordinances of Islam are not limited to a specific time or place 
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but are forever and must be observed till the end of the time. He pointed to the 
tremendous difference of the Islamic government and constitutional monarchy or 
representative government by saying that in the latter legislators are the representatives 
of the people or the monarch while in the former form of government “legislative power 
and competence to establish laws belongs exclusively to God Almighty. No one has the 
right to legislate and no law may be executed except the law of the divine legislator” 
(Khomeini, 1981: 29).  He believed that the Islamic Assembly should enact a 
programme only on the basis of this fundamental law and there should be no deviation 
from it.   
 Ayatollah Khomeini in his book “Islamic Government” clearly contrasted the idea of 
the Islamic government with that of the representative government. As Mill (1861: 37) 
explains in representative government, which is one of the models of democratic 
government, sovereignty ultimately is placed in the hands of every individual citizen 
“[b]ut since all cannot in a community exceeding a single small town, participate 
personally in any but some very minor portions of the public businesses” representative 
government must be the ideal type of government (Ibid: 47). Therefore citizens should 
elect their representatives through an electoral system, which is a fundamental 
institution in representative democracy, to sit in a forum or an assembly and represent 
them. Representative assembly is a legitimate sovereign and can give assent to the 
policies of the government because its power derives from the will of the people who 
have the right to re-elect their representatives or withdraw their vote and elect someone 
else in the next elections. “Lincoln‟s Gettysburg Address has the formula precisely, 
representative democracy is „government of the people, by the people and for the 
people‟” (Hirst, 1990: 24).  
This above-mentioned formula is not compatible with Ayatollah Khomeini‟s idea of 
the Islamic government according to which “… sovereignty belongs to God alone and 
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law is His decree and command. The law of Islam, divine command, has absolute 
authority over all individuals and the Islamic government” (Khomeini, 1981: 29).  In 
fact, Ayatollah Khomeini formulated a theocratic government within which clerics, as 
representatives of God, are the main power holders and have exclusive right to 
supervise government and implement God‟s laws. Nevertheless Khomeini‟s theocratic 
idea in the course of the Islamic Revolution did not remain intact. In practice and for 
many different reasons he had to accept some secular institutions which had no 
consistency with his Islamic theocracy. Firstly, what Ayatollah Khomeini called God‟s 
laws only comprises basic and general laws. It has nothing to say about many different 
areas of public policies and day to day aspects of society (Chehabi, 2003). In addition, 
“[t]he major problem in implementation of devine law (shari‟a) is that, while its 
theoretical foundations are beyond despute, there is great disagreement among jurists 
about its particulars. The fact that no mojtahed [source of imitation] is allowed to 
follow another perpetuates disagreement …  For the purpose of the modern nation-state, 
the Shari‟a  had to be codified. But even among the ruling clerics there were 
disagreements as to what the codes should be (Chehabi, 1991: 80). Therefore, it was 
accepted that the parliament in Islamic government could address these sorts of 
secondary issues but only according to the basic laws of Islam and under supervision of 
the Religious Leader or a council on his behalf. Secondly, as it will be explained, 
secular parties and groups were one of the main driving forces of the Revolution of 
1979 and played a very important role for toppling Pahlavi‟s regime. They stressed the 
democratic rather than the ideological character of the movement, so democratic 
institutions like parliament were crucial from their point of view. So finally Ayatollah 
Khomeini agreed an “Islamic Republic” as a form of post-revolutionary government. It 
was stated that Khomeini never believed in Islamic Republic and that he considered it 
“to be the appropriate form of government only for the period of transition to the truly 
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Islamic government” (Amir Arjomand, 1989: 118).  As it will be explained in this 
chapter, after the transitional period and when the government became relatively 
established the theocratic element of the Islamic Republic dominated the secular 
elements.                                              
After the Revolution in 1979, the followers of the Ayatollah Khomeini established a 
strong party, named the Islamic Republic Party (IRP) which according to their 
manifesto, believed that “sovereignty originates in God and that all laws must be based 
on the Islamic law, with the head of state a theologian or Imam” (Bashiriyeh, 1984: 
129).  
This party played an important role in the course of preparing the draft of the 
Constitution and formed the essential circle of political power that interpreted the 
Constitution according to the aforementioned ideology of the Ayatollah Khomeini. 
Some politicians who currently have key positions within the structure of political 
power in Iran, such as Ayatollah Khamenei (current Supreme Leader), Hashemi 
Rafsanjani (the head of Expediency Council) and Mahdavi Kani (prominent figure and 
secretary general of the Jam e Rohaniyat e Mobarez), were members of this party. 
Following the overthrow of the Shah, the Islamic Republic Party leaders continued to 
use their extensive contacts with Ayatollah Khomeini to mobilize popular support 
throughout the country. However, since there were two different approaches toward the 
economy, society and foreign policy within the IRP, the tension between them increased 
and ultimately with the agreement of Ayatollah Khomeini the IRP was dissolved and 
split into two separate factions:  those who were Conservative and supported 
privatization and a more open foreign policy but wanted more closed internal social and 
cultural policy led by Jammee Rohaniyate Mobarez e Tehran and those who advocated 
the intervention of the government in the economy and supported the idea of exporting  
the revolution and formed the Majmaa Rohanion e Mobarez. The former faction and its 
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affiliated group which formed the Conservative camp and known as the Right wing 
among Iranians, supported “balanced budget, business incentive, open market, 
relaxation of the price control, an end to rationing, privatization of industries, free-trade 
zones, removal of red tape and trade restrictions, tax holiday for wealthy entrepreneur, 
and attraction of foreign capital including from Western Europe and North America” 
(Abrahamian, 1998: 341). Despite their economic approach they supported the closed 
social and internal policy. It is noteworthy that the Conservative camp mostly consisted 
of lower members of the clergy and was supported by bazaar merchants and guilds who 
had an extensive social base in Iranian society at that time. On the other hand, the 
Majma e Rohanion e Mobarez was in the faction which was deemed Left wing and 
supported “economic planning, price controls, rationing, subsidies for social programs, 
job creation project, low-income housing, antipoverty and anti-illiteracy campaigns, 
nationalization of industry, land reform, redistribution of wealth, and national self 
sufficiency” ( Ibid: 341). They were supported mostly by the worker associations, 
students who were the members of the Daftar e Tahkim e Vahdat, and some members of 
the Revolutionary Guard.      
Among religious groups there were some that were radical and originated from the 
middle class and consisted of Islamist well educated and modern intellectuals. They 
were highly nationalistic, putting emphasis on the struggle against imperialism and the 
influence of Western capitalism in Iran. “Their catch-word was 'council democracy' or 
the establishment of councils in all institutions, which according to their understanding 
was the basic concept of government in Iran” (Ibid: 130). In comparison with Islamic 
fundamentalist groups they had little social base; they mostly consisted of students and 
urban educated youth. The most famous of these groups was Mojahedin-e- Khalgh. 
The second category (the secular) might be divided into liberal bourgeois and leftist 
groups. The liberal-bourgeois groups represented the new middle class which largely 
 101 
 
was raised during the Second Pahlavi Era. They sought to keep the social structure 
existing under the old regime, and wanted to change the political system structure by the 
establishment of a more liberal regime. “In fact in one stage they had been willing to 
accept the constitutional monarchy according to the old Constitution (of 1906), but later 
they insisted that the same constitution should provide the framework the new political 
arrangements. …. They had put their emphasis on a political change from 
authoritarianism to parliamentary democracy” (Bashiriyeh, 1984: 126).   
The leftist groups mostly consisted of intellectuals and students and called for the 
nationalization of industries and banks, ending the dependent relationship with US 
imperialism, creating a new popular military structure, and autonomy rights for ethnic 
groups. In comparison with Islamic fundamentalist groups, they lacked a considerable 
social base in the rural and urban lower classes. The most famous of these groups was 
the Tudeh party. 
After the revolution the initial alliance of different blocs of power which had been 
formed against the old regime turned into a clash over the nature and the form of the 
new political regime. In particular, the Islamic Republic Party leaders prevented the 
secular, leftist, and more liberal Islamic parties from being in the main circle of political 
power. Therefore as early as the summer of 1979, the IRP encouraged its followers to 
attack political rallies and offices of these other parties. 
While in the early stages, the revolution seemed to be a democratic movement it 
gradually changed into an Islamic fundamentalist movement and as a result the 
secularist groups, either liberalist groups or leftist, were ousted from power and 
fundamentalist groups under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini consolidated their 
power. His supporters steadily and progressively took hold of the revolutionary 
institutions at the managing levels and setting aside all other political competitors who 
had different approaches toward political system. The years that followed the return of 
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Ayatollah Khomeini and his supporters to Iran and their success in possessing the 
political power in 1979 and 1980 resulted in the establishment of a particular kind of 
theocratic government and a special type of separation of powers all of which were 
enshrined in the Constitution of 1979 and its amendment in 1989. 
 The Islamic Republic Party (IRP) was dissolved in 1987 and divided into two 
political factions which dominated the Iranian political scene till 1997. These factions 
consisted of Leftist camp (Left Wing) led by Association of Combatant Clerics and 
Conservative camp (Right Wing) led by Combatant Clergy Association. Following the 
Presidential Election of 1997, when Mohammad Khatami as Leftist camp‟s candidate 
won the election, few numbers of new political groups and factions emerged which 
essentially originated from aforementioned political camps and have been active till 
present time. They can be devided into two broad categorisations: Conservative and 
Reformist bloc. In Recent years the marginal groups of Conservative camp recognised 
as the New Conservative won the Manicipal Elections of 2003, Parliamentary Elections 
of 2004 and Presidential Elections of 2005 and appeared as powerful political faction. 
As it will be explained in detail in following chapter the Conservative, the Reformist 
and the New Conservative are the main current political factions within the political 
system which have impacted upon the major political institutions such as parliament 
and executive. 
 
3. Distribution of power in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran and its duality 
 
The first effort to draft a constitution to represent a revolutionary system in Iran 
began in Paris in the early phases of the revolution. It was prepared by the religious, 
well educated intellectuals in the revolutionary movement. The preliminary proposal 
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was presented to a commission of secular and clerical politicians who revised it and 
eventually the result was published in June 1979 (Schirazi, 1997: 22).  
Except for the provision of a clerical commission, or Guardian Council, inherited 
from the 1906-7 Constitution, according to which six high ranking clerics and six 
lawyers would monitor the laws which parliament passes, particularly in terms of their 
compatibility with Islamic laws and Constitution, the preliminary draft of the 
Constitution was mostly secular. In fact it was in many respects the Constitution of 
1906. The leader of the state was not mandated to be from the circle of the Islamic 
jurists, nor were there any provisions in the Constitution for the empowerment of any 
particular clerical council, or any Islamic jurist. To put it another way, the preliminary 
draft of the Constitution was far from the Ayatollah Khomeini‟s thesis of the Velayat-e 
Faghih, or the “rule of the theologian”. Although the Ayatollah Khomeini insisted that 
the first blueprint of the constitution be to put a referendum, the Prime Minister 
Bazargan requested the establishment of an Assembly of Experts to examine the 
Constitution.   
As a first step,  in March 1979 a referendum was held for determining the form of the 
state according to which the voters were given a choice of  whether the form of the 
future state would be an Islamic Republic or not. The turn out in the referendum was 
high and 98.2 percent of those who participated in the referendum said ''yes'' to the 
Islamic Republic (Schirazi, 1997). 
 A few months after the holding of this referendum, another election was held to 
choose the aforesaid Assembly of Experts that would revise the preliminary draft of the 
Constitution. Although the participation of the people was extremely high, the election 
itself was marked by corruptions such as ballot rigging, fraud, coercion of candidates 
and giving false information to the participants (Ibid).  
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As a result of this election sixty percent of the fundamentalist clerics, most of whom 
were under the influence of Ayatollah Khomeini and had sympathy with the Islamic 
Republic Party (IRP), occupied the Assembly of Experts. They set aside the first 
preliminary draft of the Constitution and rewrote it according to the idea of the 
“mandate of jurist” or the rule of the theologian. In other word the political system in 
Iran was framed according to a particular kind of theocracy within which the ultimate 
power vested in the hands of the religious leader.  In a theocratic political system,   the 
sanction of laws does not derive from the will of the majority, or human rules, “but in 
absolute standard revealed to man by divine agency, so that in theory at least the real 
ruler of the community is the divine agency that sets the standards, while the earthly ' 
rulers' are in the nature of high priests whose task is to interpret and enforce them. The 
exact nature of the divine agency concerned is irrelevant to the definition; what matters 
is that the ultimate author of all laws, whether written or unwritten, be said to be 
divine”(Bluck, 1955: 96). If we pay close attention to the main parts of the Iranian 
Constitution the footprint of such an approach could be found within that. In the Iranian 
Constitution there are some concepts such as law, sovereignty of the people, nation, the 
rights of the nation, the parliament, the judiciary, republic, consultation of the people 
and elections; behind these concepts stands a complex of norms, values, institutions, 
procedural rules, and organization, as well as a range of established political and 
economic ideas unknown to the Shari‟a. In fact they are meaningful in political systems 
in which democratic principles have already been accepted but are not in harmony with 
a theocratic system according to the idea of the “rule of the theologian”.   
Among those who had great influence upon the second preliminary draft of the 
Constitution were Ayatollah Montazeri and Ayatollah Beheshti. Montazeri, one the 
prominent figures of the revolution and of the followers of the Ayatollah Khomeini,   
wrote many comments on the draft of the Constitution; in the main parts of these 
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comments he proposed the idea of the Velayat-e Faghih or the rule of theologian and 
rejected the idea of  the separation of powers.  He believed that in an Islamic state there 
is one centre of power and any other power centres should be subordinate to the 
religious leader.  Another well-known political figure whose ideas influenced the 
Iranian Constitution very much was Ayatollah Beheshti who was the vice-president of 
the Constitutional Assembly and played an important role in promoting the principle of 
Velayat-e Faghih as the basis of the Constitution. He supported the maximum power of 
the Velayate Faghih by saying that people who vote for the Islamic Republic in fact 
vote for the ideology of Islam and it means that they limit themselves in the boundaries 
of Islamic laws.  
Although, after the revolution, Islamic fundamentalist groups took most of the 
political power and played the main role in establishing the new constitution, it may be 
said that the Constitution of 1979 had been under the influence of two opposite political 
forces i.e. religious and secular parties and groups which was reflected in the 
Constitution. Under the influence of the diversity of the revolutionary forces, mainly 
categorised as religious and secular groups who actively participated in overthrowing of 
the Second Pahlavi government, the Constitution of the revolution was filled with 
contradictions which in fact reflected this diversity. “On the one hand, this document 
accounts for the secular principles of rights, equality, and justice and, on the other hand, 
it acknowledges the supremacy of restrictive Islamic views on rights, justice, and 
equality. It even goes further than mainstream Islamic limitations by recognizing the 
undisputed right of the clergy to govern and by giving primacy to the interests of the 
regime” (Tamadonfar, 2001: 206). 
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                                 Figure (4-1): Distribution of power within Iranian political system  
 
  Source: Buchta, W., (2000), Who rules Iran-The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic, (Washington:    
Washington Institute of Near East Policy, diagram 1, p: 8 
 
On the basis of the above  table bove the Supreme Leader; the Assembly of Experts; the 
Council of the Guardian; the Expediency Council; the heads of those institutions that 
are appointed by the Supreme Leader, such as the head of the judiciary,  the commander 
of the regular military (Artesh); the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard; the 
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representatives of the Supreme Leader in all important state institutions such as 
universities and governmental departments, and in the provinces and cities such as 
Friday Imams; and the chairmen of the different religious foundations such as Astane 
Ghodse Razavi and Bonyads that are also appointed by the Supreme Leader, are the 
main power holder in the political system of the Islamic Republic of Iran. After this 
circle of power one can put the elected institutions such as the executive power and the 
parliament with their power subordinated to the aforementioned circle. When there is 
friction between these two kinds of institutions, a political crisis can be expected.  
The Iranian political system is therefore a combination of pluralistic and authoritative 
theocratic elements that are in constant conflict. For example, in Article 56 the Iranian 
Constitution starts by stating: “people are the sovereign.” But it continues saying: “God 
has absolute sovereignty over the world and man”. 
This duality lost its balance in favour of an authoritative theocratic element in the 
Constitution amendment of 1989. According to Article 57 “[the] sovereign powers in 
the Islamic Republic of Iran consist of the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary, 
which shall be exercised under the absolute Velayate-e Amr va Imamate-e Omat 
[Authority and leadership of religious leader] in accordance with the following articles 
of this law. These powers shall be independent from each other.” 
Four, instead of three, branches of power can be seen in this article; however the 
power and authority of the Supreme Leader is not comparable with others. In other 
words the balance of power as we will see in following pages, is in favour of the 
Supreme Leader whose power was described as absolute in the amended Constitution of 
1989.  Some writers believe that the distribution of power which was enshrined in the 
current Constitution is a formal separation of power rather than a real separation 
(Ehteshami, 1995). In fact it is better to say that on the basis of the Iranian Constitution 
there is one major power centre which controls and regulates the other power centres.    
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Many writers recognised the paradox within the Constitution which undermines the 
democratic characteristic of the Iranian political system.  Strictly speaking the process 
of the Supreme Leader‟s election as the main power holder may not be justified 
according to democratic criteria:  On the basis of Article 107, the task of appointing the 
Leader shall be vested with the experts (Expert Council) whose members‟ qualification 
for standing in the election should be recognised by the Council of Guardians. Members 
of the Guardian Council who are divided into two groups (clergy and lawyers) are 
directly or indirectly appointed by the Supreme Leader (as we explain in detail in the 
following pages). “On this account, the Leader was no longer appointed by the people” 
(Rasekh, 2008: 73). In fact the Constitution established a closed circle of power which 
is not compatible with any democratic political power circulation.    
Therefore the centre of political power in the Islamic Republic of Iran does not 
revolve around the relationship between the executive and parliament.  The power of the 
different branches of the Iranian political system cannot be assessed unless we analyze 
the influences of this duality upon other organs of the political system, particularly 
legislative power. Apart from this duality within the formal institutions of the Iranian 
political system, some writers recognised another group of institutions which are 
described as informal and which are totally under the control of the Supreme Leader. As 
Kamrava and Hassan-Yari (2004: 508) stated “in fact, these informal centres act as 
powerful instruments through which the Leader controls key institutions and/or 
resources within the system and, at the same time, guards against threats from within or 
from outside of the political establishment”.  
It might be said that Iran's political system remains rife with functional overlaps and 
institutional friction. There are some institutions in the Constitution which have parallel 
functions. For instance, the executive branch has functions and responsibilities that are 
divided between the leader and the president; the legislature is comprised of the two 
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separate institutions of the Guardian Council and the Islamic Consultative Assembly; 
and, within the Judiciary there is a separate court that deals specifically with cases 
involving deviant clerics (Special Court for the Clergies).  
 
Figure (4-2): Duality of the political power within Iranian political system 
 
From this point of view and in terms of the legislative function of the parliament in 
Iran we can recognize two kinds of political institutions which participate in the law 
making process: the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis) and the executive as 
elected institutions and the Guardian Council and Expediency Council   as unelected 
institutions which act on behalf of the Supreme Leader. It might be said any attempts to 
categorise the Iranian Parliament in terms of legislative typology should be according to 
the analysis of the elected and unelected institutions relationship and not simply the 
executive power and Majlis relationship. 
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                      Figure (4-3): The relationship of elected and unelected Institutions 
 
       Source: extracted from BBC News (2009)  
 
4. The place of executive power (elected institution) in the amended 
Constitution of 1989  
 
Executives in most political systems are very important institutions in terms of the 
significant roles which they play within the system. It might be said that they have three 
important functions: decision making through the initiation of bills and formulating 
public policy, implementation of policies which has been enacted by the parliament, and 
coordinating different affairs of the state through regulation of the relationship between 
the different branches of government.  
The type of relationship between parliament and the executive can define the law 
making power of the parliament. As Olson and Mezey put it “[t]he strength of the 
legislature's policy making role is most frequently connected to its capacity to resist or 
modify policy initiatives emanating from the executive branch” (1991: 8).  
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Usually the powers and authority of the executive power are stipulated in the 
constitutions of the countries so studying their articles help to know the place of them.  
According to the Constitution of 1979 and before its amendment executive power in 
Iran was in the hands of prime minister and his Cabinet which had to get a vote of 
confidence from parliament.  Thus the position of the President in the Constitution and 
also in practice was more formal and the framers of the Constitution of 1979 designed a 
very weak and divided presidency office. Different reasons might be found for 
designing a weak presidency, principal among them is the tremendous power which was 
vested in the hands of the Supreme Leader. As we mentioned before, the Constitution of 
1979 created four branches of power, one of which had concentrated power while the 
others were relatively weak and subordinated to the first without having any kinds of 
responsibility to the people. Also it was said that the wish for having a weak president 
had historical roots since “the “ulama” [high ranking clergy] still remember how the 
Pahlavis conveniently ignored Article II of the [1906-] 1907 Constitution, which 
granted the leading “ulama” the power to veto Majlis legislation, and thus keep them 
out of the corridor of the power” (Milani, 1992: 89).       
 During the revision of the Constitution in 1989 the post of prime minister was 
abolished.  Under the Constitution of 1979 and before its amendment the duties of the 
executive power, except those tasks delegated directly by the Constitution to the 
Supreme Leader, should be performed by the President, the prime minister and the 
ministers. In fact the prime minister and his Cabinet were responsible before the 
parliament for the main affairs of the country.  
In practice however, this system, which resembled the French political system, 
generated a lot of tensions between the first President of the Islamic Republic Abol 
Hassan Banisadr and Mohammad Ali Rejaee as Prime Minister.  There was serious 
tension also between the third President (Khamenei) and the Prime Minister (Mosavi) 
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with implications for executive power as well. Furthermore, after finishing the war with 
Iraq the economy of the country was in a dire situation so reconstruction and economic 
reforms seemed necessary and a strong executive power with enough authority was seen 
as necessary.  
Therefore in 1989 Ayatollah Khomeini issued a decree for constituting the Assembly 
to revise the Constitution of 1979.  Two major approaches arose during the debates 
around the form of the executive power: on the one hand, one group supported 
strengthening the prime minister's post and reducing the presidential office to a 
ceremonial appointment. They warned against despotism of the powerful President and 
argued that the Iranian political system was not ready for a strong President since other 
political institutions such as the Majlis or judiciary were not institutionalized and strong 
enough to provide a system of checks and balances through which different centres of 
power control each other (Milani, 1992). On the other hand, the second group advocated 
the abolition of the premiership in favour of the presidency and making the President an 
executive officer. They criticised the arrangement of the 1979 Constitution mainly 
because of the lack of a clear accountable body in the divided executive. For instance 
Khamenie, who was the President in that time, was one of the prominent critics of the 
divided executive power who supported the presidency with centralized power. Also 
Abdollah Nuri one of the influential clerics stated that “[g]overnments of the world 
either have one or two centres of [executive] power. In Iran there are 50 too many 
centres of power” (Milani, 1992: 94). Also Hashemi Rafsanjani did not accept the 
possibility of a despotic President, since the more powerful Supreme Leader was able to 
control the executive power easily.           
Finally, the presidential post which shall be elected by the people directly replaced 
the position of prime minister and the political power in the executive branch was more 
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concentrated. Currently the President is the only nationally and directly elected official 
in Iran.  
Under Article 113: “ Next to the Leader, the President shall be the highest official 
State authority who is responsible for the implementation of the Constitution and, as the 
Chief Executive, for the exercise of the executive powers, with the exception of those 
matters that directly relate to the Leader”. 
Under the amended Constitution of 1989, although the President shall be elected 
directly by the people, he must be confirmed by the Supreme Leader. Some writers 
(Buchta, 2000: 23) believe that “it is the system in which the entire executive branch is 
subordinate to a religious authority – the Vali-ye Faghih (ruling jurisprudent) – and is at 
least theoretically the executive organ for his directives; according to the Constitution, 
only the supreme jurisprudence possesses competence in all general political issues”. It 
was stated that “[t]he country has one official and one hidden executive power. The 
former is led by the president and the latter, mainly consisting of the revolutionary 
foundations, by the leader” (Rasekh, 2008: 73). Further consolidating the position of the 
Leader, the Appraisal Council deleted the position of the council of leadership which 
could have been constituted if the appropriate person could not be found for the 
leadership position.  
Nevertheless, according to the Constitution the President has various kinds of 
responsibilities; some of the more important of them are as follows: 
a.) As was mentioned, the President as holder of the executive power after the 
Supreme Leader is the highest official authority in the State and he is responsible for the 
implementation of the Constitution (Article 75 and 113). Yet because of Article 57 
which states all powers of the State shall be under the absolute power of the Supreme 
Leader, he and the institutions which depend on him cannot be supervised by the 
President for the purpose of the implementation of the Constitution (Hashemi, 2000). 
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For instance, in the Iranian political system there are lots of foundations (Bonyads) 
whose managers are directly appointed by the Supreme Leader and as will be illustrated 
later on there is no control on them by the President or even by parliament. Also the 
Supreme Leader is the commander in chief of all types of armed forces (provision 4 of 
Article 110).         
b) The President has responsibility for state planning and the budget and 
administrative and civil services of the country which is extraordinarily important in the 
drafting the economic policy (Article 126). Also according to Article 52 “[t]he Annual 
State Budget shall be drawn up by the Government in the manner provided by law, and 
submitted to the Majlis for its review and approval. Any amendments whatsoever in the 
figures of the Budget shall also be subject to the provisions of law”.  If one considers 
Articles 113 to 142 of the Constitution, it can be seen that the main responsibility of the 
executive and administrative organizations of the State are vested in the hands of 
executive officials while they have responsibility before the deputies of the parliament 
in respect of their duties and parliamentarians can strongly scrutinize them according to 
the provisions of the Constitution. 
 In the Iranian political system there are various kinds of institutions which have 
huge economic activity yet the executive power has no control over them.  In fact their 
economic policies and activities are under the full control of the Supreme Leader and as 
we will see later even the parliament cannot investigate them without the permission of 
the Supreme Leader. It was stated that “[a]lthough the foundations [Bonyads] are 
allocated 58 percent of the state budget, the executive branch does not have precise 
information regarding their economic activities or the number of businesses they 
operate” (Buchta, 2000: 73).         
c.) In international affairs he is responsible for signing treaties, contracts, 
conventions, agreements (Article 125). Also he shall appoint the ambassadors and 
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receive the credential of foreign ambassadors (Article 128). Yet the President has a 
marginal role in conducting the foreign policy of the country with guidelines for foreign 
policy being determined by the Supreme Leader (Buchta, 2000).   
d.) The President is the head of some important councils such as the National 
Security High Council and the Cultural Revolution High Council. Also he is one of the 
members of the Constitutional Review Council (Article 117). Some of these councils, 
such as the Cultural Revolution High Council, are appointed by the Supreme Leader 
and have important authority in cultural and educational affairs including enacting 
important laws and regulations which threaten the law making power of the parliament 
in Iran (Schirazi, 1997).   
e.)  The President as the head of the executive power has various kinds of 
responsibility such as leading the Cabinet, leading the institutions dependent on the 
executive power such as the Management and Planning Organization (which was 
dissolved by President Ahmadinejad), the Nuclear Power Institution and the like. 
Although he is responsible before the parliament for the activities of those 
organizations, the representatives of the Supreme Leader monitor all activities of these 
organizations and bodies as well and directly intervening in their internal affairs.    
f.) The President has different kinds of tasks and responsibility in relation to the other 
branches of government i.e. the legislature and judiciary. The relationship of the 
executive power and parliament will be examined below for recognizing the type of 
political regime in the Iranian political system.    
  
5. The type of political regime according to the amended Constitution 
of 1989 
 
 There are two ways by which the separation of power principle could be applied. 
First the territorial separation of power which refers to a country whether it is federal 
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such as United States, unitary such as Iran or confederal such as Switzerland. The 
second way is when government is divided into three branches: legislative power, 
executive power and judicial power. Allocation of the political power according to each 
country‟s constitution defines the political model of that country whether it is a 
presidential, parliamentary or hybrid political system. It is noteworthy that the 
separation of all branches of government is not possible completely which is prescribed 
by a pure concept of separation of powers, but they are relatively linked to each other or 
in other words check and balance each other.  
The relationship between parliament and the executive power is central to studying 
the law making power of the parliament. Executive power as an external variable can 
confine parliament in the law making process. In terms of the relationship between these 
two branches of political power, whether it is a parliamentary, presidential or hybrid 
regime is very important. For instance it was stated that the “[t]he policy activity of 
legislatures will be greater in presidential than in parliamentary systems” (Olson and 
Mezey, 1991: 8)   
Regarding the main question of this research, recognising the kind of relationship 
that exists between parliament and the executive according to the Iranian Constitution is 
crucial for assessing the lawmaking capacity of the Iranian legislature. Besides, due to 
the special characteristics of the Iranian Constitution and institutions such as the 
Guardian Council and Expediency Council which are directly involved in the law 
making process, we have to consider them and assess the amount of influence they have 
upon parliament.          
As we stated, the Iranian Constitution is full of perplexities and power centres which 
makes it difficult to recognize the type of political regime. There is an Assembly 
(parliament) whose members according to the Constitution shall be elected directly by 
the people. Also there is a President that shall be elected by the same method. More 
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important than that, there is a leadership institution, and institutions dependent on it, 
which all the branches of government are under his supervision of. Regarding the 
separation of powers in the Iranian Constitution, recognizing the political regime in Iran 
is difficult and complicated.  In the following pages it will be discussed in detail.     
 
5.1 The Presidential system and political regime in Iran 
 
In this system the executive is elected independently from parliament. The President 
who is both head of the state and head of the government is elected directly by the 
people for a fixed, constitutionally prescribed term and owing to that he is directly 
responsible to people who elected him. Also the term of the legislative power, unlike in 
a parliamentary regime, is fixed. The President usually has the right to appoint his or her 
cabinet of ministers who are not at the same time members of the legislature; however 
their appointment may depend on the advice or approval of the legislature. Unlike a 
parliamentary system in which ministers have collegial responsibility before parliament, 
in a presidential system the President is responsible solely. This responsibility is not 
before the assembly but to the constitution. The President cannot dissolve the assembly 
and at the same time nor can the assembly dismiss the President from office. The 
President may have authority to make laws in a presidential system (Lijphart, 1992).  
 In the US presidential model which is the prototype of this political system it has 
been demonstrated that the assembly cannot force the resignation of the president any 
more than he can dissolve the assembly. Moreover, both branches of government may 
find that their actions are declared unconstitutional by a third power, the judiciary. “Yet 
in a very real sense it is the assembly which is ultimately supreme. The president may 
have considerable authority allocated to him in the constitution but he may be powerless 
unless the assembly grants him a necessary appropriations. If he acts unconstitutionally 
the assembly may impeach him. In the event of serious conflict even the judiciary must 
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bow to the will of the assembly because this body has the right to amend the 
constitution” (Verney, 1979: 44, 45).  
According to Article 114 of the Iranian Constitution the President shall be elected 
directly by the people. He is responsible for the executive power according to Article 60 
and he is the one who can appoint the ministers and introduce them before the 
parliament for confirmation. This process is very similar to presidential systems where 
“the President is elected for a definite term of office. This prevents the assembly from 
forcing his resignation (except by impeachment for a serious misdemeanour) and at the 
same time requires the President to stand for re-election if he wishes to continue in 
office” (Ibid: 41). 
In the Iranian political system ministers shall remain in office as long as they have 
not been dismissed or the parliament has not passed a vote of no confidence against 
them as a result of impeachment or motion for a vote of no confidence (Article 135). 
This is contrary to a presidential system in which the president appoints secretaries who 
are responsible to the president and therefore do not depend on the confidence of 
parliament.  
The Iranian President has power to dismiss the ministers and in this case he has to 
introduce the new ministers for confirmation by the parliament (Article 136). As in a 
presidential system “members of the assembly are not eligible for office in the 
administration and vice versa” (Ibid: 43). 
According to the Constitution, after giving a vote of confidence to the government by 
parliament, should half of the members of the council of ministers be changed then the 
President shall again request the parliament for a fresh vote of confidence for the 
council of ministers (Article 136). 
As we mentioned before, the President is chief of the executive power but his power 
is limited in comparison with the power of the Leader in so far as in Article 113 it was 
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clearly stated that the President is the highest official State authority next to the 
Religious Leader. If one compares the authority of the executive power with the 
Supreme Leader whose authority is stated in Article 110 of the Constitution, one may 
find the executive power operating as one of agencies in the hands of the Religious 
Leader. As we can see, there are some similarities between the structures of executive 
power in the Islamic Republic Era and the First and Second Pahlavi Eras which were 
explained in the previous chapter. Executive power in both of them is under the control 
of a Supreme Leader. In the Pahlavi Eras it was the king and in the Islamic Republic Era 
it is the Supreme Leader. It has been stated that the Iranian presidency even after the 
revision in 1989 remained unique: “it is the only system in the world in which the 
elected president must be „approved‟ by an unelected faqih. It is the only system in 
which the removal of the president ultimately depends on the decision of the faqih... and 
it is the only system in the world that the executive branch exercises no control over the 
armed forces” (Milani, 1992: 95).     
The important point in terms of the law making role of the parliament is that 
determining the General Policies of the state is one the main responsibilities of the 
Supreme Leader after consulting the Expediency Council. (See No. 1 of Article 110). 
Therefore the executive power has to present bills according to these General Policies. 
For example the privatization of the economic system is one of those General Policies 
for which the executive power has to present appropriate bills for applying in the 
economic system. The Guardian Council has objected to several bills and parliamentary 
proposals due to their incompatibility with the aforementioned policies. This will be 
discussed in detail in the following chapter. 
According to this analysis it seems there is no special power or control mechanism 
for the President to control and limit the parliament whereas the parliament has different 
ways to threaten the President. However, both of these institutions are subordinate to 
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other unelected institutions (Expediency Council, Guardian Council) as we mentioned 
before.  
  5.2 The Parliamentary system and political regime in Iran 
 
The parliamentary system can be defined as a form of constitutional democracy in 
which executive power rises from and is responsible to legislative authority. In 
parliamentary systems, the executive branch of government is dependent on the direct 
or indirect support of parliament, often articulated through a vote of confidence (Carey, 
and Soberg, M. 1992). Therefore there is no straightforward separation of powers 
between the executive and legislative branches of government in this political system. 
Besides the head of the government is selected by parliament and the cabinet has 
collegial responsibility to parliament. In a parliamentary system, parliament “is the 
forum of the nation‟s ideas, and it is the school where future political leaders are 
trained. For parliamentarism to succeed, the government must not fret at the constant 
challenge which the assembly offers to its programme, nor wince at the criticism made 
of its administration. The assembly in turn must resist the temptation to usurp the 
functions of government” (Verney, 1979: 38). Many characteristics were enumerated by 
Verney (1957) which constitute the parliamentary system such as: 
a.) Assembly turns to the parliament  
b) The executive is divided into two parts 
c) The head of the government should be appointed by the head of the state 
d) Ministers should be appointed by the head of the government 
e) The ministers have collegial responsibility 
f) The government is responsible to the assembly and indirectly to the electorate  
g) Ministers usually are members of the parliament 
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h) Head of the government is able to dissolve the parliament or may ask the head of 
the state to do so 
i) Parliament is at the heart of the political system  
The political regime of the United Kingdom is the foremost and traditional example 
of parliamentary government and many countries political system have been shaped 
according to that.  
It was mentioned before that according to the Article 133 of the Iranian Constitution, 
after appointment of the ministers by the President, he has to introduce them before the 
parliament for a vote of confidence. Similarly in a parliamentary system (Newton and 
Deth, 2005:  64), the government is dependent upon the support of parliament, which 
may refrain from giving a vote of confidence to the executive power. The executive 
(government) is also dependent upon the legislature (parliament) because the latter can 
reject, accept, or amend legislation initiated by the government 
   In Iranian political system the law making power, though not exclusively, is given to 
the parliament: “The parliament may within the limits of the constitution, enact laws on 
all matters” (Article 71). 
According to Article 137 the ministers have political responsibility before the 
President and the parliament: “Every individual Minister shall be responsible vis –a vis 
the President and the {parliament} for his own especial duties …” The sanction of this 
responsibility has been stated in Article 89: “… the representatives of the {parliament} 
may impeach the Council of Ministers or any of the Ministers in cases deemed 
necessary by them.” Thus ministers shall remain in office as long as they have not been 
dismissed or the parliament has not passed a vote of no confidence against them. 
Unlike the parliamentary system where parliamentary government is only indirectly 
responsible to the electorate, in the Iranian political system it seems the executive power 
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also is directly responsible to people since the President should stand for election every 
four years.  
Apart from the people, the President has political responsibility before the religious 
Supreme Leader and parliament. In Article 110, which is about the functions and 
authority of the Leader, in provision 10 of this Article one of the Leader's powers is “to 
dismiss the president of the republic by taking into account the interests of the country, 
after the supreme court has given a verdict on the violation by President of his legal 
functions or the vote of his incompetence has been passed by the [parliament] …”. 
Article 122 states that “ the President shall be responsible vis – a – vis the Nation, the 
Leader, and the Islamic Consultative Assembly [parliament], within the limits of his 
authorities and responsibilities undertaken by virtue of the Constitution and/ or  
ordinary laws”.( see also Article 134). 
5.3 The Iranian political regime and hybrid system      
 
     The idea of a semi-presidential or semi-parliamentary regime can be traced back to 
the French Fifth Republic and the works of Maurice Duverger. In his view, a semi-
presidential system consists of a directly elected president, who is accountable to the 
electorate and a prime minister, who is appointed by the president. The government 
consist of the cabinet formed by the prime minister and ministers who can be dismissed 
by a parliamentary vote.  In fact the president as head of the state  and prime minister as 
head of government  share executive power and must coexist (Duverger, 1992:142). 
Despite the president being independent from parliament, the prime minister and his/her 
ministers are subject to a parliamentary vote of confidence (Elgie, 1999). 
Shugart (2005: 2) explained that, if one studies the many political regimes one may 
find that most of them “contain some elements of one and some elements of the other, 
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and are thus hybrids. However, not all combinations of these elements qualify a regime 
as semi-presidential, unless that term is nothing more than a synonym for „hybrid‟”.  
Duverger, (1980: 142) enumerated three core elements for the semi presidential 
regimes: “(1) the president of the republic is elected by universal suffrage; (2) he 
possesses quite considerable powers; (3) he has opposite him, however, a prime 
minister and ministers who possess executive and governmental power and can stay in 
office only if the parliament does not show its opposition to him ….”. According to this 
explanation it could be said that a hybrid government has the following characteristics: 
a president who is popularly elected, and has considerable power constitutionally and a 
prime minister and cabinet who are subject to the confidence vote of a majority of the 
assembly. In the legislative studies literature the French government is the famous 
example of such a system. In a semi-presidential system the prime minister may belong 
to the opposition party and be involved primarily in domestic policy and have some 
responsibility to the legislature.  
Although there are some elements of both presidential and parliamentary systems in 
the Iranian Constitution it is far from a typical hybrid system because, contrary to the 
semi presidential system, the President is responsible to the parliament and Leader. Also 
the members of the cabinet do not have any kind of authority to be involved in 
legislative activity. Furthermore the President is not allowed to dissolve parliament 
whereas in a semi-presidential model the president can dissolve parliament and call a 
referendum.  
To sum up it might be said that the Iranian political regime is not compatible with 
those three main forms of political regime which prevail in most political systems in the 
world but it is a combination of these three models of political systems without having 
their logical consistency and coherency. It might be said that the political regime 
according to the Constitution of 1979 resembled the Fifth French Republic while as a 
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result of the revision which took place in 1989 it turned toward the US presidential 
system (Milani, 1992). Nevertheless, there is no dispute that the Iranian political regime 
remains unique.  It seems that there are three bodies which in fact act as agencies of one 
main branch of power which is the power of the religious Supreme Leader. This point 
has been asserted clearly in the Article 57 of the Constitution: “The powers of 
government in the Islamic Republic are vested in the legislature, the judiciary, and the 
executive powers, functioning under the supervision of the absolute Religious Leader 
and the leadership of the ulama, [high ranking clergy] in accordance with the 
forthcoming articles of this Constitution. These powers are independent of each other.”  
The current Iranian political regime based on the Islamic Republic Constitution of 
1979 and revised in 1989 is very similar to the political system which was established 
by the Constitution of 1906 where the prime minister was not commander of the armed 
forces. “More importantly in both constitutions, a powerful and bigger-than-life figure 
stands above the three branches of the government. That figure is the centre of power 
and the heart of the system: he is called shah in one system and faqih [clergy] in the 
other‖ (Milani, 1992: 96).          
Reviewing the articles of the Iranian Constitution, particularly Article 57,   shows the 
absolute supremacy of the Leader over all principal bodies, especially elected 
institutions. As we will explain in the next chapter, unelected institutions are 
predominant and the elected institutions are subordinate to them. 
 
6. The place of the Islamic Consultative Assembly in the amended 
Constitution of 1989 
 
As we mentioned before, the main institutions of the Iranian Constitution have been 
framed according to the Ayatollah Khomeini's ideas. One of the Iranian writers 
mentioned in his book who interviewed Ayatollah Khomeini before the revolution 
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reported that his idea about the legislative function of the parliament was as follows: 
“there are certain matters which are executive affairs such as urban and traffic 
regulations. These are not related to {sacred} laws, and it is beneath Islam to concern 
itself with them; they are not related to basic laws. In Islam there is no room for the 
institution of basic laws and if an assembly is installed it will not be a legislative 
assembly in that sense, but an assembly to supervise government” (quoted in Amir 
Arjomand, 1988: 148, 149). Also after the revolution in 1981 he revealed his approach 
toward the parliament when he stated that “If laws are needed Islam has established 
them all, there is no need …, after establishing the government, to sit down and draw up 
laws” (Khomeini, 1981: 137, 138). 
The Islamic Consultative Assembly is an elected institution; however the nomination 
process is controlled by the powerful twelve-member Council of Guardians who are 
constitutionally empowered to examine the application of all prospective candidates. 
Legislatures are the main representative body in democracies, and therefore it must 
directly be elected in order to reflect public opinion. But with this mechanism the 
members of the Guardian Council can easily impact upon the composition of the 
assembly and therefore weaken the representative function of the parliament. The 
system of parliament in Iran is twofold, including the main Assembly and the Guardian 
Council without which the Assembly has no validity. 
6.1 Electoral system of the Iranian Parliament 
 
 People elect their representatives to the parliament every four years through, direct 
and public elections (Article 63). The electoral law gives voting rights to those aged 
eighteen and over and introduces a double-balloting system. 
 Candidates must obtain a majority of one fourth of the votes in his or her 
constituency. Those who achieve this majority will be automatically elected as members 
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of the parliament.  If more candidates than are required achieve this majority, candidates 
with the highest number of votes will be elected and if two or more candidates have 
exactly the same number of votes, a lot will be drawn to recognise the elected candidate.   
Constituencies which do not fill their allocated seats at this stage of the elections should 
enter in the second round of elections which shall be held a few months later. 
Constituencies that do not fill their allocated number of seats in the first round of 
elections will have to field candidates equivalent to twice the number of their remaining 
unfilled seats. Candidates chosen to participate in the second round of elections are 
based on the remaining candidates of the first round with the highest number of votes. 
All other candidates are disqualified at this stage. 
If there are not enough candidates in a constituency equivalent to twice the number of 
unfilled seats, all remaining candidates will be chosen to stand in the election again. 
It is deemed improbable for there to be fewer candidates available than the number of 
remaining seats. At this round of elections as in the first round, candidates that achieve a 
one fourth majority of the vote will be elected as members of the Majlis. Should no 
candidates achieve this majority or there are still seats unfilled, then candidates with the 
highest number of votes will be elected as members of the parliament. 
       If more than the needed numbers of candidates attain this majority, candidates with 
the highest number of votes will be elected. Should two or more candidates have exactly 
the same number of votes, a lot will be drawn to determine which candidate is elected.   
    Parliamentary elections in the Islamic Republic of Iran should be run according to 
the procedures of the election law which was ratified in 1999. The law comprises the 
conditions and qualifications required for candidacy, and the procedure for screening 
candidates. An eligible candidate must be an original Iranian citizen, at least 30 years 
old, must have a record clean of “moral corruption”,  and under article 28 must show 
his/her belief in and practical commitment to Islam and the Islamic Republic system.  
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Also according to this article one of the important conditions for a candidate is absolute 
loyalty to the Supreme Leader and the principle of vilayat al-faqih.  
The qualification of the candidates is examined in three stages:  First, the Elections 
Executive Committee which is formed by the Interior Ministry considers the 
qualifications of the candidates in every constituency. The Election Executive 
Committee may investigate many things such as employment background, political 
attitudes of a candidate and most important of all asking about his/her loyalty to the 
Islamic Republic.   
The second stage involves the Elections Supervisory Committee, which is fully 
under the control of the (Conservative) Council of Guardians.  Most of the above 
mentioned procedures in the first step are repeated again in this stage. If the executive 
power be dominated by the non Conservative camp, especially the Reformists, a severe 
clash will be inevitable. During the Khatami Presidency most of the candidates who 
were qualified by the Elections Executive Committees were disqualified by the 
Elections Supervisory Committee in the second stage.  
     The third stage consists of a review of the qualifications of the candidates by the 
Guardian Council, which has the power to take the final decision on candidate approval 
or rejection. The important point here is the Council may reject candidates who were 
accepted already by one or both of the committees, or it can accept candidates that 
either or both have rejected. According to the law, appeals against rejection must be 
submitted to the Guardian Council itself. Official campaigning may only begin after the 
Council has issued a final list of candidates. According to Article 9 of the Election Law 
“candidates shall be barred from launching any election campaign activities on the IRIB 
(Radio/TV) or through Friday Prayers sermons or any other official or government 
channels”.           
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 6.2 The main functions of the Islamic Consultative Assembly 
 
The functions of parliaments differ between countries. Although the parliament is 
known by its law making function, legislatures can fulfil a variety of functions within a 
political system. Various factors such as the constitution, party system, political culture, 
the role of the interest groups as external characteristics of parliament, can define the 
number of its functions and their importance. 
 As was shown the law making function is not the only task of the legislature but, as 
many writers mentioned, the key functions of modern parliament also are: scrutiny of 
the executive and the administration, legitimating, recruitment, socialization and 
training (Packenham, 1970: 86-95 and Lupo, 2001: 36). Mezey divides some common 
activities of the legislatures into three broad categories: policy making activities, 
representational and system maintenance activities. He explains that policy making 
activities might be the initiation of the policies or approving the policies which are 
initiated elsewhere or at least deliberation on it. Intermediating between government and 
the people, the representation function means articulating the interest of the 
constituencies. And finally the system maintenance function consists of those activities 
which enhance the stability of the political system and its survival. Through public 
support for the system parliamentarians are able to demonstrate fulfilment of this 
function (Mezey, 1979).         
Like other legislatures the Iranian Parliament has some functions which can be 
fulfilled through various types of parliamentary commissions. The deputies are 
normally members of three types of parliamentary commissions: the first type 
comprises the fifteen Specialized (permanent) Commissions which cover all executive 
administrations though are not parallel with them (Article 26-57 of Internal Regulation 
of the Majlis). The second type comprises Joint Committees which may be composed of 
two or three Specialized Commissions and should be formed when the Board of the 
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Speakership decides that some bills or proposals must be considered by such a 
commission (Article 58 of the Internal Regulation). The third one comprises ad hoc 
Commissions which may be formed if at least fifteen deputies of the Majlis request that 
on the basis that there is an extraordinary and important situation in the country (Article 
59 of the Internal Regulation). 
The Islamic Consultative Assembly shall meet in open session and discussion is 
normally in public by radio broadcasting and the minutes published in the Official 
Newspaper (Roznam e rasmi). However, in special circumstances and exceptional cases 
a closed session may be held upon the request of the President, or one of the ministers 
or ten deputies. The President and his ministers may participate in the open sessions of 
the Majlis either collectively or individually. 
Considering the particular separation of powers discussed before, the main functions 
of the legislature in Iran may be categorised as follow: 
6.2.1 Representative function 
 
In a democratic political system, members of the parliament are supposed to be the 
representatives of the people and therefore they must directly reflect public opinion. As 
Judge (1993) explains [h]istorically, parliament fused the principle of consent with that 
of representation and served to legitimate government policies and changes of 
government itself” (Judge, 1993: 2). Also different political parties and people who 
represent the political interest of specific groups or specific areas of the country should 
be free to participate in elections and be elected as members of the parliament. 
Delegation of popular sovereignty usually comes through an electoral system. So “[t]he 
electoral system is an important variable, in that it facilitates or limits the access of 
parties to the parliament… Laws governing the nature and conduct of parties (for 
instance, stipulating the conditions under which parties may form and contest elections, 
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and the financing of parties and campaigns), or imposing a threshold requirement for 
parliamentary representation, are also likely to affect the capacity of parties to achieve 
representation in parliament” (Norton and Ahmed, 1999: 5). 
 The election system in Iran is not democratic in comparison with the election 
process in most European democracies. According to Article 99 of the Constitution the 
“Guardian Council shall be charged with the responsibility of supervising the elections 
of the Assembly of Experts for Leadership, the President, the Islamic Consultative 
Assembly and referendums.” There have been many arguments about the supervising 
role of the Guardian Council but owing to the right of interpretation of the Constitution 
which is exclusively reserved for the Gurdian Council according to the Article 98; this 
right is interpreted as approbatory supervision (Samii, 2001). On the basis of this 
mechanism candidates‟ religious beliefs and commitment to the Islamic system and to 
the Supreme Leader should be proved by this Council. According to this authority the 
Council can arbitrarily exclude candidates who have different political positions to that 
of Guardian Council members who have been pro-Conservative since the establishment 
of the Council.     
 The Guardian Council has used this power in different kinds of elections. For 
instance in selecting candidates for the Fourth Parliamentary Elections in 1992, the 
Council of Guardians, led by traditionalist-right followers of Ayatollah Khomeini, 
rejected the majority of Islamic –left aspirants. This resulted in the Islamic left losing its 
parliamentary majority. Until then, the Islamic-left majority had kept in check, in part, 
the programme of domestic economic liberalization and foreign policy détente that then 
President Rafsanjani had pursued since 1989 ( Buchta, 2000: 17).  
In the Fifth Parliamentary Election only the credentials of 3276 out of 5365 people 
who registered were approved by the Guardian Council (Schirazi, 1997: 88). Also in the 
Sixth
   
Parliamentary Election, shortly after the deadline for registration, 401 out of 6860 
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candidates were disqualified due to their political background and ideological belief 
(Samii, 2001). In the Seventh Majlis Parliamentary Election the Guardian Council 
barred almost half of the 8000 candidates, most of who belonged to the Reformists 
parties. Also from nearly 7000 candidates who registered in the Eight Parliamentary 
Elections, 40% of them were disqualified (BBC, 2008). 
   In fact many of them were rejected because they lacked the qualifications which 
were stated in the Article 28 of the Election Law according to which candidates must 
have a   “belief in and [have] practical commitment to Islam and the Islamic Republic 
System” and be loyal to the religious Leader and the Constitution. Because of this 
system, the Religious Leader through the Guardian Council can completely control 
access to the parliament and mostly the candidates whose qualifications are approved by 
this Council represent the interests of the regime rather than people (Buchta, 2000).  
This function of the Guardian Council has affected the political parties and interest 
groups who not only shape and control policy options, but also define and carry public 
opinion to a large extent to the parliament. Their participation has been limited in Iran 
since the revolution. Although in the course of the revolutionary movement between 
1979 and 1981 there were many political parties with different political ideologies, and 
which participated in political activity, most of them were then barred, except parties 
such as the Islamic Republic Party (IPR) whose members were the loyal followers of 
the Ayatollah Khomeini. This party dissolved itself voluntarily because of internal 
conflict. Following this, two parties were created, one of them consisted of right wing 
conservative clergy (JRM) and the other one Islamic leftist (MRM) members who were 
loyal to the political regime. The activities of political parties such as the Tudeh party 
(secular leftist) and Free Movement of Iran and many other parties were banned 
(Firbanks, 1998). 
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 The Iranian Constitution in Article 26 states: “ [i]t shall be allowed to form parties, 
societies, political or profession association and Islamic or other religious societies of 
the organized minorities, provided that they do not violate the principles of freedom, 
independence, national unity, Islamic standards and essential of the Islamic Republic. 
…”.  In 1981 the first Election Law was passed according to which all parties must get 
permission for their activities. In Article 10 a committee comprises of two 
parliamentary deputies, two delegates from the judiciary and interior minister may issue 
permission for establishing political parties. This committee also is assigned to 
supervise the activities of political parties and may dissolve them.  
To sum up it might be said that due to the strict control of the political parties and 
interest groups activities in the Iranian political system, parliament in Iran can hardly 
exercise its representative function in the sense of representing the interests of the 
people.  As Mezey (1983) mentioned “because interest groups are not very strong in 
these political systems [Third World countries], individual demands are not readily 
aggregated” and therefore the parliament is not able to perform its representative 
function efficiently.                               
  6.2.2 Law making function  
 
Another main function of the parliament is law making. “Legislatures historically are 
the authoritative source of statutory law. Statutory law, subordinate to constitutions, is 
superior to all other forms of law, including administrative regulations” (Olson, 1994: 6, 
7). As the representatives of the people, legislatures translate preferences into policy 
through enacting legislation. As Norton put it they are established by the constitution  
“for giving assent to binding measures of public policy, that assent being given on 
behalf of a political community that extends beyond the government elite responsible 
for formulating those measures” (Norton, 1990: 1).  Therefore the law making function 
of the legislature has a strong relationship with the representative function.   
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As already discussed, the representative function in Iran is influenced by the power 
of the other political institutions such as the Guardian Council. The law making 
function of the parliament also is under the influence of the some other power centres 
which partly are designated in the Constitution. Nevertheless it may be said that the law 
making function is the most important function of the Iranian parliament.  From the date 
when the Iranian parliament was established until the end of 2005, 11412 laws were 
enacted, of which 2176 laws were passed by the post revolutionary parliament 
(Ghorbani, 2006). It indicates that at least quantitatively the Majlis has been used 
extensively its law making capacity. The Iranian Constitution expressly granted 
parliament the power to legislate on anything which is necessary.   According to Article 
71: “{t}he Islamic Consultative Assembly may, within the limits of the Constitution, 
enact laws on all matters.”  This article shows that the jurisdiction of Consultative 
Assembly in its law making function is general. The first paragraph of Article 85 
stipulated that “… the Assembly may not delegate the right to legislate to another 
person or committee.” However in exceptional cases the Constitution allows the 
Assembly to delegate its law making function to its internal committees. Members of 
the parliament can present their propositions if sponsored by at least fifteen 
representatives. 
 The most influential factors which normally play a major role during the law making 
process are “executive- centred elites, civilian and military bureaucracy, chief 
executives in presidential systems, cabinet members in parliamentary systems and party 
elites in those systems characterized by strong political parties” (Olson and Mezey, 
1991: 6); however, in the Iranian political system these influences are located outside of 
the executive power.     
Under the Constitution of Iran there are three institutions which are involved in the 
law making process: The executive power as an elected institution and the Expediency 
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Council and Guardian Council as unelected institutions; their influence will be 
discussed in the following pages in detail. 
 
6.2.2.1 The Contribution of the executive power as an elected institution in the law 
making process 
  
The law making process according to the Iranian Constitution may be started either 
by the executive through a government bill or by a proposal from the parliamentarians. 
In the latter case it is necessary for at least 15 deputies to support the particular 
proposal. According to Article 75 “ Members' bills, and proposals and amendments to 
government bills proposed by representatives leading to the reduction in public 
revenues or increase in public expenditures, may be presented to the Islamic 
Consultative Assembly [parliament], only if they also include ways and means of 
making good the reduction in income or of obtaining new revenue.” Therefore the 
executive power has the main responsibility to run the public affairs through 
introducing the appropriate bills to the Islamic Consultative Assembly for enactment; 
initiation by parliament‟s members is limited by the Constitution. Yet as the below 
graph shows the number of parliamentary proposals in comparison to the executive's 
bills is considerable though the number of executive bills is increasing. 
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Figure (4.4): The numbers of bills and proposals approved Over the Six sessions of the Majlis  
 
      Source:  see raw material available in Publication of Islamic Consultative Assembly (2005) 
       * Data collected by Hassan Vakilian 
 
After submitting the bill the executive may withdraw it for political reasons. For 
instance if the government believes that the present time is not appropriate for getting 
the assent of the Majlis or it predicts that the parliament will definitely reject the bill 
and for avoiding being politically embarrased then the bill may be taken back if the 
council of ministers supports this decision and if the bill just has been considered in first 
reading in plenary session. But, after the second reading, when the principle of the bill 
has been enacted in the Assembly, it is only possible to withdraw it providing that one 
of the Members of the Assembly who is against this decision can talk in plenary 
session. Withdrawal of the bill may happen due to the tremendous number of 
amendments. Some Assembly amendments may totally change the content of the 
policies pursued by the executive. For instance President Khatami had to withdraw the 
bill according to which the power and authorities of the President would be increased 
owing to the huge numbers of amendments which the Conservative Seven Majlis made 
to the bill.  
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 Although Assembly and executive powers usually interact during the law making 
process, particularly in the formulation and deliberation stages, “yet the Assembly has 
authority, according to the majority vote of the deputies to accept or reject the bills 
absolutely or to amend what ever part of that. Therefore on the basis of the Constitution 
the final destiny of the executive‟s bills is in the hands of the parliamentarians” 
(Hashemi, 2000: 163,164). However the Majlis only has power to reject the executive‟s 
bill and ask for new bill; it cannot formulate a new bill itself.           
6.2.2.2 The role of the unelected institutions in the law making process 
 
The Constitution of 1979 was the result of the revolution in Iran which was 
ideological in character. One can find this readily from the preamble of the Iranian 
Constitution where it is asserted that “the Islamic nature of the great Islamic revolution 
expressed the will 'of the Islamic people ' to establish the Constitution, on the basis of 
Islamic principles and guidelines”. The distinctive peculiarity of this revolution lay in 
its ideological and Islamic character. Furthermore in Article 12 it is expressed that “the 
official religion of the State is Islamic as interpreted by the Jafari (one of Shia's Imam) 
School of jurisprudence of the Twelver Shi'a. This religious definition of the State, in 
view of the eternal truth of Islam, can never be altered”. 
One of the most important results of the ideological nature of the Islamic 
Constitution is that all laws and regulations including civil, criminal, financial, 
economic, administrative, cultural, military, political or otherwise, shall be based on 
Islamic principles. This article shall apply generally to all the articles of the Constitution 
and other laws and regulations. It shall be decided by the high ranking clerics of the 
Guardian Council as to whether such laws and regulations conform to this article 
(Article 4). As it is clearly stated in this article, the Constitution binds legislative power 
to the Shari'a (Islamic laws). According to this Article, parliament has been forbidden to 
pass laws which 'contradict' the principles and ordinances of the State religion. 
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6.2.2.2.1 The role of the Guardian Council in the law making process 
 
The Guardian Council is one of the most important political institutions of the 
Islamic Republic which has the right of veto over parliamentary resolutions and in 
practice occupies a dominant position in the legislature. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, the history of this institution goes back to a century before when the first 
Constitutional Movement of Iranian society took place in 1906. When the demands for 
parliamentary democracy arose in the early 20
th
 century, there was resistance. The 
clergy as a source of power representing the traditional parts of society tried to insert 
one article in the Constitution which was very important in terms of constraining the 
law making power of the parliament (Article 2 of the Constitution of 1906-7). 
This Article is the historical root of the Guardian Council in the present Constitution 
of 1979 but this time it played a very important and essential role rather than a formal 
one. It seems that the voice of the Shykh Fazlollah Nuri in the course of Constitutional 
Movement of 1906 reverberated in the Constitution of 1979 and its amendment in 1989.   
The Guardian Council is composed of twelve members of whom six are Faqihs (high 
ranking clergy) appointed by the Supreme Leader (Article 91). They have the right to 
veto the Assembly's resolutions if it is not compatible with the Shari‟a.  In addition the 
other six members of the Guardian Council are jurists, specialized in various branches 
of law, elected by the Assembly from among Muslim jurists proposed by the Head of 
the Judiciary who in turn is appointed by the Supreme Leader.  
The most important point about the Guardian Council is stated in Article 93: 
“without the Guardian Council the Majlis [Assembly] shall have no legal validity 
except in case of approval of credentials of its representatives and election of six jurist 
member of the Guardian Council.” Thus the powers of the Assembly are seriously 
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reduced in the Constitution by the right of veto exercised by the Guardian Council. One 
writer stated that: 
 
 “If the implementation of the Constitution is the responsibility of the President, its 
interpretations is  the prerogative of the Guardian Council, and its enforcement the duty 
of the Judiciary, the Majles has the right to legislate, that is to enact in specific laws the 
principles embedded in the general clauses of the Constitution. This prerogative of the 
Majles, however, is absolute only with respect to initiating legislation. As mentioned 
before, the Guardian Council could remand legislation it deems incompatible with the 
Constitution or Islam and, should an impasse then ensue between it and the Majles, the 
Interest Council {Expediency Council} would have the privilege of advising the Leader 
about the final shape of the legislation. In such cases the Leader, or in practice the 
Interest Council, in effect becomes the ultimate legislator” (Tabari, 2003: 107, 108).  
In this research we are contending that the Islamic Consultative Assembly is a 
legislature which many unelected institutions impact upon given that it is subordinate to 
these institutions, but it is incorrect to say that essentially the parliament has no effect.  
As we will show, the influence of the Assembly in relation to the unelected institutions 
is marginal but in relation to the executive power especially in particular conditions, it is 
considerable.  
If one reviews the different sessions of the Iranian Parliament from the time that it 
was established, one can find this  reality:  During the First Majlis, the Guardian 
Council raised objections to 82 out of 370 (i.e. 22 percent) of the bills or proposals 
approved by the Assembly, and sent them back to be amended. During the second 
Majlis, this figure rose 73 out of 316 (23 percent) and during the Third Majlis to 66 out 
of 256 (26 percent). This practice was continued with enthusiasm during the Fourth 
Majlis in which 105 bills were returned for revision out of 342 (31 percent). During the 
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Fifth session the Guardian Council rejected 95 enactments out of 359 (26 percent). Also 
in the Sixth session of the parliament 92 enactments vetoed out of 396 (23 percent) 
(Karname e Sale Avval ta Sheshom Majlise Shoray e Eslami). 
 
Figure (4-5): The numbers of the enactments (bills and proposals) rejected by the Guardian Council 
 
 
 
Source: see raw material in publications of Islamic Republic of Iran (2002) 
* Data collected by Hassan Vakilian 
    Sometimes the Guardian Council rejected the bills or proposals several times 
whether in the name of the contradiction with Shari‟a or the Constitution. The following 
table shows the number of bills and proposals rejected by the Guardian Council in the 
sixth Session of the Majlis during which the Reformist Majlis was blocked by the 
Conservative dominated Council: 
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Table (4.1): The number of the rejection of bills and proposals by Guardian Council in Sixth Majlis   
The number of rejections 
by the Guardian Council 
(Sixth Majlis) 
 
The number of proposals 
 
The number of bills 
One time 19 52 
Two times 7 6 
Three times 5 4 
More than three times 2* 0 
Source: See raw material available in publication of Islamic Consultative Assembly (2005) 
* One of these proposals was rejected 4 times and the other one 7 times. 
**Data collected by Hassan Vakilian 
 
If one were to count the number of the articles, paragraphs and sentences to which 
the Guardian Council objected the percentage of the rejection of parliamentary 
initiatives would turn out to be much higher. It has been claimed that the importance of 
those bills and proposals which have been rejected by the Guardian Council are more 
important than those which have been passed (Schirazi, 1997). “Mohsen Alef, himself a 
member of the Guardian Council, has described the former category of resolutions as 
'fundamental'. According to a report which he published in Ressalat (6-18/6/87), out of 
64 parliamentary resolutions of fundamental importance 31 were rejected by the 
Guardian Council. These include resolutions that dealt with foreign trade, 
landownership, industrial law and the co- operative system” (Ibid: 92).  
It is noteworthy that the intervention of the Guardian Council is not limited only to 
the enactments of the parliament but it has extended to the statutory instruments 
approved by the Council of Ministers and other executive institutions. 
To sum up it can be said although the framers of the Constitution of 1979 assigned a 
significant role to the Islamic Consultative Assembly, they also enshrined a Guardian 
Council which is more powerful than parliament and is able to control its activities on 
behalf of the religious Leader.    
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 6.2.2.2.2 The role of the Expediency Council in the law making process 
 
One of the institutions which we can categorize as an unelected institution is the 
Expediency Council. This institution was founded by Ayatollah Khomeini and was set 
out in the Constitution during the amendments of 1989.  
Members of the Council are composed of legal entities and non-legal entities. The 
legal entities consist of the President, the Speaker of the Majlis, the Head of the 
Judiciary, the six clergy members of the Guardian Council, and the minister concerned 
depending on the subject under discussion. The other members include clergy or laymen 
appointed by the decree of the Leader for five years (Article 112). The number of 
appointed members used to be 22; however in 2007 the Supreme Leader Ayatollah 
Khameniei enlarged the Council by appointing five new members. “Specialists believe 
that the new composition of the Council, which acts like the Senate of the former 
Iranian Parliament (or the House of Lords in the UK), shall increase the powers and 
authority of the body” (Ahadi, 2007). 
On the basis of Article 112 “... regulation related to the Majma [Expediency Council] 
shall be prepared and approved by the members of the Majma itself and ratified by the 
Leader.” 
The first chair of the Expediency Council was Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who 
simultaneously was the Iranian President. After the election of 1997 according to which 
Khatami became the President, Hashemi Rafsanjani continued to hold his position in 
Council by decree of the Supreme Leader which has extended till today. It has seven 
permanent Commissions in different areas of policy making including the infrastructure, 
macro economy, politics and defence commissions. Also there is a Strategic Research 
Institution which has become more active in recent years.     
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The Expediency Council justifies laws which are not directly matched to Islamic 
laws or even is contradicted by them. “[A]s a principle or method of law, this doctrine 
derives its validity from the idea that the basic purpose of legislation in Islam is to 
secure the welfare of the people by promoting their benefits and by protecting them 
against harm” (Tamadonfar, 2001:  213).  In fact this is a religious principle regarding 
legislation in Islam; however, there are two interpretation of this basic principle. Some 
Islamic thinkers read this principle from a limited perspective. They accept the Zarorat 
(expediency) Principle in so far as it has not conflicted with implicit and explicit rules 
and ordinances of Shari‟a law. This approach toward this principle may be said to be a 
traditional and limited version of the Zarorat Principle. The second interpretation of the 
Zarorat Principle, which is rather wide and unprecedent in Islamic jurisprudence, 
emerged after the Islamic Revolution. Facing many practical problems in reconciling 
Islamic rules and ordinances with contemporary emergency needs of society, Ayatollah 
Khomieni provided a new interpretation of the Zarorat Priciple. He believed that the 
ruler of Islamic society in emergency conditions temporarily was able to set aside 
primary rules of Islam. “The government is empowered to unilaterally revoke any 
Shari‟ah agreements which it has concluded with the people when these agreements are 
contrary to the interest of the country or Islam”. He even added that the “government 
can also prevent any devotional (Ibadi) or non-devotional affair if it is opposed to the 
interest of Islam and or so long as it is so. The government can prevent hajj, which is 
one of the important divine obligations, on a temporary basis, in case when it is contrary 
to the interests of an Islamic Country... . Apparently, Khomeini was suggesting, in an 
unprecedented way, that the doctrine of Vilayat-e Faqih (leadership of the jurisprudent) 
is a central injunction while prayer and pilgrimage are secondary injunctions” (Ibid: 
214). This new interpretation of the Zarorat Principle was adopted by the Reviewing 
Council in the course of reviewing the Constitution in 1989.  
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According to the Constitution, the Guardian Council was in charge of determining 
the compatibility of laws with the Islamic rules (Article 66). In practice, this council 
took a very inflexible approach to its role by rejecting many parliamentary decisions 
due to its incompatibility with Islam. Frustrated by the inefficiency of the legislative 
process, Ayatollah Khomeini reacted to this situation by ruling that parliament could 
pass any laws when it was necessary for the system by a two-thirds majority. The 
Assembly used this rule to pass a contentious piece of legislation, the Temporary 
Cultivation Law. The Guardian Council had strongly objected to this law which gave 
landlords' property to occupying farmers, on the ground that the Islamic rules have not 
accepted the confiscation of private property. 
Since the continuous dispute between the Assembly and Guardian Council paralyzed 
the legislative process and made parliament inefficient in terms of its law making 
function, Ayatollah Khomeini decided to institutionalize the idea of expediency by 
establishing a council for determining what the expedient was or in the interests of the 
state or Islam (Schirazi, 1997). The Expediency Council was the result. 
6.2.2.2.2.1 Functions and authorities of the Expediency Council 
 
On the basis of Article 112 the Council‟s functions can be categorised into three 
groups: settlement of disputes between the Majlis and Guardian Council, solving 
difficulties of the system and giving advice to the Supreme Leader. 
6.2.2.2.2.2 Settlement of disputes between Majlis and Guardian Council 
 
 According to the first part of Article 112 “[t]he Expediency Council shall be 
convened at the order of the Leader to determine such expedience in cases where the 
Guardian Council finds an approval of the Majlis against the principles of the Shari‟a or 
the Constitution, and the Majlis in view of the expedience of the System is unable to 
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satisfy the Guardian Council,....”  In fact this was the main reason for establishing the 
Council.  
This Council which was enshrined in the amended Constitution of 1989 and became 
a major player in the legislative process was responsible for determining what was in 
the interests of the political system. It is stated that despite the Guardian Council which 
considers parliament‟s enactments in terms of their compatibility with Shari‟a and 
Constitution, the Expediency Council may go beyond this and take decision according 
to the expediency of the system (Zaraie, 2004).   
Despite some writers (e.g. Tamadonfar, 2001) who believe this Council was 
authorized to frame laws independently of the Assembly and the Guardian Council, 
others believe that it is not a legislative body and just is authorized to settle disputes 
between the Majlis and the Guardian Council and provide advice to the Supreme Leader 
(Zaraie, 2004). Nevertheless, in practice, the Council has extended its power to pass 
laws and regulations even without any stalemate between the Assembly and the 
Guardian Council especially in important policy areas (Schirazi, 1997: 234).  By 
employing this Council, the government passed a great deal of legislation referred to as 
the State Ordinances (Ahkam-e hokumati), which practically suspended or violated 
Islamic ordinances. Therefore the Expediency Council can be involved in the legislative 
process; however it does not represent the people and its members are not elected 
directly by them.  
The Expediency Council from the date when it was established decided on many 
important issues such as the law of urban lands, labour law, Islamic criminal law, 
divorce law, election law and the like on which Assembly and Guardian Council had 
disagreed. 
 
 
 145 
 
 
Figure (4-6):  Number of disputes resolved by the Expediency Council (1988-2007)  
 
 Source :( Majma a, 2008) 
*Data collected by Hassan Vakilian 
 
6.2.2.2.2.3 Solving difficulties of the system 
 
Article 110 of the Constitution enumerated the power and authorities of the Supreme 
Leader. According to provision 8 of this Article the problems and difficulties which 
cannot be solved by normal methods by the three branches of the State, shall be 
resolved by the Supreme Leader through the Expediency Council. The root of this 
Article dates back to the period of war between Iran and Iraq during which many 
emergency problems emerged which needed to be resolved in the shortest possible time. 
Since decision making through the normal process needed a long time and any delay 
might endanger the national interest of the country, dealing with these problems was 
referred to the Leader who was the only one that could identify an issue as a difficulty 
of the state and then refer that to the Expediency Council for discussion and making a 
decision. When Ayatollah Khomeini ordered a review of the Constitution, this 
capability of the Council for solving problems was mentioned in his order. Some writers 
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(Hashemi, 2000 and Mehrpour, 1992) criticised this process and stated that “solving 
difficulties of the system” without defining its limits was too dangerous as it might be 
misinterpreted by the Leader who has the exclusive right to identify what is the 
difficulty. The same problem also arose in the expression of “normal process” and 
paved the way for the creation of a parallel legislative power. In practice it appeared that 
executive bodies used this article to bypass the legislative power. If the executive power 
guesses that the Majlis or Guardian Council may reject its bills then it chooses to attain 
its aim through this process. For instance many laws regarding regulating land and 
properties, some crimes such as fraud, drug trafficking, banking policies, defining the 
jurisdiction of the judicial courts, and the Fourth Five-Year Development Plan which 
reasonably were possible to be dealt with through the normal process have been enacted 
by the Expediency Council under the title of the difficulties of the State (Hashemi, 2000 
and Majma, 2008).  
According to the interpretation of the Guardian Council, the enactments of the 
Expediency Council are compulsory and the Majlis or any other legislative authorities 
such as the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution or the council of ministers and 
the like are not allowed to enact laws or regulations incompatible with them.  
The below figures show the number of difficulties which has been referred to the 
Expediency Council by the Supreme Leader. Although this trend has declined 
considerably, it has the potential to be deployed as an alternative legislative power for 
promulgating laws non-democratically.  
 
 
 
 
 
 147 
 
 
      Figure (4-7): Number of difficulties resolved by the Leader through Expediency Council (1989- 
2005)  
 
Source: (Majma b, 2008) 
*Difficulties of system mean those problems in political system which may not be solved   through 
ordinary processes. These difficulties encompass a wide range of issues and only the Supreme 
Leader has authority to define whether a problem is a difficulty of the system or not. 
**Data collected by Hassan Vakilian 
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usually the executive and legislature are involved in policy making and if we conclude 
that General Policies in Iranian Constitution means the same as in legislative studies 
literature then it means that instead of them the Supreme Leader is the policy maker.   
 Some commentators (Amirarjoman, 2002 and Zaraie, 2001) have tried to clarify the 
vagueness of this term which was used for the first time during the 1989 revision of 
Constitution. In the first draft which was prepared in the sub committee for defining 
authorities of the Supreme Leader, determining the goals and General Policies of the 
state after consulting with Expediency Council was suggested to be one of the privileges 
of the Supreme Leader. Also he should have the right to supervise the implementation 
of General Policies and finally to dissolve the Majlis after approval of the majority of 
the Expediency Council (Mashrohe Mozakerat, 1989). According to the minutes of the 
meetings of the aforementioned Council some members of the Committee supported 
that suggestion on the basis that only the Religious Leader has the right to lead the 
country in the right direction since he knows the Islamic rule better than anybody else. 
Should the Majlis fail to observe these General Policies, the Supreme Leader shall have 
the right to dissolve it (Daneshzadeh, 1989: 649,650). Some members of the Committee 
strongly disagreed with the privilege of the Leader to dissolve the Majlis but most of 
them accepted his right to delineate the General Policies of the state. Only a few people 
such as Hashemi Rafsanjani commented that delineating the General Policies made the 
Majlis and government meaningless because these were the assignment of the Majlis 
and the government‟s routine task (Hashemi Rafsanjani, 1989: 679). Finally the 
privilege of the Supreme Leader to dissolve the Majlis was deleted but his right to 
determine the General Policies remained nearly the same as suggested in the first draft. 
After revision of the Constitution, Ayatollah Khamenie even without consultation with 
the Expediency Council issued the General Policies of the Second Five-Year 
Development Plan of the country and this in turn added to the confusion of the meaning 
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of the General Policies because it was supposed that he should consult with the 
Expediency Council before delineating the General Policies. However later on he issued 
a decree to the Expediency Council and mentioned that a special office shall be 
established for providing the expert reports and information for examining the General 
Policies of the State.  
    Regarding the vagueness of the term General Policies, and reviewing the minutes 
of the meeting of the Council, Amir Arjomand argued that the General Policies meant 
“public policy” which should be delineated by the Supreme Leader through the 
Expediency Council (Amir Arjomand, 2002:  82). He quoted the Head of the 
Expediency Council‟s idea about the meaning of the General Policies in his article as 
follow: The General Policies shall be essentially distinguished from regular statutes. It 
is not possible for any body to assign it to the executive bodies except the Supreme 
Leader. They are policies which should be reflected in the various kinds of laws and 
regulations, provisions which are enacted by the Council of Ministers and all state 
bodies should observe them in practice. For example no court can refer to these policies 
and they should issue verdicts on the basis of the laws. Those who enact laws or 
executive provisions shall do it according to these policies. Especially when 
government and Majlis want to formulate the Five-Year Development Plans these 
policies should be considered by them.  Also both of them have an obligation to observe 
them when they prepare regular bills or proposals (Hashemi Rafsanjani quoted in Ibid: 
82, 83). 
Despite many attempts, as Amir Arjomand put it, the meaning of the General 
Policies has remained unclear. He explains in his article that the Guardian Council 
rejected the enactment of the Majlis with recourse to the General Policies while it only 
can do so when the enactment of the Majlis has a discrepancy with the Constitution or 
Shari‟a. He concluded that if the General Policies were interpreted so broadly, it 
 150 
 
definitely would reduce the main branches of the government, particularly the Majlis, to 
subsidiary offices of the leadership institution (Ibid).  
On the basis of reports provided by the Expediency Council (Majma, c, 2008) for 
implementing  provision one of Article 110 of the Constitution, which concerns the duty 
of the Supreme Leader for determining the General Policies of the system after 
consulting with the Expediency Council, the advisory proposals presented have 
included: General Policies on oil and gas, the Third and Fourth  Five-Year Development 
Programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran, General Policies on transportation, national 
security as well as many other important subjects in different policy areas.      
The graph below shows the number of the General Policies which have been 
delineated by the Supreme Leader through the Expediency Council.  
 
       Figure (4-8): Numbers of General Policies* of the State delineated by the Leader through the 
Expediency Council (1998-2007) 
 
Source:  (Majma, d, 2008) 
*General Policies are the general approaches of the system which are determined by the 
Supreme Leader after consulting with Expediency council. All branches of government have to 
act within the guidelines of these approaches. 
**Data collected by Hassan Vakilian 
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To sum up, it might be said what the Expediency Council and some other quasi 
legislative institutions do in practice, i.e. to enact laws and regulations, has 
weakened the law making function of the Iranian parliament. As Rasekh (2008: 
73, 74) mentioned: 
 
“On one hand there is an official unelected rival to the Parliament (Majles). The 
Majles consists of representatives of the people and according to the constitution is the 
sole competent legislating authority. Members of the rival institute, namely the State 
Expediency Council, are all appointed by the absolute Guardian and despite its 
mandate – that is, to play the role of an umpire in cases where there is a tie situation 
between Majles and the Council of Guardians concerning an enactment - in many cases 
changes the enactments of Majles and indeed legislates. On the other hand, there are 
dozens of various supreme councils, such as the supreme Council for national security 
that indeed pass laws and regulations”.  
 
In fact many important and controversial policies, specially the major economic 
plans which normally should be brought into parliament for enactment, have been 
approved in other bodies which do not have law making jurisdiction. That is why some 
authors (Mezey and Olson, 1991: 1) believe that in developing countries “legislatures 
play less of a policy making role than the modal European case. The consensual view 
was that these legislatures exist for the primary purpose of providing a democratic 
façade for the authoritarian political system.”  
The pyramid (Figure 4-9) indicates the main decision making stratification in the 
Iranian political system.  As we can see the unelected institutions which are fully under 
the control of the Leader, stand above the elected institutions. Yet it should be explained 
that the ranking of the Majlis and executive power at least in real politics may be 
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changed according to their political attitude as we will examine in detail in the next 
chapter.  
 
 
                              Figure (4-9): The pyramid of decision makers‟ power in Iranian political system 
 
Source: Zarei, 2001: 199 
 
6.3 The function of scrutinizing the executive power and its administrations 
 
Another primary function of legislatures is monitoring executive power and 
administrative offices of the state in terms of their efficiency, probity and fidelity. 
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power because they have to make sure that policies which had been enacted in 
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Such as with other functions of legislatures, the power of the parliament for 
supervising the executive power depends on many internal and external variables. For 
instance the constitutional arrangements or the form of the political regime whether it is 
parliamentary or presidential may be definitive.  
The oversight function of the parliament may be exercised through questioning the 
President or prime minister and members of the cabinet on the floor or hearing in 
specialized commissions or establishing ad hoc committees for investigating specific 
subjects and so on. In the relationship between parliament and the executive power there 
are many ways by which parliament may exercise this function: 
 
6.3.1 Question time 
 
 In most political systems, the president or prime minister and ministers have to be 
present in parliament to answer the questions of the parliamentarians. In the Iranian 
political system, whenever at least one-fourth of the total number of representatives of 
the Islamic Consultative Assembly have a question to ask of the president, or any of the 
representatives from the responsible ministries on a subject relating to their duties, the 
President or the minister concerned, as the case may be, shall be required to appear 
before the Majlis and answer the question. Such answers shall not be delayed for more 
than one month in the case of the President, or more than ten days in the case of the 
ministers, unless there is a plausible excuse, as decided by the Majlis. Despite the 
President never being questioned by parliamentarians until now (Seven Majlis), 
ministers have been summoned to the parliament many times,  though the members of 
the  parliament always complain about the ministers who rarely appear before the  
Specialized Commissions or hardly give satisfactory answers to the questions of 
parliamentarians (Khatamai and Maidari, 2007). 
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Table (4-2): The number of questions by deputies over the seven sessions of the Majlis   
The session of the Majlis The number of questions by deputies 
First  Majlis 124 
Second Majlis 83 
Third  Majlis 16 
Fourth Majlis 51 
Fifth Majlis 82 
Sixth Majlis 155 
Seventh Majlis 102  
Source: see raw material in publication of Islamic Consultative Assembly (2008) 
*Data collected by Hassan Vakilian 
 
6.3.2 Investigation 
 
The Majlis is authorized to conduct investigations and verifications in connection 
with all affairs of the country (Article 76). But Article 198 of the Internal Regulation of 
the Islamic Consultative Assembly excludes all institutions which are under the 
authority of the Supreme Leader. In other words, parliamentarians are not authorized to 
monitor important political institutions such as the Guardian Council and Council of 
Experts or economic institutions such as different kinds of foundations (Bonyads) which 
constitute the main part of the public sector economy and all armed forces, all of which 
are under the control of the Supreme Leader. Yet in the Sixth Majlis after affirmation of 
the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenie, the Majlis had the opportunity to launch an 
inquiry into the financial affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting which was 
controlled by the pro-Conservatives who were alleged to have abused the Iranian 
National Radio and Television organisation in favour of Conservatives.  
Therefore the scrutiny function of the Iranian Parliament is limited to the executive 
bodies and administrations. 
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Table (4-3): The number of requests of the deputies for investigating the Executive offices over seven 
sessions of the Majlis 
The session of the Majlis The number of requests of deputies for 
investigating the Executive offices 
First  Majlis 0 
Second Majlis 0 
Third  Majlis 13 
Fourth Majlis 16 
Fifth Majlis 13 
Sixth Majlis 28 
Seventh Majlis 19 
Source: see raw material in publication of Islamic Consultative Assembly (1986-2008)   
* Data collected by Hassan Vakilian 
 
It is noteworthy that the investigatory functions of the parliament can be applied 
through relevant Specialized Commissions which have jurisdictions parallel to 
government administrations and mentioned in the Internal Regulation of the Majlis. 
 
6.3.3 Impeachment and vote of no confidence 
 
This is the ultimate power of the parliament which is mentioned in Article 89 of the 
Constitution under which the deputies of the Majlis may impeach the council of 
ministers or any of the ministers in cases deemed necessary by them. Also in the second 
part of this article it is stated that one-third of the representatives may impeach the 
president in respect of the discharge of his duties of management of the executive power 
and running the executive affairs of the state.  
Parliament has used this power several times against ministers, especially in recent 
years when factional conflicts and clashes have increased; however it was never used 
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against the President. But in the Seventh Majlis, reformist parliamentarians started 
collecting signatures in the Majlis and demanded the impeachment of President 
Ahmadinejad. For doing so it required the signatures of 72 deputies; in the face of 
strong resistance of the majority new Conservatives of the Seventh Majlis they could 
collect only 38 signatures and the attempt failed (BBC News, 2007). Impeachment is a 
very efficient tool in the hands of the Majlis to put pressure on the government which 
has no majority in the parliament. The Seventh Majlis had intended to use impeachment 
against Khtamati‟s cabinet. In the last year of Khatami‟s second term in office, New 
Conservatives who won in the Seventh Parliamentary Elections in 2004 impeached the 
Minister of Transportation, and gave a vote of no confidence to the new nominee for the 
job. Impeachment votes against the Ministers of Education and Interior Affairs, who 
were important to Khatami's reformist policies, had also been on the agenda but the 
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenie ordered the parliament not to continue 
impeaching members of President Khatami's cabinet. He mentioned in his letter that it is 
not “fruitful” in the final year of Khatami‟s office (Karnamee Sale Avvale Majlese 
Haftom, 1383, [2005]). 
Table (4-4): The number of impeachments by deputies over seven sessions of Majlis 
The session of the Majlis The number of impeachments  
First  Majlis 2 
Second Majlis 0 
Third  Majlis 3 
Fourth Majlis 2 
Fifth Majlis 3 
Sixth Majlis 5 
Seventh Majlis 3 
Source: see raw material in publications of Islamic Consultative Assembly (2008) 
*Data collected by Hassan Vakilian 
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6.3.4 The Commission of Article 90 
 
There is a permanent Specialized Commission in the Iranian Parliament through 
which the investigative power of the Majlis can be applied to other branches of the 
government particularly the executive power. 
 Anyone having a complaint against the manner in which the Majlis, the executive or 
judiciary is carrying out its functions, may submit a complaint in writing to this 
Commission. It shall then be bound to examine the complaint and give an adequate 
reply. In case the complaint relates to the executive or the judiciary, it shall demand 
proper investigation and they must reply to the commission, and then the results should 
be announced within a reasonable period of time; in cases where it relates to the public, 
the Majlis shall inform the public at large (Article 90 of the Constitution). The 
Commission of Article 90 has not been influential from the time it was established, 
however during the Sixth session of Majlis in which the Reformists had a majority, 
many complaints were presented especially regarding the performance of the judiciary 
and the members of commission tried to use their constitutional power and authority but 
most of their activity was frustrated. The judiciary is under the full control of the 
Supreme Leader and the Commission was denied the opportunity.  
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Table (4-5): The number of complaints presented before the Commission of Article 90 
The session of the Majlis The number of complaints presented 
before the Commission of Article 90 
First  Majlis 115438 
Second Majlis 40925 
Third  Majlis 32077 
Fourth Majlis 51305 
Fifth Majlis 21540 
Sixth Majlis 35971 
Seventh Majlis - 
Source: raw material in publications of Islamic Consultative Assembly (2005) 
*Data collected by Hassan Vakilian 
 
6.3.5 The State Audit Office 
 
The State Audit Office is another instrument by which parliament examines or 
audits, in the form which is stipulated by law, all accounts of ministers, government 
companies, institutions and other organizations which in any manner whatsoever benefit 
from the state budget, to ensure that no expenditure exceeds credit allocations and that 
each sum has been spent for its allotted purposes. The State Audit Office shall collect 
accounts and relevant papers and documents according to law and submit each year's 
budget liquidation report together with its own comments to the Islamic Consultative 
Assembly. Such reports must be made available to the public (Article 55). This Office is 
one of the parliamentary bodies and operating under the direct supervision of the 
Islamic Consultative Assembly. The power of this Office for scrutinizing the executive 
administrations mostly depends on the power of the whole Assembly.   
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6.4 Recruitment function 
 
Another function of the parliament in Iran as with many other legislatures is training 
and preparing political activists for executive offices. Through parliamentary activities, 
deputies gain some precious experiences and “learn the norms of elites, they learn 
political skills, and they acquire visibility and prestige resources which are useful to 
them in acquiring, maintaining and utilizing these other roles” (Packenham, 1990: 90). 
Paying close attention to the Table 4-6, it shows that apart from the first term of the 
Islamic Consultative Assembly during which 13 cabinet ministers came from the 
Majlis, the recruitment function of parliament is weak. The President prefers to appoint 
his colleagues through personal contacts and traditional networks. Due to the absence of 
modern political parties, government officials usually come from informal and personal 
circles of politicians.   
Those parliamentarians who want to start working in executive offices cannot stay in 
parliament and have to resign.The table below shows just how this function of the 
Iranian Parliament is not very strong: 
Table (4-6): The number of deputies recruited for executive office 
The session of the Majlis The number of deputies recruited for 
executive office 
First  Majlis 13 
Second Majlis 0 
Third Majlis 6 
Fourth Majlis 2 
Fifth Majlis 3 
Sixth Majlis 2 
Seventh Majlis 2 
Source: Publications of Iranian Islamic Consultative Assembly (2008).  
*Data collected by Hassan Vakilian 
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6.5 Legitimizing function  
 
  Popular consent is strongly required for the political system to survive (Judge, 1993). 
Parliaments as elected institutions are very important in terms of legitimizing the 
political system. “Simply by meeting regularly and uninterruptedly, the legislature 
produced, among the relevant populace and elites, a wider and deeper sense of the 
government's moral right to rule than would otherwise have obtained” (Packenham, 
1990: 87). Also by giving approval to the bills of the executive power on behalf of the 
people who elected them, they legitimize the policies of the government. As Mezey 
noted “[l]egislatures, could have the effect of mobilizing public support for the regime 
and thereby of legitimizing the whole political system” (Mezey, 1979:  4, 5).   
It seems in countries such as Iran, whose political system is a collection of 
democratic and non democratic institutions, parliament “by providing the symbols if not 
always the reality of democracy, can engender support for the regime” (Mezey, 1983: 
527).  Explaining the functions of the Third World countries Mezey believed that “if 
legislatures were not central to law making yet continued to exist, they had to be 
performing some other functions for the political systems in which they persisted. Such 
a line of inquiry yielded several alternative non law making functions, the most 
important of which centered on the legitimizing effects of the legislative institution” 
(Ibid: 512).  
The table below shows the considerable number of plenary session of the Majlis in 
each term. The plenary sessions of parliament have been held at least three days a week 
and as a result the numbers of parliamentary resolutions are high: 
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Table (4-7): The number of plenary sessions over seven sessions of the Majlis   
The session of the Islamic consultative 
Assembly 
 
The number of Majlis plenary 
sessions 
 
First Majlis 625 
Second Majlis 540 
Third Majlis 489 
Fourth Majlis 426 
Fifth Majlis 387 
Sixth Majlis 432 
Seventh Majlis 428 
           Source: raw material in publications of Islamic Consultative Assembly (2008). 
             *Data collected by Hassan Vakilian 
 
 In plenary session, a large amount of time is allocated to the speeches of the 
members prior to the deliberation process. If one considers the contents of speeches 
which were presented in the plenary sessions by deputies, one rarely can find those 
speeches which criticize the behaviour of the real power centres such as leadership 
institutions or the bodies dependent on them. In particular if exceptionally 
parliamentarians criticize the Supreme Leader they put at least their jobs at risk. For 
instance this was the case of Akbar A‟almi who served in the Majlis for three 
consecutive terms (Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh).  He attacked the Supreme Leader because 
of the Guardian Council‟s approach toward the Eighth Parliamentary Elections and said 
“the Supreme Leader is equal to others  in the eyes of the law, meaning that, in 
proportion to their powers, the Supreme Leader and his  appointees are responsible to 
the people and must answer for their actions.” A‟alami  added, “According to Article 
111 of the Constitution, if the Supreme Leader is unable to  observe his legal duties or 
comes to lack any of the characteristic mentioned in Articles 5  and 109 of the 
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Constitution, he is by default demoted and removed from his position” (Roozonline, 
2008). Due to his open criticisms the Guardian Council disqualified him to stand in the 
Eighth Elections. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter the Iranian Parliament was examined in the Islamic Republic Era. As 
with parliament in the pre revolutionary era, the role of the political forces was briefly 
explained and their influence upon the political structure was shown. It was stated that 
while the secular factions either with liberal or left attitudes were excluded from 
participation in political activities, the Islamic fundamentalists, including right wing 
(Conservatives) and left wing (Radicals) under the charismatic leadership of Ayatollah 
Khomeini, took control of the major political and economic institutions and ousted the 
other political parties from the centres of power. The Iranian revolutionary Constitution 
ultimately was written and established according to the religious and theocratic ideas of 
Ayatollah Khomeini within which the Leader was deemed have absolute power in the 
realm. Nevertheless since the first draft of the constitution was prepared by the more 
secular intellectuals some secular ideas remained in the Constitution and therefore a 
kind of contradictory constitution was established in 1979. Although the separation of 
powers was embedded in the revolutionary Constitution, it was too far from the real 
separation of powers principle recognized in democratic countries according to the 
Montesquieu doctrine. In the next step, the duality of the political power which is 
reflected in the Constitution was analyzed and it was stated that this duality originated 
from the heterogeneity of the political forces behind the Islamic Revolution. As a result 
of this heterogeneity two types of political institutions were established each of which 
possesses different amounts of political power and authority. The executive as an 
elected institution acts as an agent of the absolute religious Leader. Also the parliament, 
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whose members should be elected directly by the people, is surrounded by the two 
institutions which have members not directly elected by the people. The Expediency 
Council and the Guardian Council which are under the full control of Supreme Leader 
have a wide range of authority and political power. It was explained that in the pyramid 
of decision making power in the Islamic Republic unelected institutions have the upper 
hand over elected institutions such as the executive and parliament. 
After explaining the key charactereristics of the Iranian political system according to 
the Constitution the place of the executive power was discussed in detail and then the 
Iranian political regime was analyzed. It was concluded that the political regime in Iran 
is composed of three models of presidential, parliamentary and hybrid regimes. In fact it 
is compatible with none of them while it has some elements of each. It was seen in the 
relationship between parliament and the executive the first one has tremendous power 
vested in it. In fact many instruments were created in the Constitution which ensures the 
supremacy of the parliament and its priority over the executive. 
In the next step, the place of the parliament was studied and it was stated that the 
Iranian Parliament is formally a unicameral legislature but one which in reality has two 
elements: the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Guardian Council without which 
the Islamic Consultative Assembly has no validity. The different functions of the 
Iranian Parliament including representation, law making, scrutiny, recruitment and 
legitimizing were examined and it was stated that the executive (elected institution), 
Guardian Council and Expediency Council directly impact upon law making function of 
the parliament as well as its other functions. The executive plays the main role in 
formulating and introducing bills in the first stage of the law making process, while the 
power of the parliament particularly in financial proposals has been limited. But 
parliament in the deliberation and enactment stages has no constraints in terms of 
amending the government‟s bills.  
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The main limitation of the parliament and even the executive as elected institutions is 
located in the final stages of the law making process. It was explained that the Guardian 
Council, whose members are directly or indirectly appointed by the Supreme Leader, 
has different kinds of functions. For instance it has approbatory power in various kinds 
of elections including presidential and parliamentary elections. Through this authority it 
can influence the parliament‟s representation and law making functions. In terms of the 
law making function of the parliament it can veto the enactments of the parliament 
whether due to its discrepancy with Shari‟a or incompatibility with the Constitution. It 
was shown statistically how many government bills and parliamentary proposals have 
been rejected by the Guardian Council. In fact it is the Supreme Leader who controls the 
power of the parliament through the Guardian Council. It was mentioned that the 
Guardian Council has historical roots in the Iranian political system and originated from 
traditional social forces in Iranian society. 
Another institution which is directly involved in the law making function of the 
parliament is the Expediency Council. The historical background of this institution was 
analyzed and it was mentioned that it was essentially formed to mediate between the 
Islamic Consultative Assembly and give advice to the Supreme Leader. But in practice 
the Expediency Council, most of whose members are appointed by the Supreme Leader, 
has extended its powers and authority to legislation and acting as a legislative body. 
Also according to the Constitution, the Leader has the right to determine the General 
Policies of the political system after consulting with the Expediency Council. Both the 
executive and parliament have to observe and act within this framework.  The activities 
of this institution were examined statistically and it was shown that the Expediency 
Council can greatly intervene in the law making process. 
To sum up, it can be said that Iran has a contradictory constitution within which the 
main power is vested in the Religious Leader. Constitutionally the parliament has 
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supremacy over the executive but practically both of these institutions are subordinated 
to the Supreme Leader and the institutions which act on his behalf. In fact for 
understanding parliamentary behaviour we have to consider the unelected institutions 
which represent the real power centre which arguably are the main players in the law 
making process of the Iranian Parliament. In the next chapter the interactions of these 
institutions involved in the law making process will be considered in terms of real 
politics.   
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The Majlis in practice  
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1. Introduction 
 
In previous chapters, the constitutional context within which the Iranian Parliament 
is supposed to operate was explained mostly through analysing the Constitution. 
Although analysing the law making power of the Majlis according to the Constitution is 
crucial, the picture of the Majlis in real politics is still not clear: To what extent is the 
Iranian Parliament really relevant during the interactions with other institutions 
involved in law making process? Is it able to implement its full power and authority?  
 Obviously to answer to these questions, we need to examine the parliamentary 
sessions after the revolution and test different hypothesese which we have already 
proposed. For doing so, the Sixth and Seventh Majlis were chosen because the 
dichotomy of the Conservatives/ Reformists as rival factions in parliament emerged 
from the Sixth term of parliament. Reformists dominated the Sixth Majlis and the 
Conservatives were in a minority.  In the Seventh Majlis this situation changed and New 
Conservatives dominated the Majlis and Reformists were in a minority. Therefore 
through comparing and contrasting these two Majlis different hypothesises of the 
research can be tested. Also the scope of the thesis is limited to the budget policies 
during the aforementioned terms of the parliament; the reason for choosing this area 
will be discussed in the following pages.  
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2. Why the annual budget bill? 
 
The annual budget bill as a short term plan of the country is one of the most 
important tools of macroeconomic management and resource allocation which normally 
is vested in the hands of officials of the executive.  
Like some OECD countries that are trying to expand the power of their legislatures 
in the budget process “in developing and transition countries, too, there is a trend 
towards legislative budget  activism, reflecting the process of democratization and the 
opening up of possibilities for legislative  involvement in what was previously closed 
budgetary systems” (Stapenhurst,  2004: 3). Therefore the budget process becomes 
more and more critical since the confrontation of the legislature and executive take 
place in this process and they challenge each other‟s power. 
As Leston-Bandeira (2004:  103) has mentioned in her work, the budget season is 
one of the very important occasions through which the law making power of the 
legislature can be assessed accordingly. Every year in a specific time government 
should submit the budget bill and parliament must review the annual revenue and 
expenditure proposals. The budget bill is the annual plan of the government and is 
supposed to be a comprehensive statement of the nation‟s priorities and parliament must 
make sure that the government‟s bill has been prepared appropriately; otherwise, 
depending on the level of the parliament‟s power, parliamentarians can show their 
dissagreement. For instance the most powerful legislatures (such as the US Congress) 
are those that have the ability to draft a new budget bill and are able to alter 
expenditures and revenues in either direction, without the consent of the government: 
“the president‟s budget only serves as a benchmark for the subsequent congressional 
action. Congress has unlimited power to make amendments to the president‟s budget. 
Congress uses these powers extensively and designs its own budget. This power 
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founded in the constitution states that no money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but 
in consequence of appropriations made by law” (Blondal, 2004: 464).  On the other 
hand there is another category of legislature (mostly the Westminster model) that has 
little impact on the budget bill or has ceased to exercise any influence on budgetary 
policy, and just gives assent to the executive draft budgets without any changes. For 
instance in the UK members of the the House of Commons are not able to increase 
expenditure or revenue items: “The House of Commons lacks effective power to 
increase or change the government‟s expenditure estimates. Its main option for 
changing substantially the expenditure estimates would be to bring down the 
government via a vote of no-confidence. This has never happened in recent United 
Kingdom history, mainly because the Cabinet and the ruling party‟s whip ensure that 
party unity is maintained” (Ibid:  422).  
Therefore it seems that the number of the amendments that legislatures make to the 
budget bill constitutes an important yardstick which helps us to examine the law making 
power of the Iranian parliament.  
 
3. Legal framework 
 
In Iran as in many other countries, there is a legal framework within which the 
jurisdictions and functions of the government branches are defined. The laws that 
support the annual budget processes set a framework for the power struggles between 
legislature and executive. Legislatures approve annual budgets and receive different 
kinds of reports on budget execution. Executives prepare and submit national budgets to 
the legislature, implement the budget, and prepare accounts and fiscal reports. From a 
normative point of view to what extent is the legislature allowed to dictate the “rules of 
the game” during the budget process? 
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For knowing the law making role of the Iranian Parliament during the budget 
process, it is necessary to study the pyramid of related laws within the Iranian legal 
system. For doing so, the following three groups of laws and regulations will be 
examined: Constitution, organic laws, ordinary laws. 
3.1 Constitution 
 
The Constitution, as we have seen, is the most important official document in 
countries whose legal system is Roman-German and is the main place for understanding 
the system of separation of powers and authority of the different branches of political 
power. The constitutions specify the general rules of the executive and legislature, 
including a few essentials of the budget process. In other words, they often contain at 
least a few provisions related to the budgetary system which defines the ways that the 
budget system should operate. Regarding the role of the Islamic Consultative Assembly 
during the annual budget process,  Article 52 of the Iranian Constitution  states that: 
“the annual state budget shall be drawn up by the government in the manner provided 
by law, and be submitted to the Islamic Consultative Assembly for its review and 
approval. Any amendments, whatsoever in the figures of the budget shall also be subject 
to the provision of law”.    
As can be seen, the Consultative Assembly is permitted to amend the annual budget 
bill which is prepared by the executive power, however, the limitations of these 
amendments shall be defined by other groups of laws and regulations. 
  Apart from that, Article 75 of the Constitution limits substantially the power of the 
representatives for amending the budget bill. Under this article, members' proposals and 
amendments to the executive bills leading to a reduction in public revenues or an 
increase in public expenditures may be presented to the Consultative Assembly only if 
they also include ways and means of making good the reduction in income or obtaining 
new revenues. But some writers (Fayazi and Lameai, 2007) believe that from the 
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perspective of the Guardian Council, which has the right to interpret the articles of 
Constitution, Article 75 is not relevant to the annual budget bill: “Article 75 does not 
address the member of Majlis‟ proposals regarding the budget bill” (the interpretation of 
The Guardian Council quoted in Fayazi & Lameai, 2007: 4). It means that 
representatives of the Assembly have permission to change and amend the budget bill 
which is prepared by the executive power without any limitation. Despite this, the 
limitation of representative power during the budget process might be found in other 
groups of laws and regulation. This is possible because as it was said before, the power 
of the representatives to amend the budget bill shall be subject to the provision of laws 
which might be organic laws or ordinary laws. 
3.2 Organic laws 
 
Not all enactments of the parliament have equal importance and validity. In the 
pyramid of laws and regulations some of them directly help to exercise the articles of 
the constitution and also have a special procedure for their adoption and their alteration. 
These types of laws which normally are higher than ordinary laws and regulations and 
have priority over them are called organic laws (Blondal, 2004). 
In the Iranian legal system, Internal Regulations of the Islamic Consultative 
Assembly and the Five-Year Development Plans are deemed organic laws which shall 
be considered in terms of the power of the Assembly's representatives: 
3.2.1 Internal Regulations of the Islamic Consultative Assembly 
 
After the Constitution, the Internal Regulation of the Assembly is one of the 
important legal frameworks which define the procedure of the operation of the 
Assembly. According to Article 65 “After holding the elections, the sessions of the 
Islamic Consultative Assembly be validly held with a quorum of two-thirds of the total 
number of representatives. … For approving the Internal Regulations the votes of a 
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majority of two-thirds of those present shall be needed.”  This especial quorum 
indicates that Internal Regulation of the Iranian Parliament is higher than the ordinary 
laws. 
Reviewing the Internal Regulation of the Assembly one can see many important 
provisions which define the role of the Assembly during the budget process. Under 
provision 3 of Article 33, considering the annual budget bill is one of the main functions 
of the Specialized Commissions. Moreover according to Article 213 for examining the 
annual budget bill vigorously an ad hoc commission called the Consolidation 
Commission shall be constituted every year after the submission of the budget bill by 
the executive power.  
Apart from a time limitation for submitting the new proposal by the parliamentarians 
there is a significant limitation for deputies to amend the budget bill. According to 
Article 224 of the Internal Regulation, all motions and proposals of the individual 
representatives and Specialized and ad hoc Commissions shall not have any discrepancy 
with the Five-Year Development Plans as a mid-term plan of the country. Other than 
this restriction, it seems that there is no limitation in the Internal Regulation for the 
parliamentarians to change the executive budget bill.  
3.2.2 Five-Year Development Plans 
 
There are two types of development plans in Iran: the annual budget bills as short 
term plans and Five-Year Plans as mid-term development plans. The Five-Year 
Development Plans explains the mid-term objectives and necessary actions for reaching 
these objectives. 
Government planning has played an important role in Iran‟s economy. Since the late 
1940s the government has designed and implemented multiyear planning programmes 
with the goal of industrial diversification which has extended until now. After finishing 
the war with Iraq, which lasted eight years, many efforts were made to turn the 
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economic situation to a peacetime basis. A special committee was formed for providing 
the First Five-Year Development Plan (1989-/90- 1993/4) which consisted of sets of 
qualitative objectives with macroeconomic targets. This plan which was approved by 
the Majlis in January 1986 “provided an important framework within which government 
could embark on a program of structural reform and economic liberalization” 
(Shokoohi, 1996: 35). Following the first one, the Second, the Third and the Fourth 
Development Plans were approved by the Majlis with the same goals for reconstituting 
the country, especially in the macroeconomic area.  In other words until now many of 
Iran's budget bills have been guided by the frameworks and targets of these Four Five-
Year Development Plans. These frameworks define the macroeconomic aggregates, 
establish the overall revenue and spending targets, broad sector spending priorities, and 
set the direction of expenditure management policies. They are used as a constant point 
of reference in preparing and justifying budget proposals, and deviations from the plan 
are monitored and reported to parliament according to them. The implementation of 
development plans is one of the main tasks of the executive agencies and the President 
is required to give progress reports to parliament regarding their implementation every 
year. These development plans establish a relatively coherent framework based on 
consensus among ministers and parliament on the key economic matters. As mentioned 
before, it has priority over annual budget bills and parliamentarians are not allowed to 
submit proposals which are not compatible with that during the deliberation of the 
annual budget bill.  
3.3. Ordinary laws and regulations 
 
These are the rules whose subject matters are not mentioned in the constitution or 
organic laws and are passed by a simple majority of the Majlis. Different ordinary laws 
and regulations govern the budget process in Iran of which the most important are: 
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3.3.1 Plan and Budget Law 
The Plan and Budget Law was approved in 1972 and only minor amendments have 
been made in it since then. This law contains ten chapters which mostly define the 
procedures of preparation and formulation of the annual budget bill. According to 
Article 4, the head of the Plan and Budget Organization should be appointed by the 
President, and in accordance with Article 6 the deputy heads of the Organization are 
proposed by the head and must be approved by the President. On the basis of Article 5 
the most important functions of the Plan and Budget Organization are as follows: 
Carrying out studies and economic surveys, preparation of long term economic 
programmes, drawing up the Five-Year Development Plans, suggesting budget policies 
to the Economy Council, preparation and compilation of the budget, supervision of 
development plans, harmonization of statistical methods and programmes of the country 
and assessment of the efficiency of executive agencies.  
 The Plan and Budget Law is the most important normative source for the process of 
formulating the annual budget bill but it is silent about the parliamentary stage of the 
budget process and concentrates on the tasks and functions of the executive power.  
 
3.3.2 State Budget Auditing Law 
 This law was approved for the first time by the National Consultative Assembly at 
the beginning of the formation of the Constitutional Movement, and has been amended 
several times since then. The latest amendment was made by the Islamic Consultative 
Assembly in 1987. Since that time some changes have been made in different articles of 
the law. The most important parts of this law are the definitions of budget, ministerial 
bodies, government institutes, non-governmental public institutions, fiscal year, credit, 
articles of expenses, public revenues, government's receipts, other sources of financing, 
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public funds, special income, income of government companies and so on. It also has 
some articles regarding the implementation of the annual budget bill and financial 
supervision. 
To sum up it might be said except for the Five-Year Development plans as organic 
law which define the limitations of the annual budget bill and limit the law making 
power of the parliamentarians, in other laws and regulations which are directly about the 
annual budget bill, there is no prescription which limits the power and authority of the 
parliamentarians during the process of reviewing the annual budget bill.  
 
4. Review of the budget process 
Normally the budget process consists of:  preparation of the draft of the budget bill 
and submission of it to the legislature, the parliamentary stage within which the 
government‟s bill is discussed in detail in parliamentary commissions and finally 
ratified on the floor either with amendment or without any changes. The next step is the 
implementation of the budget bill which is the responsibility of the executive power. 
The penultimate step is dedicated to the right of the parliament to control the 
implementation of budget bill by the government and eventually, in the final stage it is 
the turn of the independent external audit office to audit the financial accounts. 
  In the Iranian budget system the main branches of government are involved in all 
phases of the budget process. The executive prepares the budget bill. Thereafter the 
legislature examines and adopts the executive proposals. The executive has 
responsibility for implementing the bill which has been ratified by the legislature and at 
the end either the judiciary or legislature can investigate and monitor the 
implementation of the annual budget bill by the executive power. In this research we 
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want to focus on the two steps i.e. preparation of the annual budget bill by government 
and the second stage i.e. the parliamentary stage. 
4.1 The role of the executive power in the budget process 
 The executive power as one of the main branches of the political system in Iran 
consists of several departments which are administered by ministers who are appointed 
by the President and approved by the Majlis.  There are different types of organs and 
entities under each ministry; some of them are directly under the ministries, while 
others are supervised by the ministers or nominally controlled by them. These include 
departments, public institutes, state banks, and social security organizations.  It should 
be noted that since the Constitution prescribed that the President and his cabinet 
ministers collectively and individually are held accountable to the Majlis, all 
governmental organizations must be affiliated with one of the ministers or the office of 
the President, unless they are under the control of the Supreme Leader. 
As we mentioned before according to the first part of Article 52 the executive has 
responsibility for preparing and compiling the annual budget bill. The Management and 
Plan Organization and Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finances   are under the 
presidency and play the main role during the budget process. The first step of the budget 
process begins with the Circular issued by the President. This Circular should be 
prepared by the Management and Plan Organization (MPO), and then be approved by 
the Economy Council. The Budget Circular is the most important part of the budget 
process because it consists of policies, the general principles envisaged for the budget of 
the following year, the ceilings of incomes and expenses of the budget, time schedule, 
forms and instructions used for preparation of the budget. The Management and 
Planning Organization (MPO) whose director is appointed by the President plays a very 
critical role during the budget process between the legislative power and executive 
agencies. Occasionally parliament is involved in this step of the budget process. For 
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instance in 2005, the head of the Budget and Plan Committee wrote a letter to the 
parliament speaker and mentioned the key items which the executive power should 
consider for preparation of the next year‟s annual budget bill (Panahi, 2008 interview 25 
Feburary).  
After receiving the Circular, central budget offices of ministries and other entities 
and their sectors, specify instructions and send them to spending units. In the next step, 
the ministers and head of spending units discuss the priorities and budget instructions 
and then spending units prepare their budget requests and send them to their main 
ministry. The central offices of ministries review and compile the budget of various 
spending units and prepare each ministry's request. MPO's specialized offices for each 
ministry which have responsibility to review the proposed budget of each executive 
agency study them and after consultation and negotiation with the relevant ministry 
confirm their annual budget. The consolidated budget of all agencies will be presented 
to the cabinet for its review and approval.  Following the changes made in the budget 
bill by the cabinet, the Management and Plan Organization prepares the final budget bill 
and, together with its attachments, sends them to the President for presentation to the 
Islamic Consultative Assembly (Farzib, 2001: 35-48).The annual budget bill which 
should be submitted to the Majlis usually consists of the “president‟s speech to the 
Parliament, one short volume containing the budget notes, the main volume of the 
budget, which include summary tables, sources, and uses ([t]his was 1030 pages in 
2002/3, and is what is usually referred to as the budget); Appendix 1 listing 
development projects; Apendix 2 containing the provincial budget; and Appendix 3 
with summary budgets of public enterprises and banks” (The Islamic Republic of Iran, 
2005:  56).  In fact, in this time the first phases of the budget process i.e. preparation 
and formulation of the annual budget bill by the executive power come to its end. In 
2007 President Ahmadinejad despite the objections of many experts (Pajoyan, 2006)  
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dissolved  the Budget and Plan Organization, which was at least 60 years old and had 
played the main role in the preparation and formulation of the annual budget bills, and  
brought it under his direct control. 
4.2 The role of the Islamic Consultative Assembly in the budget process 
Like other legislatures, the legislative oversight of the Iranian parliament over the 
budget is one of the very important functions of the Majlis. It might be said that 
legislatures which are not seriously involved in the annual budget are ineffective 
legislatures. Parliament‟s power of the purse is applied by the internal organizations and 
divisions that work within them. Once the annual budget bill is submitted to the Majlis 
it will be passed to the Specialized Commissions and then the budget Consolidation 
Commission, each of which may propose their own amendments. When the 
amendments are accepted in the plenary session, it will be sent to the Guardian Council 
for approval. If no discrepancy is found between the budget bill and the Shari‟a and 
Constitution, it will be submitted to the executive power for implementation, otherwise 
if the Majlis and the Guardian Council dispute the budget bill then the Expediency 
Council has the main role in determining the destiny of the budget bill. These stages 
will be examined in detail in the following pages.  
4.2.1 Specialized Commissions and budget bill 
 “As Laundy notes, „[a]ll parliaments work to a greater or lesser extent through 
committees‟ ” (Longley and Davidson, 1998: 21). The committee stage in the budget 
process is a very crucial moment which can define the fate of the budget bill in 
parliament. Where committees or commissions are powerful, there is more chance for 
parliamentarians to go into technical detail and review the plans and estimation of the 
government. The amount of time dedicated to commissions for debating a government‟s 
bill, and the interaction between them, as well as the commission‟s access to 
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independent research and departmental information are among the most important 
factors which define the power of the commissions. 
 In fact parliament is a critical institution which can influence the annual budget bill 
through its Specialized Commissions over a period of 2-3 months. There are 14 
Specialized Parliamentary Commissions and every parliamentarian should register for 
one of them and most of them are involved in the first part of the budget process in the 
Majlis. Twelve Commissions are directly involved in the budget bill which consists of: 
Training and Research Commission, Social Commission, Economic Commission, 
Social Security and Foreign Policy Commission, Energy Commission, Plan and Budget 
and Accounting Commission, Sanitation and Treatment Commission, Industry and 
Mines Commission, Development Commission, Culture Commission, Legal and 
Judiciary Commission and Agriculture, Water and Natural Resources Commission.    
These commissions are able to meet when no plenary debate is scheduled. According 
to the Internal Regulation of the Assembly the annual budget bill shall be examined in 
parliament in three stages: in the first stage the executive proposal will be debated in the 
12 Specialized Commissions. Deputies shall submit their motions and amendments 
within 10 days to these Commissions. Their proposals will be debated as far as it does 
not contradict the Constitution, or Five-Year Development Plans. Apart from the 
aforementioned limitations there are no constraints for the members of the Commissions 
to change or amend the budget bill. At this stage usually they add or remove some lines 
of the bill which are totally in contrast to the government‟s will. It was stated (Haddad 
Adel, 2007: 3) during the consideration of the budget bill of 2006/2007 that 
parliamentarians proposed approximately 6000 proposals, among which 2549 proposals 
were published and 347 were debated in the plenary session.  Specialized Commissions 
shall investigate the parliamentarians' proposals within ten days and submit their report 
to the Consolidation Commission. The sessions of the Specialized Committees are not 
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open to the public.  According to notification 2 of Article 33 of the Internal Regulation, 
the Specialized Commissions may employ experts and advisors through the speakership 
board of the Islamic Consultative Assembly for fulfilling their tasks. They can call the 
ministers to appear before them; however as Khatami (2007 interview 27 March), the 
first vice speaker of the Sixth Majlis, mentioned “they do not take very seriously the 
parliamentarians‟ request for coming to the Specialized Commissions. Deputies also 
rarely have enough knowledge about the mostly complicated budget bill. In addition the 
government reports submitted to the Commissions are not transparent enough to help 
members of the parliament to consider budget bills properly. 
 
 4.2.2 Consolidation Commission and budget bill 
 In the second stage the Consolidation Commission starts working on the proposals 
of the individual legislators and Specialized Commissions. According to Article 213 of 
the Internal Regulation of the Consultative Assembly the Consolidation Commission 
consists of all members of the Plan and Budget Commission whose members are 
selected from the majority and opposition parties and two representatives of each 
Specialized Commission. The Consolidation Commission consists of three sub- 
Committees including the Social Affairs Committee, Defence and Public Affairs 
Committee and the Economic Affairs Committee each of which debates their own 
subjects in the annual budget bill and submits their reports to the parent Commission.  
According to the Internal Regulation the most important criterion for the selection of the 
members is not their party affiliation but their specialization and experiences in budget 
affairs. Also two members of each Specialized Commission, who attend on behalf of 
their Commission, present their Commission‟s point of views. In fact the Consolidation 
Commission acts as a coordinating body for other relevant Commissions. The decisions 
in the Consolidation Commission should be made according to the majority votes of 
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their members. “In the past few years, the discussion of budget proposals in the 
Consolidation Commission has been accompanied initially by a lot of criticism from the 
members, who have maintained that the revenue and expenditure figures were too 
optimistic. Yet each year, the criticisms subside with passage of time and even more 
funds are added to the bill presented by the government” (The Islamic Republic of Iran, 
2005: 61). 
4.2.3 Plenary session and budget bill  
Debates about the annual budget bill in parliaments, in the chamber-oriented 
parliaments mainly take place on the floor rather than in the parliamentary commissions 
while in committee-oriented parliaments these discussions are carried out in the 
committees.    
In the Iranian parliament the plenary stage is the last phase of the second stage of the 
budget process. In fact in this stage general discussion and deliberation take place and 
consideration of the policy proposals of the government in detail left to the Specialized 
Commissions.  
  Following the presentation of the budget bill to the floor, the plenary session of the 
parliament will be held consecutively. The debates on the bill are divided into two parts. 
In the first part revenues are examined and then the expenditure is reviewed and in the 
end votes will be taken on proposals in each part. The proposals can be passed normally 
by a majority vote of those who attend. The attendance of at least two-thirds of 
parliamentarians is needed to hold the session. Parliamentarians can introduce unlimited 
and new proposals during the debates of the budget bill on the floor and they are free to 
either support the government budget bill or the Consolidation Commission‘s report. 
But usually they back what the Consolidation Commission submits to the plenary 
session; occasionally parliamentarians support the government budget bill and speak 
against the Consolidation Commission‘s report. Debates and consideration of the annual 
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budget bill usually take place within one or two weeks and generally are open to the 
public. It seems at least in the budget area the Majlis is Commission-oriented because it 
is only at this stage that technical debates take place and major amendments proposed 
by the parliamentarians.  In fact the main changes and adjustments to the budget bill 
happen in the specialized and Consolidation Commissions and most of the time the 
Consolidation Commission draft is ratified in the plenary session.  
4.2.4 Majlis Research Centre and budget bill 
 
The access of parliamentarians and commissions to independent research expertise 
can enhance the power of the legislature when confronted with the government during 
the budget process. Many of the more active parliaments have influential budget 
research institutions which help the deputies to analyze the government‟s budget bill. 
Their staff members provide general or specialized research and information and give 
services to the legislators especially in the budget season.  The staffs are responsible for 
providing non-partisan and independent evaluation of the plans and policies of the 
government and responding to the questions of the deputies. Regarding the budget bill 
the primary aims of these institutions are to research and deliberate on important issues 
of economic and fiscal policy such as overall economic management and budget 
formulation and reviewing the revenues and expenditures which are provided by the 
government. 
  The Iranian parliament also has a Research Centre that assists parliamentarians who 
are members of the Specialized and Consolidation Commissions in all stages of the 
legislative process. They are supposed to provide various kinds of qualitative and 
quantitative research to relevant Commissions.  This centre consists of nine research 
offices.  According to Article (2) of MRC Functions Act, the obligations and functions 
of this centre are as follow: 
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a) Studying, researching, and commenting on all drafts and bills;  
b) Compiling, evaluating and preparing the comments of the researchers of university 
and research centres, executive systems, institutions, political party and groups and 
public ideas on society needs;  
c) Studying and carrying out scientific research on good law makings and other 
legislative observatory aspects, and also make suggestion to address executive 
problems; 
d) providing information services to parliamentary committees and representatives by 
providing access to research information services; 
e) Research or undertaking case studies in terms of all requests of parliament 
representatives, committees, and the board of committee chairmen; 
f) Performing particular tasks or assignments which are related to parliament libraries 
and controlled directly by the (Majlis) Speaker;  
g) Distributing research studies results and papers by publishing books, papers, 
bulletins, and other publications and  reflecting effective comments to related organs 
and systems by order of the board of parliament committee chairmen and the head of 
MRC. 
 Regarding the budget bill this centre examines the different sections of the budget 
bill and presents its finding to relevant sector committees. Standing and consolidation 
committees may also call outside experts to take part in this proceedings and debates. 
4.3 Guardian Council and annual budget bill  
When the Assembly passes the budget bill, it needs to be approved by the Guardian 
Council to see whether it is compatible with the Constitution and Shari‟a or not. If the 
Guardian Council believes it has some kind of discrepancy with the aforementioned 
laws, the budget bill will be returned to the Assembly for reconsideration. If the 
Assembly disagrees with the Guardian Council, it can send back the bill to the Guardian 
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Council and in the event that both of them insist on their ideas, the Assembly can refer 
the dispute to the Expediency Council. The impact of the Guardian Council on the 
budget bill in the Sixth and Seventh Majlis will be discussed in detail in the following 
pages.   
4.4 Expediency Council and budget bill 
The Expediency Council also is one of the formal institutions which may be involved 
in the budget process. For the first time since its establishment, it happened in the 
budget bill of 2002/2003. Since that time the Expediency Council has tried to mediate 
between the Assembly and Guardian Council when there are any differences regarding 
the budget bill. But in the budget of 2008/2009 the Expediency Council functioned as a 
lawmaking body and directly intervened in the content of the annual budget bill. This 
might constrain the law making power of the Majlis even more than before. This also 
will be explained in detail in the following pages. 
The process of the budget bill formulation and initiation, its deliberation and 
enactment by the Majlis, it ratification or rejection by the Guardian Council and the 
possible involvement of the Expediency Council is shown in the below figure: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 185 
 
               
    Figure (5-1): Elected and unelected institutions‟ contribution during the budget process   
 
                            Submitting budget bill  
                            Agreement  
                            Disagreement  
                            Reffering to the Expediency Council 
 
The Figure 5-1 shows the overall process of the budget law making: after preparation 
of the annual budget bill, the president submits it to the Majlis. The Budget bill will be 
examined by the Specialized and Consolidated Commissions in the Majlis and after its 
enactment in the plenary session it will be sent to the Guardian Council (unelected 
institution) for monitoring. If this Council approves the Majlis enactment the budget bill 
will be sent to the executive for its implementation. Should the budget bill be rejected 
by the Guadian Council, it will be returned to the Majlis for reconsideration. The Majlis 
may satisfy the Guardian Council by accepting its point on the bill otherwise and in the 
case that the Majlis insists upon its enacted policies and after the shuttling the budget 
bill between the Majlis and the Council, the former may send it to the Expediency 
Council which has power to take the final decision. Although the Expediency Council 
(Constitutionally) only has authority to mediate between the Majlis and the Guardian 
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Council, as will be shown below, this Council may adopt new policies. The enactment 
of the Expediency Council directly and without engagement of the Guardian Council 
will be sent to the executive for implementation.  
     
5. Analyzing the law making power of the Majlis in the budget bill   
Now we will test the research hypothesis in two terms of the Majlis: the Sixth and 
Seventh Majlis. To what extent could the Majlis shape the budget policies? Is it in 
Norton‟s terminology, a policy making legislature which can formulate and initiate bills 
and proposals as well as can reject or modify them? Or is it only a policy influencing 
legislature which just can reject or modify the proposals but not formulate or substitute 
proposals with their own? Or finally is it a parliament with little or no policy effect 
which is not important in the budget policy making process at all?    
 
5.1 Sixth Majlis 
5.1.1 The Sixth Majlis in context 
The Sixth Majlis Election was one of the very important turning points in the 
relationship of the Conservative camp and Reformist Movement which had started after 
the Seventh Presidential Elections during which Seyed Mohammad Khatami was 
elected as an Iranian Reformist President in 1997. Many different factions became more 
active  after that election including the Reformist clerics organised in the Majma-e 
Rouhanioun-e Mobarez (the Militant Clerics Society), an extremely closed circle of the 
former populist-revolutionaries organized in the Sazman-e Mojahedin-e Enghelab-e 
Islami (The Islamic Revolution Mojahedin Organization), the State‟s bureaucrats and 
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pragmatist-politicians organized in the Kargozaran-e Sazandagi-ye Iran (Iran‟s Servants 
of the Construction), Melli-Mazahabi groups, Daftar e Tahkim e Vahdat (consists of 
students who support the Reformists) and a small number of progressive reformists 
organized in the Jebhe-ye Mosharekat-e Iran-e Islami (The Islamic Iran Participation 
Front). These political groups formed a loose coalition which could win the 
parliamentary election of 2000. It should be noted that the Reformist bloc mostly 
originated from the Radical Leftist bloc who reassessed their previous strategies and 
policies and began moving toward a more moderate ideology and emphasising the rule 
of law, personal freedoms, and a more positive approach toward the West. It has been 
stated (Rasekh, 2008: 87) that “the expansion of middle class, ideologically alien with 
an oligarchic system, expansion of education that helped the expansion of middle class, 
development of urban life, division among ruling groups, international pressure in the 
field of economics, communications and culture, appearance of democratic and 
pluralistic interpretation of Islam and different crisis within the system (crisis of 
legitimacy, participation and sovereignty)”, led to the considerable victory of the 
Reformists.  
Prior to 2000, the Fifth Majlis has been dominated by the Conservative bloc, who 
was supported by both traditionalist clerics and the traditional merchant class of Iran 
that had been a driving force behind the Islamic Republic Revolution. They supported a 
more open, market oriented economy, in opposition to the planned system of the 
Radical Leftists who had dominated the Majlis from 1980 till the end of the Third 
Majlis. The Conservatives came to power in the Fourth Majlis from 1992 and could 
pose considerable problems to Khatami‟s government and his policies for three years, 
from 1997 till 2000 during the Fifth Majlis. The political composition of the Fifth 
Majlis was formed from three distinct blocs. The first comprised 170 Conservatives 
who divided into two groups: a hundred Conservative parliamentarians who opposed 
 188 
 
any form of cultural relaxation and were closer to the Supreme Leader Ayatollah 
Khamenei and seventy Conservative members who had more liberal approaches toward 
culture and strongly supported Hashemi Rafsanjani. The second bloc which constituted 
the minority of the Majlis consisted of forty economic statists who on many issues sided 
with President Hashemi Rafsanjani against the Conservatives. The third bloc contained 
thirty independent parliamentarians who had no clear political strategy and, depending 
on the subject, sometimes backed the Conservatives and sometimes sided with the 
Reformists (Abrahamiyan, 1998).       
During the Fifth Majlis which was dominated by the traditional Conservatives, they 
moved against policies and several of Khatami‟s supporters and impeached his key 
Cabinet ministers Abdollah Nuri the Minister of State and Ata‟ollah Mohajerani the 
Minister of Culture. 
 After the Sixth Parliamentary Elections it became clear that the Conservatives had 
lost the majority of seats of the Majlis to the Reformists identified with President 
Khatami.  As the below table shows, in the election of the Sixth Majlis in 2000, 189 
seats went to the Reformists under the name of 2nd Khordad Front (Jebhee Dovome 
Khordad) while the Conservative coalition gained only 54 seats including 12 
Conservative groups which created an alliance named The Front of the Followers of the 
Imam's and Leader's Line (Jebhe-ye Piravan-e Khat-e Imam va Rahbari).  
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Table (5-1): Summary of the 10 February and 23 May 2000 Iran election results 
Orientation of candidates seats % of 
seats 
Reformists 189 65% 
Conservatives 54 19% 
Independents 42 14% 
Armenians recognized minority religion 2 0.6% 
Chaldean and Assyrian Catholic recognized minority religion 1 0.3% 
Jewish recognized minority religion 1 0.3% 
Zoroastrian recognized minority religion 1 0.3% 
Total 290 100 
Source:  Nation Encyclopaedia, (2008) 
Therefore the Reformists took control with an almost two-thirds majority of 
the Majlis. On the basis of the result of this election it was contended that “for 
the first time, there [was] a balance of power between two rival factions: 
Fundamentalists and Reformists. The former has the structural power within 
the state, the latter has the power of popular support, and the pragmatists play a 
balancing role between them” (Saifzadeh, 2002, para: 4). Yet, the minority 
Conservatives of the Sixth Majlis, who emphasized the need for improving the 
economic conditions rather than political reform, could count on the absolute 
support of the Guardian Council and to some extent the Expediency Council 
given that most of its members were from the Conservative camp (Gheissari 
and Naser, 2006).   Even after the election, the Guardian Council was reluctant 
to accept the victory of the Reformists and wanted to recount the votes in 
Tehran. The Minister of State stated in the official session that “there were 
many strong pressure on the Guardian Council to abolish the result of [the 
Sixth Parliamentary] Elections in Tehran” (Roozonline, 2007). In such 
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circumstances the deputy speaker of the Consultative Assembly Mr. Armin 
described the desirable situation of the Reformist camp. He (Nowrooz 
Newspaper, 16 April 2001: 8) said: 
“It seems that the Reformists and the 2nd Khordad movement are in a favourable 
situation. Usually when a current party takes over the executive management and 
authority of the Majlis and the administration, it will suffer discord, branching, and 
diversion. Its solidarity capacity will be reduced and the coalitions thus formed will be 
broken. On the contrary, the minority and losing party gains a better solidarity 
capacity. But the current situation of the reformists may be one of the rare and 
exceptional situations where despite having the majority in the Majlis and control of 
administration, and also despite all the anticipations and efforts made by the 
Conservatives, no change may be sensed in the degree of solidarity of the groups and 
parties forming the 2nd Khordad front as compared with that of the 2 Khordad [Front 
in the presidential elections of May 1997]”. 
    The Sixth session of the Iranian Parliament started the democratization and 
liberalization of the political system by introducing the proposals for changing the 
election laws, freedom of speech, empowering civil society institutions through funding 
the NGOs and political parties, encouraging foreign investment, and so on. On the other 
hand, having lost their power on the Majlis, Conservatives tried to use their influence in 
the judiciary and bureaucracy to control the Reformists‟ Movement which they 
perceived as threatening their economic and/or political positions.  During the Sixth 
Majlis the judiciary prosecuted the Reformist parliamentarians and ignored 
parliamentary immunity several times. Several lawmakers, most notably Loqmanian and 
two others, Mohammad Dadfar and Fatemeh Haqiqatjou, were caught by the judiciary 
for their critical comments on political developments which were prevented by the 
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Conservatives, and some 60 others were reportedly being prosecuted by the court 
(Payvand News, 2001).  
At the same time that President Khatami's government was trying to clip the 
Guardian Council's wings, the Council was trying to increase its authority by 
establishing supervisory institutions at the provincial and local levels. These efforts 
were proving just as controversial as the March 2003 decision of the Expediency 
Council to significantly increase the Guardian Council's budget. Also the Conservative 
camp tried to use many pressure groups which were backed by the Revolutionary 
Guard, and secret groups. They even physically attacked the key ministers of Khatami‟s 
government in Friday prayer ceremonies in public.    
Taking control of both the Consultative Assembly and the executive power by the 
Reformists, it might be said that the government could pass its bills easily through the 
majority Reformist Assembly. As the graph below shows Majlis passed 88% of the bills 
which were submitted to it. However as we will see later, in comparison with the 
Seventh Majlis it seems that the Sixth Majlis‟ viscosity was relatively high. 
                Figure (5-2): The percent of Reformist government bills enacted by the Reformist Sixth Majlis    
  
Source: Karname e Majles e Sheshom, (2000-2004) 
Despite the close relationship between the Assembly and the executive power, the 
most crucial bills and parliamentary proposals which were enacted by the Sixth Majlis 
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faced severe resistance from the unelected bodies particularly the Guardian Council. 
The most important bills and members‟ proposals which were challenged by the 
Guardian Council were:  
The Majlis in 2001 passed a bill that aimed to encourage foreign investment by 
removing unnecessary regulations and guaranteeing investors‟ profits.  In fact it was the 
first bill relating to foreign investment since the Revolution.  But the Guardian Council 
rejected it and argued that it is not compatible with the Constitution.  Rejecting the 
amended versions of the bill by the Guardian Council, parliamentarians preferred to 
send it to the Expediency Council which finally passed it with many changes. 
Ultimately, in 2003 the bill was submitted to the government for implementation when 
the Khatami‟s second term was coming to an end in 2004. 
 In September 2002, President Khatami submitted new bills to the Majlis designed to 
make ineffective the obstacles which prevented his Reformist ideas: One new bill aimed 
to increase the President‟s power to issue warnings when state institutions trespassed on 
the principles of the Constitution. President Khatami had issued numerous such 
warnings over the years to protest against the illegal closure of newspapers or the jailing 
of opposition political activists, but his warnings had not been noted. Khatami believed 
that in the current situation, the President‟s role is just “office coordinator” or, as he said 
only tadarokatchi.  He stressed that there is no balance between the power and 
responsibilities of the President and in this situation he was no longer a serious decision 
maker but just implemented other power centres‟ wishes. 
There was another bill which was designed to limit the powers of the Guardian 
Council to veto electoral candidates. According to this bill the “approbatory 
supervision” of the Guardian Council would be removed.  Although at the end of the 
year as it was expected, the bills had passed by Majlis easily, the Guardian Council 
vetoed both bills immediately and sent them back to the Majlis for further amendment. 
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The twin bills had been referred to the Guardian Council and had been rejected by them 
more than once. Finally President Khatami stated that he would not be referring the bills 
to the Expediency Council, the next part of the political process, and expressed the hope 
that the dispute between the Majlis and the Guardian Council be resolved before the 
next Majlis elections but this was not achieved. In another case the Guardian Council 
rejected on three occasions the bill regarding the issue of juries for press and political 
trials.  
In 2002, the Majlis enacted a bill according to which some health-related functions 
of the Emdad Imam Khomieni Foundation which is under the direct control of the 
Supreme Leader would be transferred to the health care bodies which were under the 
control of the government. The parliament believed that this change would improve 
transparency and accountability. The Guardian Council, however, said that the bill 
would undermine the Supreme Leader's prerogatives so it was against Shari‟a and 
therefore it was rejected.    
  Abedin has noted that during these years “[t]he Reformers faced an uphill battle 
against entrenched hard-line interests. Over the past four years, the Conservative-
dominated judiciary shut down over one hundred reformist periodicals and jailed 
hundreds of liberal political activists, journalists and students. Numerous pieces of 
reform legislation were approved by parliament only to be vetoed by the un-elected 
Guardian Council.” (Abedin,  2004: para: 6). For example during 2000 and 2002 the 
Guardian Council used its veto power nearly 50 times in encounters with the Majlis' 
proposals and Khatami's government bills (BBC News, 2002). 
Referring to the obstacles which the Guardian Council made for the Majlis, Fatimeh 
Rakei, the parliamentary representative of Tehran, was reported as saying that “when 
the Constitution was drawn up (in 1979) nobody imagined that the empowerment of the 
Guardian Council would so obstruct the legislative process, “Aftab-i Yazd” reported the 
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next day. Rakei urged the Supreme Leader to caution the Guardian Council to respect 
the limits of its powers and responsibilities” (RadioFarda, 2002).   
If we compare the percentage of the executive‟s bills which were rejected by 
the Majlis and the figures below which show the percentage of the bills which 
were rejected by the Guardian Council, we find that the Council challenged the 
executive bills much more than the Majlis. In other words the unelected 
institution of the Guardian Council was a more influential variable than the 
Sixth Majlis as an elected institution for preventing the government following 
its plans and policies. While the Majlis rejected 12 percent of the executive‟s 
bill, the Guardian Council rejected 20.1 percent of them. This might be 
explained by saying that the political composition of the government and 
Majlis during the Sixth Majlis (Reformist) was the opposite of the political 
composition of the Guardian Council (Conservative).    
 Figure (5-3): The percentage of Reformist Majlis bills rejected by the Conservative Guardian Council 
 
                                         Source: Karname Majles e Sheshom ( 2000-2004) 
Also the figures below indicate the situation of member proposals which were 
approved by the majority Reformist Majlis but rejected by the Conservative dominated 
Guardian Council. It should be noted that of 95 member proposals approved by the 
Majlis, 33 (34.7 %) were rejected by the Guardian Council. Also 55 member proposals 
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were withdrawn by the parliamentarians. The members‟ proposal regarding the 
“Establishment of the Press Jury Board”   was rejected  seven times and the proposal on 
banning torture was rejected four times by the Guardian Council which shows the very 
serious clash between elected institutions and unelected institutions. Also 27 member‟s 
proposals were rejected between one to three times by the Guardian Council.    
 Figure (5-4): The percent of MPs proposals of the Reformist Sixth Majlis rejected by the 
Conservative Guardian Council   
            
                                                Source: Karname Majles e Sheshom ( 2000-2004) 
If we add the percentage of the members‟ proposals and executive‟s bills which were 
rejected by the Guardian Council we can see that in the Sixth Majlis, from 2000 to 
2004, the Guardian Council rejected 32 percent of bills and member proposals. It should 
be noted that the Sixth Majlis was coincident with the last year of the first term and 
three years of the second term of Khatami‟s presidency, known as the Reforms 
Movement in Iran. Therefore we can come to the conclusion that when the Majlis and 
government were dominated by the Reformists the most important challenge is not 
between the legislature and executive, both of which are elected institutions, but 
between these two and the Guardian Council whose members have been appointed from 
Conservative clergy and lawyers directly or indirectly by the Supreme Leader. 
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5.1.2 Elected and Unelected institutions and their impact upon the budget bill 
 
 
    The Table 5.2 shows that the Sixth Majlis generally enacted the government‟s budget 
bills without significant alterations. In fact the average variations dictated by the Majlis 
to the Budget Bills of 2001/2002- 2004/2005 were only 14.3 percent. Nevertheless, 
there are some notable alterations:  In the Annual Budget Bill of 2002/2003 the Majlis 
increased the government revenues by increasing the figure of the sale of financial 
assets from 31762 billion Rials up to 55012 billion Rials (73.2 percent). In order to 
cover the increased budget resource, the Majlis permitted the government to withdraw 
35420 billion Rials from the “Oil Stabilization Fund”1 and also to sale some 
government-owned companies (mostly companies affiliated to the Oil Ministry) (Sadab, 
2004). Requiring the government to sale the government-owned companies, the Majlis 
accelerated the privatization plan which was one of the main targets of the Fourth Five-
Year Development Plan and the government had to formulate annual budgets according 
to it. At the same time, the Majlis increased the government expenditures by requiring it 
to pay off the greater amount of foreign debts. For this purpose the Majlis increased the 
figure of holding financial assets from 7117 billion Rials up to 29617 billion Rials 
(316.4 increase) in this year. 
    The Sixth Majlis also increased the other government revenues in the Budget Bill of 
2003/2004 by increasing the general revenues figure from 97238 billion Rials up to 
204508 billion Rials (110.3 percent) without increasing the expenditures in this year 
(Sadab, 2004). These revenues consisted of income from the government ownership of 
informatics and communication technology, ownership of oil and incomes of the 
                                                 
1
 - The “Oil Stabilization Fund” (OSF) was established in 2000 with two stated objectives: the 
stabilization of oil revenues by building up reserves and support of investments in the private sector to 
increase employment and non-oil exports (Islamic Republic of Iran, 2005: 27).   
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“targeted subsidies scheme”1. In fact in this fiscal year the Majlis helped the 
government to overcome budget deficit which has been common in annual budget bills 
after the revolution. Therefore, it can be said that the Majlis alterations helped the 
government to implement its policies rather than impeding them (Hoseini, 2009, 
interview 8 March).    
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 - “Targeted Subsidies” was a scheme, under which government spending will be diverted to those social 
groups that need it most (Hoseini, 2009, interview 8 March). 
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Table (5-2): The average alterations of budget bill, made during the Sixth Majlis (majority Reformist) by the parliamentarians 
 
 
 
Annual Budget Bill     
Composition 
2001/2002 2002/2003 2003/2004 2004/2005 
Bill 
(in 
billion 
Rials) 
Law 
(in 
billion 
Rials) 
Perce
ntage 
of 
variat
ions 
Bill 
(in 
billion 
Rials) 
Law 
(in 
billion 
Rials) 
 
Percent
age of 
variatio
ns 
Bill 
(in 
billion 
Rials) 
Law 
(in 
billion 
Rials) 
Perce
ntage of 
variations 
Bill 
(in 
billion 
Rials) 
Law 
(in 
billion 
Rials) 
Percen
tage of 
variations 
 
 
Budget 
resources 
Revenue 68098 72501 6.5 79344 82669 4.2 97238 204508 110.3 223860 222665 -0.53 
Sale of 
financial 
assets - - - 31762 55012 73.2 61754 64194 3.95 77594 86425 11.4 
Sale of 
capital 
assets 68516 68653 0.2 100453 102558 2.1 126170 126851 0.54 150700 150833 1.7 
General 
governmen
t resources 136614 141154 3.3 211559 240239 13.5 285162 395554 38.7 452154 459924 1.7 
 
 
Budget 
expenditur
e 
Expenditur
es 102472 104427 1.9 150256 155635 3.6 169050 285749 69 316886 315710 -0.37 
Holding 
financial 
assets 102582 104537 1.9 7117 29617 316.14 34649 35553 2.6 40187 44372 10.44 
Holding 
capital 
assets 34032 36616 7.6 54185 54987 1.5 81463 85206 4.6 95081 99841 5 
Total 
136614 141154 0.2 211559 240239 13.5 285162 395554 38.7 452154 459924 1.7 
Source: Consolidation Commission reports of 2001/2002- 2004/2005 budget bills, (2005) 
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Despite the Majlis, which had really minor influence on the budget bill of the 
government, during the Sixth Majlis the Guardian Council strongly blocked them 
several times: 
For example after approval of the Annual Budget Bill of 2002/2003 by the Islamic 
Consultative Assembly, the Guardian Council disagreed with it and the Assembly 
insisted on its own enactment for the second time. When the Guardian Council rejected 
it again, the Budget Commission of the Consultative Assembly sent the budget bill to 
the Expediency Council for taking the final decision (Article 112 of the Constitution). 
The Guardian Council objections to the Budget Bill of 2002/ 2003 were as follow: 
a)  “Allocation of funds for political parties. In the budget bill of this year 
the Sixth session of the parliament allocated 50 billion Rials for supporting the 
political parties. 
b)   A provision and financial guarantees for foreign investors in response 
to investment of up to $3.5 billion through the Central Bank of Iran. Also 
insisted on buy-back guarantees according to the provisions of the Third Five-
Year Development Plan. 
c) Allocation of financial support to social and sport activities for religious 
minorities recognised in the Constitution. 
d) Monitoring the budgets of Bonyads enterprises which are completely 
under the control of the Supreme Leader. 
e)  Decreasing the budget of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting 
which is directly run by the Supreme Leader” (Roozonline, 2007). 
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After referreing the disputes to the Expediency Council, the members of the Council 
held sessions and partly accepted the Guardian Council‟s point of view and in some 
parts confirmed the changes which had been made by the Assembly.  
Table (5-3): The number of rejections of the budget bill by the Guardian Council in the Sixth Majlis  
 
Term of the 
parliament 
 
Years 
The number of  
rejections of budget 
bills by the Guardian 
Council 
 
The items of the 
rejections 
 
Sixth Majlis 
2001/2002 - - 
2002/2003 2 19 
2003/2004 1 53 
2004/2005 1 9 
Source: Consolidation Commission reports of 2001/2002- 2004/2005 budget bills, (2005) 
During the Sixth Majlis, the Guardian Council took further steps and obliged the 
Assembly and Executive to include what they wanted to be in the budget bill. For 
example in the Annual Budget Bill 2003/2004 the executive increased the Guardian 
Council's budget to 44 billion Rials and the Assembly ratified that. But the Guardian 
Council rejected the bill and asked the Assembly to increase its budget to 160 billion 
Rials. The conflict over the Guardian Council's budget again was referred to the 
Expediency Council and finally Guardian Council budget increased to 100 billion Rials. 
This process entailed “sharp criticism from the deputies who maintained that the 
Council had bypassed the legislative in approving the budget rise” (Pyavand‟s Iran 
News, 2003, para: 8). Mohsen Armin, Second Deputy Speaker of the Sixth Majlis, 
stated that parliamentarians would “under no condition ever accept the recent 
verification by the Expediency Council (EC) to increase the annual budget of the 
Guardian Council (GC). The Expediency Council decision in favour of the Guardian 
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Council has been politically motivated and efforts to approve the Guardian Council 
huge budget rise has all been meant to humiliate the Majlis and the government” (Ibid). 
In another case after the ratification of Annual Budget Bill 2004/2005, the secretary 
of the Guardian Council returned the bill to the Majlis and noted “in the review of the 
country‟s budget bill, eight points were found to be contrary to the Constitution and one 
point contrary to the Shari‟a” (Jannati, 2004). Not foreseeing the source of revenue, the 
unclear amount of expenses, and the non budgetary nature of some sections were among 
the Guardian Council‟s objections to the annual budget bill of 2004/2005.    
 
5.2 The Seventh Majlis 
 
5.2.1 The Seventh Majlis in context 
 
 Elections to the Seventh Majlis took place in February and May 2004. Prior to that, 
the Reformists‟ domination was nearly complete in respect of elected institutions i.e. 
executive power, Majlis and Municipal Councils but the Conservatives did not give up. 
They turned their attention to the Municipal Elections which took place in 2003 and 
won all the seats and then prepared themselves for the Parliamentary Elections of 2004. 
The Guardian Council disqualified nearly 2500 candidates; among them there were 80 
prominent Reformist parliamentarians of the Sixth Majlis. Following that, 120 
Reformist deputies of the Majlis staged a sit-in and Mohammad Reza Khatami, First 
Deputy Speaker of the Majlis and the head of Islamic Participation Front Party, stated 
that “we have no hope that a fair, free and legitimate election can be held on February 
20. So in the current circumstances we cannot participate” (Khatami, 2004). The 
Guardian Council was accused of trying to open the way for Conservatives to enter the 
Majlis and establish a pro-Supreme Leader parliament. The Interior Ministry declared 
that it was impossible to hold free and fair elections.  
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Despite raising political tension between the Reformists and Conservatives it was 
decided that the election be held and in the final report before the election the 
Spokesman of the Guardian Council stated the causes of the disqualification of the 
candidates (mostly Reformists) as follows: “12.5 percent financial corruption, 13.5 
percent moral corruption, 14.5 percent sympathy towards or membership in counter-
revolutionary groups, 13.5 percent lacking belief in principles of Islam, 6.8 percent 
publication of untrue statements and disturbing public opinion, 15.7 percent having ill 
repute, 6.5 percent having acted against national security, 16.5 percent lacking belief in 
the Constitution” (Jahromi, 2004, para: 2). 
In contrast, the candidates of the Conservative camp, mostly from the alliance of 
Islamic Iran Developers (Eatelafe Abadgarane Iran e Eslami) including the Society of 
Devotees of the Islamic Revolution (Jamiyat-e Isargaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami), the Islamic 
Society of Engineers (Jame'e-y-e Eslami-e Mohandesin), Hay‘at-e Motalefe Eslami, 
Jame‘e-ye Ruhaniat-e Mobarez, Jame‘e-ye Modarresin-e Howze-ye Elmiye-ye Qom were 
almost fully approved by the Guardian Council. Some writers believe that in the 
Seventh Majlis a new generation of Conservative politicians was raised which 
controlled most of the political sphere of Iran and has continued to do so and called 
them “New Conservatives” (Ehteshami, and Zweiri, 2007). 
After the Presidential Election of 1997 when the Conservative candidate lost the 
election to Khatami and after the domination of the Majlis by the Reformists in the 2000 
Parliamentary Elections, some groups of Conservatives started to review their policies 
and their approaches toward political activities. ―Many on the old right clung to 
revolutionary tenets denouncing the West and preaching selflessness, with a particular 
stress on ―martyrdom‖ as the sacrifice of one‘s life—literal and figurative—for the sake 
of Islam‖ (Khosrowkhavar, 2004, para: 6). Instead New Conservatives who mostly 
consisted of Conservative clerics, at the head of them Mesbah Yazdi, Revolutionary 
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Guard (Sepah e Pasdaran) officials (who have a very strong financial basis) and many 
well educated figures, emphasised more economic development and prosperity, strong 
government, social services, efficiency and so on. They mainly stressed state-building 
and development combined with asserting the ideological values of the Islamic 
Republic. In the Parliamentary Elections of 2004, they introduced a slogan which 
showed their new strategy in the election: ―a free, developed and joyful Iran‖ (Iran-e 
azad, abad va shad). This was in contrast to the Reformists who put more stress on 
political and cultural development and tried to apply the Eastern Europe and Latin 
America model of development; the New Conservatives “preferred the East Asia model, 
with its combination of authoritarianism, economic progress, and emphasis on 
indigenous values. Conservative leaders often talked of their vision to turn Iran into an 
“Islamic Japan”, and they referred to the “China model” as the preferred development 
path for Iran” (Gheissari and Nasr, 2006: 145, 146).      
In the Parliamentary Elections of 2004 the Conservative camp took the majority of 
seats in the Assembly while the executive was still under the control of the Reformists 
till 2005.  
Table (5-4): Result of the Seventh Parliamentary Elections  
Orientation of candidates Seats % of Seats 
Conservatives 149 54 
Reformists 40 13 
Independents 31 11 
Elected in second round 59 20 
Armenians recognized minority religion 2  
Chaldean and Assyrian Catholic recognized minority religion 1  
Jewish recognized minority religion 1  
Zoroastrian recognized minority religion 1  
Total (Turnout around 50 %) 290  
Source: IPU, (2007)   
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 As a result of the Seventh Parliamentary Elections Conservative groups “obtained 
some 149 of 290 seats in parliament which gave them the absolute majority while the 
Reformist only won some 40 seats” (IPU, 2007). The Seventh Majlis was composed of 
three political factions: The first was the New Conservative faction named “Abadgaran” 
which had very close links with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard and its affiliated 
organisations and had a majority in the Assembly. Most of these parliamentarians were 
new faces in the political scene and had quite poor knowledge of domestic and 
international politics; however they had very strong loyalty to the political system under 
Velayat e Faghih and had a critical approach toward Rafsanjani‟s and Khatami‟s 
policies.  
 The minority faction was formed mostly by the Reformists with 40 deputies. Since 
almost all the prominent figures of the Reformist camp were disqualified by the 
Guardian Council there was no influential leader to lead the minorities in the Majlis and 
the Specialized Commissions. The last faction included the independent deputies whose 
views were closer to the New Conservative faction.  New Conservative deputies 
criticized cabinet members, requesting a wide range of changes in the composition of 
the ministers. They started to question and impeach Khatami's ministers who resisted 
Conservative demands. The Assembly challenged Khatami's government mostly in 
foreign policy, economic strategies and cultural issues (Takhshid, 2005). 
 For example the economic figures of the Seventh Majlis supported introducing a 
proposal which prevented increasing the price of gasoline, electricity, water, postal 
services and telecommunications which was predicted in the Fourth Five –Year 
Development Plan. This enactment of the Seventh Majlis could create a budget deficit 
and was against the mid term plans of the country which was started by Hashemi 
Rafsanjani‟s government.  Also experts on the economy believed that it was 
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antidevelopment and against the privatization policy of Khatami's government 
(BBCPersian, 2004). The government spokesman argued against this proposal and said 
it would prevent the government from implementing its social and economic plans as 
scheduled.  He asked the Guardian Council to oppose the proposal and said it would 
lead to a high inflation rate. Also the Minister of Economy and Financial Affairs 
objected to the proposal and said he did not see any economic benefit in this proposal. 
Nevertheless, the said proposal was enacted in the Assembly and the Guardian Council 
ratified it. By ratification of this proposal the Seventh Majlis could frustrate the attempts 
of the thousands of experts and bureaucrats who had been working for many years on 
economic strategy (Donyaye Eghtedsad, 2007).     
It seems the law making power of the Assembly increased in the first year of the 
Seventh Majlis where the main policies of the government were challenged by the 
Majlis, firstly because a strong opposition formed in this session of parliament against 
the executive which was under the Reformists. Secondly, the real power holders of the 
legislative system i.e. the Conservative Guardian Council obviously supported the 
Conservative opposition faction in the Assembly against Reformists who controlled the 
executive. As the figure below shows the New Conservative dominated Seventh Majlis 
rejected 10 percent of the bills of Reformist government of Khatami in one year while 
the Sixth Majlis whose majority was Reformist rejected only 12 percent of the Khatami 
government‟s bills during four years. In addition 73 bills of the Khatami government 
during one year were left in the Commissions of the Majlis without any decision being 
taken on them and delayed till the second term of Khatami‟s presidency had expired.   
 Comparing the aforementioned figures in both Majlis indicates that the law making 
power of the Majlis increased sharply during the first year of the Seventh Majlis. 
Although the influence of the Majlis in this period reached its maximum level, it does 
not mean the Majlis can be categorised in the policy making group according to 
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Norton‟s categorisation of legislatures since it could only reject the bills or delay them 
without having the ability to formulate and substitute a new bill instead. 
     
            Figure (5-5): The percent of Reformist government‟s bills rejected by the New 
Conservative Seventh Majlis (2004-2005)  
 
                                             Source: Karname e Majles e Haftom (2005-2008) 
   
This trend changed in 2005 when the New Conservative candidate Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad surprisingly won the Ninth Presidential Elections. He was one of the 
fundamentalist politicians who had served in different units of the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard. After the Second Municipal Election of 2003 in Tehran, in which 
the Principalist (Osolgarayan) faction of New Conservatives won the majority of seats 
of the City Council, he was appointed as the mayor of Tehran. In the 2005 Presidential 
Elections, while the main parts of the Conservative camp (traditional Conservatives) 
supported Ali Larijani in the first round, the candidates of the marginal parts of the New 
Conservatives supported Ahmadinejad who, compared to candidates of the Reformists 
and traditional Conservatives was less well known. In the second round of the 
Presidential Election he had to compete with Hashemi Rafsanjani, the former President 
whose term in office is known as the “Reconstruction Era”. Ahmadinejad started to 
criticise the Reconstruction Era of Hashemi Rafsanjani and Khatami‟s presidency which 
were called the “Reform Era”. He focused mostly on the uneven economic development 
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of Hashemi Rafsanjani and weak approach of Khatami toward the economy of the 
country and giving priority to political and cultural development rather than economic 
prosperity. He criticised the “oil mafia” in the country and promised to put the price of 
the oil in the hands of the people.  He did not believe in the development programme 
which had been exercised in the Hashemi Rafsanjani and Khatami Eras and just put 
stress on efficiency and equal distribution of resources. “Ahmadinejad adopted a populist 
platform directed at the urban and rural poor. His focus on ‗bread-and-butter issues‘ made 
the ―the theme of the content ‗change versus the status quo‘ rather than ‗reformers versus 
conservatives‖ (Mahdavi, 2006: 17). 
Finally Ahmadinejad defeated Hashemi Rafsanjani in the second round of the election. 
Nearly 30 million people (or 62 percent of those who were eligible to participate in the 
election) voted in the first round during which Hashemi Rafsanjani was on the top of the 
presidential candidates and Ahamdinejad in second place.  In the second round 27 million 
of the electorate voted, as a result of which Ahmadinejad won 61 percent of the votes and 
Hashemi Rafsnjani 35 percent of them (Gheissari and Naser, 2006).       
Therefore the candidate of the New Conservatives once again won in the election. 
Ahmadinejad appointed his cabinet ministers mainly among those who served in the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard or its sub organisations. As was expected due to his 
Conservative views and apparent support of the Supreme Leader, he got more 
cooperation and support from the deputies of the Seventh Majlis and particularly the 
Guardian Council whose members totally were from the Conservative camp. However 
it was not the case in the relationship between Ahmadinejad and the Expediency 
Council whose president Hashemi Rafsanjani was beaten by him in the bitter run off 
election. It seems the Majlis, government and Guardian Council, all of which were in 
the Conservative camp, did not incline to send the bills or proposals to the Expediency 
Council controlled by Hashemi Rafsanjani. Apart from Hashemi Rafsanjani, in the 
Expediency Council there was a combination of inner political factions including some 
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prominent figures that adopted a critical approach toward the policies of President 
Ahmadinehad. For instance Mohsen Rezaee, the former Commander of the 
Revolutionary Guard, who currently is one of the influential members of the 
Expediency Council, condemned Ahmadinejad several times for injecting huge amount 
of funds through local construction projects which he believed increased the inflation 
rate. If the activities of the Expediency Council in the Sixth and Seventh Majlis are 
compared different approaches can be realized:  during the Sixth Majlis when the 
parliament and executive power were under the control of Reformists 31 bills and 
members‟ proposals were referred to the Guardian Council while in the Seventh Majlis 
dominated by new Conservatives this number decreased to 25 bills and proposals.          
 After the presidential election, the Majlis tried to show its independence from the 
executive especially during giving a vote of confidence to some proposed ministers for 
the cabinet. For instance New Conservative deputies did not give the vote of confidence 
to the candidates who were introduced three times as Oil Minister by President 
Ahmadinejad to the Majlis (BBC News, 2005). 
 Nevertheless it seems the Majlis remained subordinate to the executive for most of 
the time. As one of parliamentarians (Aboutaleb, 2007: 5) put it “following the 
presidential election, for whatever reason they moved toward supporting the 
government, consequently the Majlis become weak before the government. It has now 
reached the stage whereby the Majlis doses not carry out even its basic and legal 
duties”. One may be able to find the reason for the absolute support of the Seventh 
Majlis to the Ninth Government in the short words of the First Deputy Speaker of the 
Majlis and key politician of the Conservative camp when he said: “whether we like it or 
not the Ninth administration is all the Conservatives have” (Saraf, 2007, para: 1).  
The below figure proves the absolute subordination of the Majlis to the government 
where approximately 99 percent of bills were passed by the parliamentarians. In fact the 
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viscosity of the Majlis reached its lowest level where almost all executive policies have 
been passed easily in the Seventh Majlis. Using Norton‟s terminology it can be said the 
Seventh Majlis had little or no policy making power in this period.  
 
          Figure (5-6): The percent of New Conservative government‟s bills rejected by the New          
Conservative Seventh Majlis     
  
                             Source: Karname e Majlis Haftom (2004-2008) 
Also the figures show the very good relationship of the Guardian Council and New 
Conservative majority of the Seventh Majlis: While in the Sixth Majlis the Guardian 
Council rejected 34.7 percent of the parliamentarians‟ proposals, in the Seventh Majlis 
it decreased to 6.3 percent. This type of relationship is understandable when we know 
the high ranking clergy (Ayatollah) who mostly had Conservative attitudes and had 
influential political positions praised the Seventh Majlis parliamentarians openly and 
repeatedly. For instance Ayatollah Meshkeni, one of Conservative clerics and the Head 
of the Experts Council, criticized the Sixth Majlis and stated that the Seventh Majlis 
parliamentarians had been endorsed by the holy Imam Zaman (Meshkini, 2004).        
       
 
 
     
 
 
 210 
 
 
 Figure (5-7): The percent of New Conservative Seventh Majlis MPs proposals rejected by       
the Conservative Guardian Council 
 
                                       
                                         Source: Karname e Majlis Haftom (2004-2008) 
The Guardian Council, as expected, offered absolute support to President 
Ahamdinejad‟s bills. As the figures below show, 97.5 percent of government bills were 
passed through the Guardian Council. It might be said that policies of President 
Ahmadinejad were mostly either implicitly or explicitly endorsed by the Supreme 
Leader on whose behalf the Guardian Council acts.  If one compares the number of the 
executive‟s bills in the Seventh Majlis which were rejected by the Guardian Council one 
realises that the Guardian Council supported the government even more than the Majlis 
as the below figures indicate.  
            Figure (5-8): The percent of New Conservative government‟s bills rejected by the 
Conservative Guardian Council      
 
                                 Source: Karname e Majlis Haftom (2004-2008)           
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5.2.2 Elected and Unelected institution and their impact upon budget bills 
 
The subordination of the Majlis to the Ninth government reached to its highest level 
during the preparation and ratification of the Annual Budget Bill of 2008/2009. Before 
submission of the bill, the government stated that the method of drafting the budget bill 
would be changed radically. According to these changes, first of all the government did 
not want to submit supplementary clauses but intended instead to submit a single article 
in conjunction with a handful of clauses or paragraphs. Also according to the new style 
of the budget formulation, the Ahmadinejad government decided that not all executive 
departments would be allocated specific budget allocations. Only 60 executive 
departments would receive funding allocations. These funds and allocation would be at 
the disposal of the highest ranking senior official in each executive department. The top 
senior official in each department would distribute the funds within his or her 
department. President Ahmadinejad enumerated the shortfalls of the previous method of 
annual budget drafting as follows: Lack of clarity, complexity in implementation, lack 
of clear distinction in the scope of responsibilities and authorities, impossibility for 
supervision, careful consideration, saving and so on. He stated that he had reduced the 
number of bodies which were accountable according to the Constitution from over 610 
to 39. Therefore the number of executive bodies was reduced. There were many 
complications as well, as out of 180 mandates only a few were essential (Ahmadinejad, 
2007). He added that the Annual Budget Bill of 2008/2009 was clear and gave enough 
time to the parliamentarians to consider all parts of the bill in detail. The bill was around 
248 US billion dollars which underwent three major revisions by Ahmadinejad‟s direct 
order. Despite this, it seemed that parliamentarians were not happy with the new method 
of drafting the annual budget bill. One of the members of the Budget and Planning 
Commission of the Majlis stated that “this new method of allocating funds is 
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problematic. Apart from that it is contrary to the Fourth Five-Year Development Plan; it 
reduces the parliamentarians‟ power to haggle.  Every parliamentarian from whichever 
constituency he or she may come from enters the Majlis for the problems which affect 
his or her constituency. If the annual budget were to be drafted in this way, then it 
reduces the power of the parliament as a whole” (Haghshenas, 2007, para: 18). 
Also the Majlis Research Centre produced many expert reports and stated that the 
government had ignored the right of the Majlis in respect of the budget bill.  For 
instance in one of their reports it was concluded that “depriving the parliament of its 
power to approve the budget bill, vesting him (the state) such powers absolutely 
regardless of laws and rules, is in breach of principle (85) of the Constitution” (Majlis 
Research Centre Report, 2008).    
Despite many parliamentarians opposing the Budget Bill of 2008/2009, eventually a 
majority of members (159) gave a positive vote to it and it was ratified mostly 
according to the method and figures which President Ahmadinejad preferred 
(Hamshahri Newspaper, 2008). In some part the Majlis could change the executive‟s 
bill. According to one government official, the Majlis rejected the government‟s idea 
about the National Iranian Oil Company and the government had to modify its idea 
about that. Also regarding the number of the departments and bodies to which the 
budget should make allocations, the Majlis rejected the government‟s idea and increased 
their number from 40 to 247 departments (Hosieni, 2008).   
Paying close attention to the relationship of parliament and government it can be said 
that the Seventh Majlis, whose majority backed  President Ahmadinejad, walked with 
its own feet towards the slaughterhouse because it had sacrificed its law making  power 
due to its unquestioning support for and collaboration with the Ninth Government. As 
one member of the Seventh Majlis put it “too much support for the administration in my 
opinion, did not allow the Majlis to  supervise the expenditure of the country‟s revenues 
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in the past 4 years, which were  unprecedented in the past 40 years, and implement 
economic reforms in the nation” (Moshiri, 2008, para: 5).  
 The Seventh Majlis did not defend its rights and jurisdictions against the attacks of 
the Ninth Government which enjoyed the absolute support of the Guardian Council and 
the Supreme Leader.   
As Table 5-5 shows the budget bill was slightly altered by the Seventh Majlis and 
this variation indicates the poor law making power of the Majlis in this policy area. It 
could adopt the budget bill of the government just varying it by 6.2 percent as a whole 
while this figure was 14.3 percent in Sixth Majlis. Comparing these figures it might be 
said that the Sixth Majlis could influence the policies of the government approximately 
twice as much than the Seventh Majlis. Nevertheless, there are some notable differences 
between the government‟s budget bill and what the Majlis‟ enacted: in the Annual 
Budget Bill of 2005/2006 the Majlis increased the revenues of the government by 
increasing the figure of the sale of financial assets from 97808 billion Rials to 113601 
billion Rials (16.1 percent). Also in the same year the Majlis increased the figure of 
holding financial assets from 27051 billion Rials to 42051 billion Rials (55.4 percent) 
(Sadab, 2008). With these alterations the Majlis required the government to sell a higher 
number of the government-owned companies which was one of the crucial policies of 
the Fourth Five-Development Plan. In order to cover the government budget deficit the 
Majlis allowed the government to withdraw from the “Oil Stabilization Fund”. 
The Annual Budget Bill of 2006/2007 indicates a different approach of the Majlis 
toward the government‟s budget bill. In that year the Majlis decreased the government 
resources from 182924 billion Rials to 149237 billion Rials (18.4 pecent) (Ibid).  In fact 
the Majlis reduced the revenues of the government through decreasing the trend of 
selling government-owned companies and also withdrawals from the “Oil Stabilization 
Fund”.  The Majlis came to this conclusion that the government had not been successful 
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in implementing the privatization policies dictated by the Fourth Five-Year 
Development Plan and decided to reassess the effectiveness of this policy. Furthermore, 
the Majlis took the decision to stop the increasing trend of the government withdrawals 
from the “Oil Stabilization Fund” because this fund was established for stabilizing 
economic situation and not for spending on day to day affairs of the government 
(Hoseini, 2009, interview 8 March). In this year the Majlis decreased the expenditures 
of the government by reducing the figure of holding financial assets from 26664 billion 
Rials to 14084 billion Rials (-47.2) and changing the figure of holding capital assets‟ 
figure from 184618 billion Rials to 156551 billion Rials (15.2) (Sadab 2008). In fact, 
the Majlis required the government to pay off the government debts to the internal 
banks (Ibid).   
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Table (5-5): the average alterations of budget bill, made during the Seventh Majlis (majority Conservative) by the parliamentarians 
 
 
 
Seventh Majlis 
 
 
 
 
 
2005/2006 
 
2006/2007 
 
2007/2008 
 
2008/2009 
 
Bill 
(in 
billion 
Rials) 
 
Law 
(in 
billion 
Rials) 
Percenta
ge of 
variations 
 
Bill 
(in 
billion 
Rials) 
 
Law 
(in 
billion 
Rials) 
Percenta
ge of 
variations 
 
Bill 
(in 
billion 
Rials) 
 
Law 
(in 
billion 
Rials) 
Percenta
ge of 
variations 
 
Bill 
(in 
billion 
Rials) 
 
Law 
(in 
billion 
Rials) 
Percentag
e of 
variations 
 
 
Budget 
resources 
Revenue 270158 286887 6.2 239493 244455 2.1 261312 277508 6.2 33663 338753 0.62 
Sale of 
financial assets 97808 113601 16.1 182924 149237 -18.4 180108 186218 3.4 210484 222771 5.84 
Sale of capital 
assets 132260 137371 3.9 167865 154878 -7.7 171225 175725 2.6 173194 179961 3.91 
General 
government 
resources 500226 537859 7.5 590282 548571 -7.1 612645 639452 4.4 720341 741485 2.94 
 
 
Budget 
expenses 
Expenditures 368486 382829 3.9 379000 377935 -0.28 388007 399400 2.9 442524 463176 4.67 
Holding 
financial assets 27051 42051 55.4 26664 14084 -47.2 49594 55614 12.1 36409 35785 -1.71 
Holding capital 
assets 104689 112979 7.9 184618 156551 -15.2 175044 184438 5.4 241408 242524 0.46 
Total 500226 537859 7.5 590282 548571 -7.1 612645 639452 4.4 720341 741485 2.94 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Source: the Consolidation Commission reports of 2005/2006- 2008/2009 budget bills, (2008)
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Also the Guardian Council impact upon the budget bill decreased after the Seventh 
Majlis started working. As the figures below show the items of objection which the 
Guardian Council made during the Seventh Majlis declined in comparison with the 
Sixth Majlis. This is natural and is compatible with the overall approach of the Guardian 
Council to the New Conservative Seventh Majlis and Ninth Government.  
                  
Table (5-6): The number of the rejections of budget bills by the Guardian Council in Seventh 
Majlis 
 
Term of the 
parliament 
 
Years 
The number of 
rejections of budget 
bills by the Guardian 
Council 
 
The number of 
items of   the rejections 
 
Seventh Majlis 
2005/2006 1 5 
2006/2007 1 13 
2007/2008 1 11 
2008/2009 1 1 
Source: Ibid 
 In contrast, the Expediency Council resisted strongly the economic policies of the 
government. After the approval of the Budget Bill of 2008/2009 (1387) the Expediency 
Council intervened in the law making process on an unprecedent scale. The Head of the 
Expediency Council wrote a letter addressing the Guardian Council and mentioned that 
some items should be contained in the Budget Bill of 2008/2009. He contended that the 
annual budget bill prepared by the Ahmadinejad Government and passed by the Majlis 
had many discrepancies with the Fourth Five-Year Development Plan and the General 
Policies of Article 44 of the Constitution which had been issued on behalf of the 
Supreme Leader.  Hashemi Rafsanjani, the Head of the Expediency Council, in the 
Council session mentioned the collective responsibilities for the country and in the 
course of condemning the government‟s growing dependency on oil, said that the 
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implementation of Article 44 of the Constitution and the Vision Document that outlines 
the development direction of the country for the next 20 years required that the State 
Expediency Council intervene seriously in the matter. Hashemi Rafsanjani specifically 
named the government as being responsible for this, pointing out that the administration 
had been presenting bills to the Majlis that contradicted the Vision Document endorsed 
by the Leader. “Based on law, we have the authority to intervene and not simply 
because of the conditions of the country and the needs of the government. This was an 
opportunity for the new government to implement its new promises, but now the 
Council has to intervene to seriously supervise the situation,” he continued (Hashemi 
Rafsanjani, 2007, para: 3). 
After the final approval of the budget bill in the Majlis, the Secretary of the 
Expediency Council also mentioned that there were numerous problems in the budget 
bill when it was compared with the General Policies of the State and if the Council 
wanted to dig out all contradictions in depth the budget would not have been finalized 
until the end of parliament‟s work and thus the approval of the budget bill would be 
postponed to the next year (Reza‟i, 2008).   Many parliamentarians, who believed this 
intervention was illegal, protested against that and threatened to leave the plenary 
session. Nevertheless Haddad Adel, the Speaker of the Seventh Majlis, didn't accept 
their objection and said that the Expediency Council was fulfilling its scrutiny function 
on behalf of the Supreme Leader and therefore could do it (Haddad Adel, 2008). 
 Referring to the changes which have been made by the Majlis and the Expediency 
Council, the government spokesman said these changes would increase the inflation rate 
and the government has no responsibility for that. In response, the Speaker of the Majlis 
Haddad Adel claimed that the Majlis changed the government‟s budget bill only by a 
margin of 3 percent (Tabnak, 2008).   
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Also the Secretary of the Expediency Council said that the Council would strengthen 
its supervision of the government‟s conduct the following year which might mean the 
direct intervention of this unelected institution would be increased in the law making 
process (Reza‟i, 2008).  
 
6. Conclusion 
In this chapter the Sixth and Seventh Majlis law making power was examined 
during the budget process. First of all the legal framework of the budget process in the 
Iranian Constitution and other relevant laws and regulations were analysed in normative 
terms. Obviously the ability of parliament to amend the budget bill partly depends on 
the power and authority which is conferred by the Constitution and other laws and 
regulations.  These powers are positively correlated with the ability to affect and change 
the bills of the executive power. 
It was stated that although on the basis of the Constitution, there is no limitation for 
amending or adapting the annual budget bill, it prescribed that the parliamentarians are 
allowed to change the budget bill only within the framework defined by other laws and 
regulations. Reviewing all relevant laws and regulation, and apart from the 
compatibility with the Constitution, we found just one main limitation: based on the 
Internal Regulation of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, within the budget bill all 
motions and proposals of individual representatives shall not have any discrepancy with 
the Five-Year Development Plans which act as a framework for the annual budget bill.  
Then the contribution of the executive power and the Majlis in the budget process was 
explained according to which the preparation and initiation of the budget bill is the duty 
of the executive and the President is in charge of that. In the second stage the bill should 
be submitted to the Majlis within which the different Specialized Commissions and 
Consolidated Commission debate the policies of the government in detail. The 
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relationship of government and parliament and their interaction at this point is very 
helpful for understanding the law making power of the parliament. This relationship 
was closely examined during the Sixth and Seventh Majlis. In the first step, the political 
context within which the Majlis acted was explained and it was stated that the Sixth 
Majlis in the final year of the first term, and three years of the second term of Khatami‟s 
presidency belonged to the Reformist camp. On the other hand, in the final year of his 
presidency Khatami coped with the New Conservatives who dominated the Seventh 
Majlis. Unsurprisingly we found that except in the final year of Khatami‟s government, 
in which two opposite political attitudes dominated the executive and the Majlis, the 
law making power of the parliament seriously declined and executive bills, particularly 
budget bills, could be passed in the Majlis easily and without tremendous amendments 
and alterations. Only in the final year of Khatami‟s presidency did the Majlis veto many 
important bills of government. Yet, if one compares the Sixth and Seventh Majlis, one 
can find that the Sixth Majlis bill viscosity was higher than the Seventh Majlis. It seems 
the principal reason for that was the homogeneity and high discipline of the 
Conservative camp and New Conservative factions within parliament which dominated 
the Seventh Majlis and the Ninth Government.  
In this chapter after analysing the political context of the Sixth and Seventh Majlis 
the relationship of the executive power and the Majlis in the budget policy area was 
examined. First of all it should be noted that none of government‟s budget bills were 
rejected by the Sixth or the Seventh Majlis. They could only have some influence over 
the bills. As Figure 5-9 shows, most policies of the government got through easily in 
both the Sixth and Seventh Majlis; the only considerable exception happened during the 
Sixth Majlis (the Annual Budget 2003/2004). In this year the Majlis tried to support 
Khatami‟s government to implement its privatization policies rather than impeding 
them. This trend changed in the Seventh Majlis and parliamentarians tried to limit the 
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government by controlling the budget as it was explained previously. It reached to its 
highest level in the Annual Budget Bill of 2006/2007 but as Figure 5-9 indicates in the 
following years the Majlis could not make considerable alterations.  
 
 
 
Figure (5-9): The average alterations and amendments of government budget bills (2001/2002- 
2008/2009) by the Sixth and Seventh Majlis 
  
 
Source: Consolidation Commission reports of 2001/2002- 2008/2009 budget bills  
* This figure is accoding to the data of Tables 5-2 and 5-5   
 
 
After considering the relationship between the government and the Majlis (both of 
which are deemed elected institutions) during the budget bill process the relationship of 
these bodies and unelected institutions i.e. Guardian Council and Expediency Council 
was examined. Table 5-7 shows that unelected institutions are important actors which 
can seriously affect the law making function of the parliament through changing the 
outcomes of government‟s policies. In this table different approaches of the unelected 
institutions toward elected institutions in the Sixth and the Seventh Majlis can be 
recognised. In the Sixth Majlis with majority Reformist, the Guardian Council and the 
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Expediency Council became more active while in the Seventh Majlis they were 
agreeable to Seventh Majlis enactments.      
 
 
Table (5-7): The situation of bills and members‟ proposals in the Sixth and Seventh Majlis      
The situation 
of bills/ members’ 
proposals 
 
Sixth session*   
 
Seventh session** 
Bill Proposal Bill Proposal 
Approved by 
Majlis 
 
362 
 
86 
 
217 
 
95 
Rejected by 
Guardian Council 
 
62 
 
33 
 
9 
 
17 
Referred to 
Expediency 
Council 
 
17 
 
7 
 
5 
 
5 
Rejected  by 
Majlis 
 
13 
 
43 
 
29*** 
 
23 
*Source: Karname e Majles e Sheshom, ( 2001-2004) 
**Source: Karname e Majles e Haftom, ( 2005-2008) 
*** The number of rejected bills in the Seventh Majlis is higher than the Sixth Majlis because most of 
them belong to the last year of Khatami‟s presidency which was coincident with the first year of the 
Seventh Majlis   
****Data collected by Hassan Vakilian 
 
 
 
The Guardian Council in particular, dominated by the Traditional Conservatives and 
absolutely controlled by the Supreme Leader could block the bills and members‟ 
proposals of both the Reformist government and the Reformist Majlis. As Figure 5-10 
shows this trend was sharply decreased in the Seventh Majlis in comparison with the 
Sixth Majlis.  
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Figure (5-10): The percent of Sixth and Seventh Majlis enactments rejected by the Guardian 
Council  
 
   Source: Ibid 
*Data collected by Hassan Vakilian 
 
 
The same approach of the Guardian Council was applied to the annual budget bill. 
As the table below shows the number of Items which the Guardian Council rejected 
during the Sixth Majlis is considerably higher than in the Seventh Majlis. In the final 
year of the Seventh Majlis only one item of the budget bill was rejected by the Guardian 
Council which shows that the New Conservative Ahmadinejad government could 
follow its policies very easily, both in the Majlis and in the Guardian Council.  
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Table (5-8): The number of rejections of budget bills by the Guardian Council in the Sixth and 
Seventh Majlis       
 
Term of the 
Majlis 
 
Years 
The number of 
rejections of budget 
bills by the Guardian 
Council 
 The number of     
items in the     
rejections 
 
Sixth 
Majlis 
2001/2002 - - 
2002/2003 2 19 
2003/2004 1 53 
2004/2005 1 9 
Seventh 
Majlis 
2005/2006 1 5 
2006/2007 1 13 
2007/2008 1 11 
2008/2009 1 1 
*Source: Consolidation Commission Reports of 2001/2002- 2008/2009 budget bills 
**Data collected by Hassan Vakilian  
 
Another unelected institution which increased its role during the law making process 
was the Expediency Council. We have already examined the Council‟s place in the 
Constitution and in practice and it was shown that although constitutionally it has only 
an arbitration and consultation function, in practice it has intervened in the law making 
process in many ways.  Figure 5-11 this claim and indicate that the Sixth Majlis with a 
Reformist majority preferred to refer their enactments to the Expediency Council rather 
than adapting it according to the wishes of the Conservative-dominated Guardian 
Council. This is reasonable since the composition of the Expediency Council, where a 
moderate Hashemi Rafsanjani presides, is slightly more open than the Guardian Council 
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where the Conservative clergy seriously resisted the Reformists. Furthermore it was 
stated that the Expediency Council may even set aside the Shari‟a law and take 
decisions on the basis of the interest of the system and this leave more room for 
manoeuvre.  This trend in the Seventh Majlis declined since the New Conservatives of 
both the Seventh Majlis and Ninth Government felt more sympathy with the Guardian 
Council than the Expediency Council where the moderate Conservatives dominated. 
The figure below shows this trend in the Sixth and Seventh Majlis.   
Figure (5-11): The percentage of the Sixth and Seventh Majlis enactments referred to  
the Expediency Council      
 
*Source: Karname e Majles e Haftom, ( 2005-2008),Karname e Majles e Sheshom, ( 2001-2004)  
**Data collected by Hassan Vakilian 
 
Despite the Seventh Majlis and Ahmadinejad who tried to have less interactions with 
the Expediency Council, this Council – as was explained - increased its supervision and 
intervention especially in budget affairs to an unprecedented extent.   
To sum up it might be said the law making power of the Majlis in comparison with 
its power and jurisdictions stipulated in the Constitution and other relevant laws is 
small. However, as was shown, it depends on the political composition of the political 
institutions involved in the law making process as to the capacity of the Majlis to 
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increase or decrease its power. Apart from this factor, which generally can define the 
overall power of the Majlis, regarding the budget bill the factors which can explain its 
weakness in budget process are as follow:  
 
6.1 Structure of the political power in Iran 
 According to the Iranian Constitution, the leadership institution is located in the 
centre of the political power. In fact the highest authority within the Iranian political 
system is the Supreme Leader and all branches of the government are accountable to 
him while he has no responsibility to anybody. Although the President is in charge of 
preparing the budget bill and presenting it to the Majlis, the Supreme Leader has more 
considerable economic power. So long as the Constitution places ultimate political 
power in the hands of the Supreme Leader, it is very difficult to say that the President 
has meaningful power or is fully responsible for the executive because in such 
circumstances he does not have a decisive position within the power structure, and it 
might be said he is just a performer. This is the case especially in some important policy 
areas such as foreign policy, macroeconomic planning, and defence policy. Several 
important financial and economic institutions such as Bonyads and other Foundations 
are under the Leader‟s direct control. These Foundations which were established after 
the Islamic Republic Revolution are estimated to control approximately 40 percent of 
Iran‟s non oil economy and often operate parallel to the executive power while very 
rarely coordinating their activities with the executive apparatuses. For instance the 
Oppressed and Disabled Foundation (Bonyad e Mostazafan  va Janbazan) which is the 
institution for providing various kinds of services to the people who were injured and 
disabled during the war with Iraq or very poor people of the country, is one of the 
biggest companies in Iran. It has been  stated (Kamrava and Hassan -Yari,  2004) that 
Bonyads with an annual turnover  which has reached 3.5 billion dollars, control more 
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than 400 companies and factories in different areas such as  the food industry, 
beverages, chemicals, metals, petrochemicals and farming. The most important point is 
that at the same time that they are able to carry over the budget received as a transfer 
from the government budget, they are only responsible to the Supreme Leader and the 
government and parliament have no power to intervene in their affairs either in terms of 
making laws or overseeing them (The Islamic Republic of Iran, 2005). It is stated that 
“these enterprises provide services and funds to the politicians supervising them; 
although their activities in many cases are unrelated to the tasks of the government 
entities to which they are attached. The main function of these enterprises is to enable 
the politicians to offer rewards to their personnel and constituency and carry out tasks 
that are not feasible through the normal budgetary processes” (Salehi Esfahani and 
Taheripour, 2002:  697). In fact the duality of the political power within the Iranian 
political system clearly shows itself during the budget process and reveals how many 
competitors there are to the parliament and how much they can influence its power.    
Moreover, the Constitution gives very important power to the Supreme Leader to 
delineate the General Policies of the system and supervise their implementation. We 
explained before that in this process the Expediency Council acts on behalf of the 
Supreme Leader and there are many cases (some of them are mentioned in this research) 
that show unelected institutions seriously involved in the law making process especially 
during budget ratification.  
Also the influential intervention of the Guardian Council during the budget process 
may considerably limit the power of both branches of government. It was shown that 
the political composition of the executive and legislative power is very relevant.   
Although the executive power is weaker in relation to unelected institutions, if one 
compares the executive and the Majlis, one can see that the former has more influence 
over the budget bill than the latter. The executive has some privileges which make it 
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more powerful than the Majlis during the budget process.  The President has the right to 
draft the budget bill for which he can employ many advisory and professional bodies. 
For instance the Plan and Management Organization, which is a very professional 
institution with substantial resources, helps the President while the parliament lacks 
similar bodies with abilities to help it during the budget process in parliament as we will 
see in the following pages.  
 
6.2 Lack of political parties 
The relationship of the parliament and political parties is crucial in terms of 
its law making power. The impact of parties upon the internal workings of 
parliament and behaviour of parliamentarians constitutes the main part of the 
current studies about parliament. Parties may help parliament to gather 
different views and approaches toward policy.  
In most of the countries where there is plenty of research about their legislatures, 
such as Britain where the party discipline is very strong, the parliament‟s independence 
has been sacrificed in favour of party power; complete dominance of parliamentary 
activities by parties affects the parliamentarians‟ independence. In contrast, the lack of 
strong party discipline has enhanced the law making power of the Congress of the 
United States. That is why party politics are in the centre of studies considering power 
of the legislatures.  Such an approach toward the Iranian Parliament appears quite 
irrelevant. Not only is there no party discipline in the Iranian political parties, there are 
no political parties such as those that can be seen for example in European countries 
where parties are ubiquitous.  
As we mentioned, although the activities of political parties are permitted according 
to the Constitution, they have no important role in Iranian politics including 
parliamentary activities; most of them were banned after the Islamic revolution. As 
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Fairbanks argues “the establishment of political parties by civil groups is perceived as a 
direct threat to the clerics‟ power and is incongruent with the theory of Vellayate- 
Faghih” (Fairbanks, 1998: 17). Instead of political parties, there are many quasi- 
political parties and factions in the Iranian political system which informally engages in 
political activities. Even those political factions endorsed by the official authorities 
cannot play an influential role as an opposition party mainly because of the electoral 
system which prevents them from participating meaningfully in parliamentary elections 
and with most of their candidates disqualified by the Guardian Council. For instance, as 
Hajjarian (2007) mentioned, the minorities (Reformists) in the Seventh Majlis acted 
very weakly within the parliament and in fact there was no resistance to the 
Conservative majority of the Seventh Majlis.  
  Lack of political parties affected the power of the parliament because consequently 
parliamentarians are not backed by parties. Instead of modern political parties, there are 
political factions which are not well organised because they have not enough financial 
resources to make them independent of government. In these factions there is no clear 
leader; just powerful individuals that can set the agendas of the factions. They consist of 
no homogenous group and no coherent organizational structure. There is no official 
political programme as with the modern political parties. Individual members express 
their opinion in the public media (Moslem, 2002).  Most of the Iranian parliamentarians 
have not had any experience of working within institutionalized political parties and 
because of that they cannot cope with the professional and well trained executive 
officials, especially in relation to budget affairs which are highly complicated. Even 
some candidates of the Majlis elections emphasise they are independent candidates and 
have no affiliation with political factions (Khatamati, 2007 interview 27 March).  
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6.3 Complicated budget bill and not enough information for deputies 
 The annual budget bill is a complicated document; its content is not easy to 
understand by the parliamentarians, most of whom have not enough experience and 
information about budgetary issues. In contrast, the executive‟s officials who prepare 
and submit the budget bill have enough information about the policies and preferences 
of the government. In other words, the executive usually has greater information sources 
than the Majlis which enters the budget process at a late stage after secretive 
departmental negotiations have finished. Therefore, it is vital for the parliament to have 
access to sufficient, accurate and useful information on the budget. This requirement 
includes information on the budget proposal and reports from every executive 
department. Also an effective research service along with dedicated, specialized 
personnel is necessary to help deputies in analyzing the budget bill.  
As has been stated (Shobeirinejad, 2007) in Iran one cannot compare the knowledge 
and information of executive officials with that of the parliamentarians about budgetary 
affairs. Obviously the deputies need relevant information and reports from the 
government for being able to examine and probably to adjust the budget bill and this 
kind of information usually is not presented to the Majlis by the executive‟s officials. 
Also it was stated that “there is relatively little information on off budget or implicit 
revenues and spending, loan guarantees and other contingent liabilities, and quasi-fiscal 
obligations. Likewise, there is little information on the process of budgetary execution, 
including a lack of periodic reporting on the status of budgetary execution during the 
year itself, although the budget document contains actual out-turns for previous years (a 
welcome contrast to many countries). In addition, many budget execution decisions are 
both non-transparent and non-public, including contract awards for public procurement” 
(Islamic Republic of Iran, 2005: vii). Also it seems there is unwillingness on the part of 
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the executive power to give enough information to the Majlis, making it unable to force 
changes.   
According to an interview with one of the deputies of the Seventh Majlis, he believes 
that the information and knowledge of the parliamentarians were not enough to examine 
the annual budget bill. However he thought the situation varied in different periods of 
the Majlis.  Shahbazkhani (2008, interview 2 March) evaluated the knowledge of his 
colleagues as follows: “we did not have skilled, qualified and able forces familiar with 
the country‟s  issues in the Majlis especially in the budget area which needs well trained 
people”.  He believes that due to the disqualification of many prominent figures and 
experts with experience of working in  the government and Majlis during the Seventh 
Parliamentary Elections, the Specialized Commissions were empty of such workforces. 
The table below shows the opinion of members of the Sixth and Seventh as to the 
level of deputies‟ information about the annual budget bill: 
Question: Is the level of information about the budget bill adequate? 
Table (5-9): Opinion of the Sixth and Seventh MPs about the level of 
budget information of the deputies 
Term   of 
Parliament 
Answer Percent 
 
 
Sixth Majlis 
Yes 6.9 
No 89.2 
No answer 10.3 
Total 100 
Members of  58 
 
 
Seventh Majlis 
Yes 0 
No 95.8 
No answer 4.2 
Total 100 
Members of  24 
                               Source: Ghasemi et al, (2008), Bodgeh Rizi Dar Iran, 
                                            Tehran, Entesharat e Majlis e shoraye Eslami 
 
 Also the educational situation of parliamentarians seems to be one of the factors 
involved in the quality of the work of the parliament in budgetary matters. It was 
mentioned (Shahbazkhani, 2008, interview 2 March) that using the unfamiliar and 
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technical terms in the budget bill makes it more difficult to deal with the annual budget 
bill. That is why Shahbazkhani believes that in the current situation the parliamentarians 
should not change the budget bill in its details but rather discuss only the overall plans 
and policies of the government. 
Therefore, it seems that a lack of Information on the draft of the budgets, particularly 
information below the department level which enable parliamentarian to discuss its 
proposed expenditure and revenue, resulted in the weak law making power of the 
Majlis.  
Parliamentarians‟ lack of knowledge about the budget bill may be compensated by 
the effective research services which require dedicated and specialised personnel. In the 
Iranian Parliament the Majlis Research Centre which provides the research services was 
established in 1993 (14 years after the establishment of the Islamic Majlis) and it is not 
well institutionalized. The head of the Majlis Research Centre should be appointed by 
the vote of a majority of the Majlis Speakership Board which usually takes place at the 
beginning of each Majlis session. This procedure which takes place every four years has 
affected the stability of the institution. Therefore the structure and the staff of 
parliament are not in a strong position to provide proper services to the parliamentarians 
and, as mentioned on its website, the resources allocated are not enough to fulfil its 
functions (Majlis Research Centre a, 2008). Also as the former Deputy Speaker of the 
Sixth Majlis mentioned (Khatami, 2007 interview 27 March) it seems that 
parliamentarians are not certain to rely on the papers and reports produced by the 
experts of the Majlis Research Centre. Nevertheless in the budget season the budget 
office of the Majlis Research Centre is becoming more active. The office usually 
prepares many reports on the different phases of the annual budget bill and helps the 
parliamentarians to understand the complicated draft of the bill. For instance according 
to official reports published by the Institute in the Seventh Majlis, 239 reports on budget 
 232 
 
bills had been provided by the Majlis Research Centre (Majlis Research Centre b, 
2008).  
 
6.4 Weak parliamentary commissions 
The factors which may affect the power of the parliamentary commissions can be 
grouped in two categories: structural and behavioural features. As Strøm (1998) put it, 
the type and tenure, the number of their members and size, their jurisdictions and 
correspondence with executive departments and so on can define the structural features 
of the commissions which define the room for manoeuvre within the parliamentary 
arena. By behavioural features is meant the parameters such as the level of experience, 
education, information, and occupation which guides the activity of the members of the 
commission (Parliamentary control over public expenditure in Bangladesh: the role of 
the committees, 2000).  
 In terms of its structural features it might be said that the Iranian parliamentary 
commissions in some respects have the characteristics of strong and influential 
commissions. For instance the Specialized Commissions of the parliament which 
according to provision 3 of Article 4 of the Internal Regulation of the Majlis have 
jurisdiction to examine the budget bill are established and maintained for the entire 
session of the Majlis. In terms of their size, the number of every Commission might 
vary between 19 and 21 (Article 29 of Internal Regulation) and within them the 
establishment of subcommittees is allowed (Article 48 of Internal Regulation). 
Nevertheless in other respects it seems the parliamentary Commissions‟ organization 
has not enough power to control the executive power. For example while the number of 
the Specialized Commissions which consider the governmental bills is just 12, the 
executive departments (apart from executive bodies within government) are 21 which 
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obviously affect the power of the Commissions. They are not parallel to executive 
departments and that is why one of the parliamentarians stated that the workload of the 
Commissions is too much and prevents them from monitoring the activities of the 
executive departments properly and rigorously (Maidari, 2007 interview 27 March).  
  Also the time allocated to the Commissions is a very important variable which may 
impact upon their activities.  Longer time enables detailed analysis to identify and 
support suggested amendments. Where Commissions do not have sufficient time for 
analysis, their role in suggesting amendments may be weakened. Sometimes the 
executive delays submitting the budget bill and this affects the Commissions‟ power.  
Abdollahi, who presides over the Consolidation Commission of the Seventh Majlis, 
criticized Ahmadinejad‟s government for delaying the submission of the budget bill of 
2008/2009. He said “the annual budget bill was given to us very late this year. The 
Specialized and even Consolidation Commissions had not enough time to consider the 
documents in detail and take the evaluation of the experts. They did not even have time 
to flip the pages of the budget. Some of the deputies did not have the time to review it 
once. In such circumstances not too much can be expected from the Majlis to change 
this bill” (Abdollahi, 2008 interview 4 February).  Abdollahi also mentioned that a large 
number of deputies had found it very difficult to cope with the enormous information 
which was included in the complicated tables which they received a few days before the 
parliamentary session. 
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Table (5-10): The opinion of the Sixth Majlis MPs about annual budget bill time schedule 
MPs answer Submission of 
bill to Majlis 
Time limit of 
MPs to give 
proposal 
Time limits of 
specialized 
commission to 
give proposals 
Time limit of 
consolidate 
committee to 
give proposal 
Enough 55.2 48.3 48.3 50 
Not enough but 
impossible to 
change 
1.7 3.4 - 5.2 
Not enough but 
possible to change  
31 41.4 46.6 34.5 
No answer 12.1 6.9 5.2 10.3 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Members of 
Parliament 
58 58 58 58 
Source: Ghasemi et al, (2008), Bodgeh Rizi Dar Iran, Tehran, Entesharat e Majlis e shoraye Eslami 
 
 
 
Table (5-11): The opinion of the Seventh Majlis MPs about annual budget bill time schedule 
MPs answer Submission of bill 
to Majlis 
Time limit of 
MPs to give 
proposal 
Time limits of 
specialized 
commission to 
give proposals 
Time limit of 
consolidate 
committee to give 
proposal 
Enough 16.7 58.3 29.2 25 
Not enough but 
impossible to 
change 
8.3 4.2 8.3 4.2 
Not enough but 
possible to change 
8.3 29.2 58.3 62.5 
No answer 16.7 8.3 4.2 8.3 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Members of 
Parliament 
24 24 24 24 
Source: Ghasemi et al, (2008), Bodgeh Rizi Dar Iran, Tehran, Entesharat e Majlis e shoraye Eslami 
 
 
 Also they have not enough financial resources for recruiting the appropriate experts 
when they deal with the complicated bills such as the budget bill (Bahrami, 2007 
interview 14 October).  
In terms of their behavioural characteristics it was stated that the membership of 
parliamentarians in Specialized Commissions of the parliament is based on their 
political affiliation rather than their experiences and expertise in the policy area of the 
Commissions. Most of the parliamentarians who rush into those Commissions, such as 
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Foreign Policy and Internal Security, have no skills or experiences in these areas of 
policy making (Mazrouei, 2007 interview 21 April). 
Furthermore, in the Majlis the minorities of the parliament have no meaningful 
participation and the majority lack the willingness to challenge the policies of the 
government in Commission, as we saw with the 2008/2009 annual budget bill (Ibid). 
Parliamentary Commissions in Iran do not have well-trained staff and permanent 
expertise and their current staff are inadequate. Apart from routine work of the 
Commissions, such as arranging the meetings, travelling and time scheduling, most of 
them are not able to be involved in other parliamentary activity such as influencing 
agenda setting decisions, working to create coalition in Commission, and investigation. 
Nevertheless, they do have some limited resources to hire temporary experts who can be 
consulted on the subject raised in the Specialized Commission. Ghanbari, (2006 
interview 5 July) one of the members of the Budget and Plan Commission of the Sixth 
Majlis, complained about the level of the contribution of his Commission staff and said 
“apart from some simple secretarial jobs, most affairs of the Commission are to be done 
by ourselves and this worsens our time shortage problem”.            
 As we saw, parliament is substantially involved in budgetary discussions. The draft 
budget, in full detail, is distributed and discussed over a period of several weeks through 
a series of Commissions in parliament. Technical support is provided by the Parliament 
Research Centre. Parliament may eliminate or add activities, or change allocations, 
provided that overall fiscal discipline is respected. In practice, however, parliamentary 
changes are typically small, driven by local constituencies, and inevitably tend to 
increase spending over the executive‟s proposals. Parliamentary budget deliberations 
are televised, and the parliamentary Research Centre analyses are published.   
Finally it can be concluded that the law making power of the parliament is 
weak mainly because of the strong performances of the unelected institutions. 
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They can easily block enactments of the parliament in final part of the 
legislative process. All factors which mentioned before can exacerbate this 
situation.     
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Chapter Six: 
              Conclusion 
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In this research the law making power of the Iranian Parliament has been explored at 
two levels: parliament in the Constitution and then parliament in reality.  As an external 
variable, constitutions are one of the important factors which can help researchers for 
better understanding legislatures. Yet it does not mean parliaments established in the 
constitutions are the same in real politics. In fact parliament as is designed in the Iranian 
Constitution and parliament in reality, and the gap between them, constitute the main 
themes of this research.      
Firstly since the constitutions have strong links with their historical background and 
their social context, the evolution of the Iranian Constitution since its establishment was 
overviewed. It was stated that absolutism and arbitrary power were the main 
characteristics of Iranian society before the Constitutionalism Movement. For the first 
time a loose alliance of heterogeneous political forces led to a public demand for the 
limitation of political power and the establishment of the first Iranian Constitution. 
Having in mind the impact of the political forces that created the first Iranian 
Constitution, we explained the place of the parliament within that by explaining the 
separation of power system according to the Constitution and in the distribution of 
political power in reality. Although constitutionally the Iranian Parliament was intended 
to be the supreme power in relation to the other power centres, two traditional forces 
which have deep root in Iranian society resisted this new phenomenon i.e. the 
parliament‟s supremacy: the power of the monarchy which had absolute political power 
since the time of ancient Persia and the power of religion which was interpreted 
exclusively by the clergy.  
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Overviewing the functions and activities of the parliament before the Islamic 
revolution and post revolutionary Iran, it might be said that the Iranian Parliament was 
always threatened by these traditional forces. The Pre-revolutionary Iranian Parliament, 
except for short periods of time during which the central political power weakened for 
what ever reason (either internally or because of the international situation), has been 
subordinated to the power of the monarchy. In fact in the First and Second Pahalavis 
Eras, not only parliament but also the executive power was under the absolute control of 
the Reza Shah and Mohammad Reza Shah. Therefore one may find a big gap between 
the power of the parliament on the basis of the Iranian Constitution and its capabilities 
in real politics. Obviously in these circumstances no political party could play any 
meaningful role in shaping the policies or participating in political power.  
After the Islamic Revolution of 1979, although the monarchy was ended, the power 
of religion and the clergy limited the role of the parliament. It was explained that severe 
clashes started between the two major political powers that contributed to the Islamic 
Revolution of 1979 i.e. secularist and religious. They tried to establish a new political 
arrangement in the Iranian Constitution which as a result of their attempts a 
contradictory Constitution emerged: within that the secular institutions such as an 
elected executive power and parliament were juxtaposed with religious institutions such 
as the religious leadership, the Guardian Council, the latter of which had roots in the 
Constitution of 1906-7.  
The post revolutionary Constitution in 1989 deepened the paradoxes of the Iranian 
Constitution by vesting absolute power in the Supreme Leader and establishing a new 
unelected political institution which had strong potential to become a parallel 
parliament. According to the new arrangements, which were enshrined in the amended 
Constitution, the puzzle of the separation of powers was explained. It was shown that 
the Iranian political regime is neither a presidential nor parliamentary nor even a hybrid 
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political regime. It has some elements of these political systems and some elements 
which belong to the theocratic political system. On this basis, two major categorisations 
of the Iranian political institutions were recognised as elected institutions, primarily the 
Majlis and the executive power, and unelected institutions including the Guardian 
Council and the Expediency Council which were directly involved in the law making 
process. It was stated that elected institutions, although under the full control of the 
unelected institutions, are directly elected by the people. On the other hand the members 
of unelected institutions either directly or indirectly are handpicked by the Supreme 
Leader.  
This categorisation of political power is important in terms of assessing the law 
making power of the parliament. It was mentioned that despite the current literature 
with its emphasis on the relationship of the legislature and executive power for 
assessing the law making power of the parliament, such an approach toward the Iranian 
Parliament may confuse the picture of its law making power. In fact, understanding the 
logic of separation of powers between elected and unelected institutions can explain the 
behaviour of the Iranian Parliament. It was stated that elected institutions, due to the 
charismatic legitimacy of the Ayatollah Khomeini, were blunted and gradually 
weakened. On the other hand, the unelected institutions expanded their power especially 
through the absolute support of the Supreme Leader as the main power holder within 
the Iranian political system. It was explained that the Guardian Council fully controlled 
the main elections including parliamentary elections through approbatory supervision. 
By disqualifying the candidates of the opposition, even those who were known as 
moderate politicians, the Guardian Council could impact upon the political composition 
of the Majlis and has done so, particularly in recent years. Also by rejecting the many 
enactments of the Assembly either in the name of having a discrepancy with the Shari‟s 
or conflicting with the Constitution it could block the Assembly‟s outputs significantly. 
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Also the Expediency Council‟s functions and authority were examined and it was stated 
that this unelected institution is potentially a legislature, but with a different philosophy 
and approach toward the law making function. It was stated that a majority of members 
of this council were appointed by the Supreme Leader and has three main functions: 
settlement of disputes between the Majlis and Guardian Council, solving difficulties of 
the State by the order of the Leader, and delineating the General Policies of the State 
after the approval of the Supreme Leader. In fact the Council acts on behalf of the 
Supreme Leader and has the right to enact policies even against the Shari‟a with 
recourse to the concept of interest of the State ( Maslahate Nezam) while the Majlis and 
Guardian Council have no such rights and capabilities. It means that the law making 
capacity of the Expediency Council can be far more than that of the Majlis. Therefore, it 
might be said there is no balance between the power of the elected institutions and 
unelected institutions since the latter are vested with more political power 
constitutionally. 
On the basis of above-mentioned analysis of the political institutions and the logic of 
the separation of powers, in the sixth chapter theories and hypothesises of the thesis 
were examined. Since the political composition of the executive power and the Majlis is 
important for assessing the law making power of the parliament, therefore two different 
terms of Majlis were chosen for study: the Sixth Majlis which was dominated by the 
Reformist camp and the Seventh Majlis in which the majority were New Conservatives. 
The interaction of the Majlis and executive during the budget process was studied in 
these two terms of the parliament. Also it was stated that the Majlis according to the 
legal framework of law making in the budget process has no limitation except observing 
the Five-Year Development Plans as mid term developing plans which in fact act as a 
framework for the annual budget bill. 
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Through analysing its political context, it was explained that the Sixth Majlis was 
coincided with the Reformist government of the Khatami who could pass his policies 
through the Majlis with no serious troubles, especially the budget bill. It was shown that 
the Sixth Majlis could alter the government‟s budget bill only 14.3 percent on average. 
Despite the Majlis being an elected institution, the Guardian Council could reject 
several key government bills and MPs‟ proposals, including the budget bill. In fact 
when the executive and the Majlis are being dominated by the Reformists the main 
clash over policies is not between them but between elected institutions and unelected 
institutions. This is the consequence of the duality (theocracy versus democracy) of the 
political institutions within the Iranian political system. This research shows that there is 
no political power balance between elected and unelected institutions and in practice the 
elected institutions are subordinate to the unelected institutions during law making 
process which in turn ultimately leads to weakness of the Majlis.   
 Therefore, the situation of the Sixth Majlis in terms of its law making power can be 
formulated as follow:  
 Reformist executive power (elected institution) + parliament with Reformist majority 
(elected institution) + Conservative Guardian Council (unelected institution) + 
Conservative Expediency Council (unelected institution) =   parliament with little or no 
law making power. 
According to this formulation the Guardian Council can use its veto power against 
the policies enacted by the Majlis and reject the whole or parts of the Majlis enactments 
and should the Majlis insist on its own enactments and refuse to accept the Gardian 
Council‟s vetos, then the interference of the Expediency Council is inevitable. The 
decision making function of the Expediency Council in this situation will increase 
considerably as was the case in the Sixth Majlis. Although the Expediency Council 
constitutionally must only mediate between the Majlis and the Guardian Council, in 
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practice the Expediency Council has proposed and enacted its own policies several 
times. That is why it can be said that the Expediency Council can be deemed a potential 
law making institution parallel to the Majlis.     
Following the Seventh Parliamentary Elections, the New Conservatives dominated 
the Majlis in 2004 in the final year of Khatami‟s presidency. It was shown that during 
this year (2004-5) the law making power of the Majlis tremendously increased and the 
Majlis could block the main policies of the executive power. In addition the Guardian 
Council backed the New Conservative Majlis and paralysed Khatami‟s government; 
Khatami described his government as an Office Coordinator (Tadarokatchi) which 
shows he had not enough authority and power to follow its policies. Khatami had to 
withdraw some of his major bills due to considerable amendments and alterations which 
were made by the majority New Conservative Seventh Majlis.    
Therefore, it might be said that the first year of the Seventh Majlis (New 
Conservative majority) the law making power of the Iranian Parliament matched the 
third hypothesis of this research according to which: 
 Reformist executive power (elected institution) + parliament with Conservative or 
New Conservative majority (elected institution) + Conservative Guardian Council 
(unelected institution) + Conservative Expediency Council (unelected institution) = 
parliament with strong law making power or policy influencer.  
In this case the law making power of the Majlis reaches its maximum level because 
the essential power centers, which are mainly vested in the hands of unelected 
institutions (Guardian Council and Expediency Council), support the Majlis and so they 
can significantly challenge the policies of the executive. The decisive factor in this 
hypothesis is the political composition of the Majlis. The Conservatives always have a 
majority in the unelected institutons, when they also win the majority seats of the 
Majlis, the policy battlefield changes. In such circumstances, instead of relying on 
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unelected institutions, Majlis can easily reject or substantially change the content of the 
bills submitted by the government. This was the case in Seyed Mohammad Khatami‟s 
last year of presidency when the power of the executive reaches its minimum level and 
it had to withdraw some of its principal bills.   
This hypothesis can be tested once again in the Presidential Elections of June 2009. 
If the candidates of the Reformist (currently Seyed Mohammad Khatami, former Iranian 
President from 1997 till 2004 has more chance amongst the Reformist candidates) win 
the elections, his government would be challenged by the Eighth Majlis which is under 
the control of a majority of the New Conservatives. 
 The relationship of the Majlis and executive power changed when Ahmadinejad 
from the New Conservative faction won the Presidential Elections of 2005. So for the 
first time in the history of the Islamic Republic of Iran, homogenous political factions 
occupied the elected and unelected institutions. In fact this situation was hypothesized 
as follow:  
Conservative or New Conservative executive power (elected institution) + 
Conservative or New Conservative parliament (elected institution) + Conservative 
Guardian Council (unelected institution) + Conservative Expediency Council 
(unelected institution) = parliament with strong law making power. 
As it was analysed this hypothesis cannot be right. Apart from exceptional bills the 
Ahmadinejad Government could pass its policies easily through the New Conservative 
Seventh Majlis. This can be explained by the sympathy of the Supreme Leader and the 
Guardian Council with the Ninth Government. It can be said that the variable which is 
decisive in this situation in the relationship of the Majlis and the executive is their 
closeness to the main political power centers. Either of them can be more supported and 
play a more powerful role during the law making process. As was explained, in the 
Ninth Government (the New Conservative) which coincided with the three years of the 
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Seventh Majlis (Majority New Conservative) the subordination of the Majlis to the 
executive power increased considerably, with Ahmadinejad‟s Government being 
strongly supported by the Supreme Leader and the institutions under his control.  
Therefore the initial hypothesis can be reformulated as follows: 
Conservative or New Conservative executive power (elected institution) + 
Conservative or New Conservative parliament (elected institution) + Conservative 
Guardian Council (unelected institution) + Conservative Expediency Council 
(unelected institution) = parliament with little or no law making power 
It should be noted that, instead of the Guardian Council during the budget process in 
the Seventh Majlis, the Expediency Council played a more active role and strongly 
intervened in budget law making process. This can be explained by saying that the 
executive power and Majlis were dominated by the New Conservatives who had a close 
relationship with the Guardian Council, while the Expediency Council dominated by 
Moderate Conservatives who did not agree with the radical policies of the Ahmadinejad 
Government.  
The final hypothesis of this research, which has remained unexamined, is: 
Conservative or New Conservative executive power (elected institution) + 
parliament with Reformist majority (elected institution) + Conservative Guardian 
Council (unelected institution) + Conservative Expediency Council (unelected 
institution) = parliament with little or no law making power. 
The Iranian political system has not experienced an instance of this political 
composition yet. However on the basis of the analyses which  have been done in this 
research, it might be said that in this situation the Majlis law making power may reach 
its minimum level of law making power. 
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  These hypotheses which show the different levels of the law making power of the 
Majlis in different scenarios (political composition of the elected and unelected 
institutions) according to Norton‟s typology can be summarized as Table 6-1 shows: 
 
Table (6-1): Law making power of the Majlis according to the poltical composition of the 
elected and unelected institutions 
 
Elected institutions 
 
Unelected institutions 
 
 
Law 
making 
power of 
the Majlis 
 
Political 
composition of 
the Executive 
 
Political 
composition of 
the Majlis 
 
Political 
composition 
of the 
Guardian 
Council 
 
Political 
composition 
of the 
Expediency 
Council 
 
Majority 
Reformist 
 
Majority 
Reformist 
 
Majority 
Conservative 
 
Majority 
Conservative 
 
Little/no 
law 
making 
power 
 
Majority 
Reformist 
 
Majority 
Conservative/New 
Conservative 
 
Majority 
Conservative 
 
Majority 
Conservative 
Strong law 
making 
power/ 
policy 
influener 
 
Majority 
Conservative/New 
Conservative 
 
Majority 
Conservative/New 
Conservative 
 
Majority 
Conservative 
 
Majority 
Conservative 
 
Little/no 
law 
making 
power 
 
Majority 
Conservative/New 
Conservative 
 
Majority 
Reformist 
 
Majority 
Conservative 
 
Majority 
Conservative 
 
Little/no 
law 
making 
power 
 
      
Although the Iranian Parliament generally tends to be weak for implementing its law 
making power, whenever the Traditional Conservative or New Conservative dominates 
the Majlis and the Reformists take control of the executive the law making power of the 
Majlis increases, and, depending on the level of unelected institutions‟ support, the 
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Majlis would be either able to influence policies (policy influencer) or would have 
strong law making power on the basis of Norton‟s typology.  
 
Future research:  
  
   In this thesis, the main limitations of the Iranian Parliament within its constitutional 
framework have been examined. It was shown how much institutions other than the 
executive can directly and significantly impact upon the law making power of the 
Majlis. Obviously, the influences of these institutions are not limited to the law making 
function of the Majlis. Also the formal institutions enshrined in the Constitution are not 
the only factors which can confine the power of the Majlis. Therefore this research can 
be developed by focusing on the other functions of the Majlis and the other external 
variables which have strong links with the functions of the Majlis: 
Regarding the uniqueness of the Iranian political system in terms of combining the 
theocracy with some elements of representative democracy, the importance and 
effectiveness of the representative and legitimation functions of the Majlis can be 
explored from the legislative studies perspective. 
  A lack of modern and disciplined political parties and interest groups which shape 
the relationships between political institutions such as executive and parliament is one 
of the characteristics of the Iranian political system. Absence of the organised political 
parties, both inside and outside of the Majlis, and its impact upon the strength of the 
parliament is one of the unknown areas of the research which can crucially lead to better 
understanding of the Majlis and the parliamentarians‟ behaviour. Instead of political 
parties, political factions have a leading role whithin the internal organisation of the 
Majlis. They are very active inside the Specialized Commissions which are located in 
the heart of the internal organisation of the Majlis. Despite their importance there are 
 248 
 
not comprehensive studies about them. The mechanisms of the allocation of seats to the 
political factions inside the commissions and the decision making process can be the 
subject of an independent research.                                 
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